Ending a Tenancy in Hong Kong: Which Forum, How It Ends, What You Can Recover

This article is written from the current text of seven Ordinances: the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7), the Lands Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 17), the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219), the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) and the Estate Agents Ordinance (Cap. 511). The version-in-force date of each is given in Sources.

Introduction

When a tenancy ends — or when one side wants out before it ends — there are really only two questions. When can I leave, or when must I? And what happens to the money?

The second is the expensive one. Not because of the risk of losing, but because of the risk of filing in the wrong place: choosing a forum that is not permitted by statute to hear your claim, discovering it months later, and finding that a limitation period has been running throughout.

Four bodies deal with Hong Kong tenancy disputes: the Small Claims Tribunal, the Lands Tribunal, the District Court and the Court of First Instance. They are not alternatives you pick between on convenience. Cap. 338 section 5(2) is blunt about it:

A claim that falls inside the Small Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction is not actionable anywhere else. That is a locked door, not a preference.

This article is ordered by what a reader actually needs: first which door, then what happens behind it (lawyers, costs, appeals), then how a tenancy is brought to an end, what happens on rent arrears, how deposits work, the separate regime for subdivided units, and finally what a landlord is not permitted to do.

First: Which Forum Hears Your Case

The Small Claims Tribunal: $75,000 or less, and exclusively

Cap. 338 section 5(1): "The tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims specified in the Schedule." The Schedule opens at paragraph 1:

A claim for the return of a deposit is a monetary claim founded in contract. A Hong Kong residential deposit is typically two months' rent — at HK$18,000 a month, HK$36,000, well inside the band. So most deposit disputes belong in the Small Claims Tribunal, not the Lands Tribunal.

Paragraph 1 does not stop at $75,000. It carries a proviso that removes whole classes of claim:

The third column is this site's inference, not the Schedule's content. The proviso quoted above says only that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction; where a removed claim goes instead is settled by the jurisdiction provisions of other Ordinances (Cap. 25, Cap. 453, Cap. 511 and so on), and the Schedule names no forum at all. The first two columns are the provision itself.

And the proviso is not the last word — the next paragraph runs the other way. Schedule paragraph 1A:

So limb (d) removes anything within the Labour Tribunal's jurisdiction, but a claim transferred across from the Labour Tribunal under Cap. 25 section 10(2) is one the Small Claims Tribunal may hear. Exclusion and transfer are different things.

Who most needs this: of the seven, two rows speak directly to a landlord-and-tenant reader — (f) and (e). Take (f) first. In the Ordinance's words: "(f)any action or proceeding for an order for the costs of and incidental to a dispute in relation to which no proceedings have been commenced in the tribunal." Meaning — if you and the other side argued, you instructed a solicitor to write letters, and the matter settled without proceedings, you cannot then start a claim purely to recover those costs. The Lands Tribunal has a very close restriction, Cap. 17 section 8(12): "Except as provided by any other Ordinance, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to make an order for the costs of and incidental to a dispute in relation to which no proceedings have been commenced in the Tribunal." Two forums, one position: no proceedings, no costs order.

They are not identical, though. Section 8(12) opens with a saving — "Except as provided by any other Ordinance" — so another Ordinance can give the power back to the Lands Tribunal. Limb (f) of the Cap. 338 proviso carries no such saving. That is the difference in the two texts; nothing is said here about whether any particular Ordinance supplies the exception.

Then limb (e) — estate agents. Tenancy disputes very often involve a licensed agent — how the commission was calculated, whether it was earned, whether the agency did what it agreed to — so this limb repays reading carefully. In full:

Two conditions have to hold together: the action must have been submitted to the Estate Agents Authority, and the Authority must not have declined jurisdiction under or pursuant to Cap. 511 section 49.

So what does section 49 provide? It defines which disputes can reach the Authority at all. Section 49(1):

Three things follow: the dispute must be between a licensed estate agent and his client or clients, and about that agent's commission or other fee; it must relate to the amount or to how it is calculated or payable; and it can only be referred with the agreement of the agent and of each client. The Authority then has its own gate — section 49(2):

How we read it: limb (e) therefore does not remove "tenancy disputes involving an estate agent". It removes a commission or fee dispute that has actually been referred under section 49 and that the Authority has not declined. Where there was no referral, where the other side would not agree to one, or where the Authority has declined, a commission claim of $75,000 or less remains a Small Claims Tribunal matter. Read (e) broadly and you will send away a claim that belonged in the Tribunal.

And a threshold sits in front of the agent's own claim. Cap. 511 section 45(1):

In other words — without an estate agency agreement in the prescribed form, entered into and executed while the agent was licensed, the agent has no cause of action for the commission at all. (Editorial Note: this section came into operation on 1 November 1999 only for the purposes of its application to and in relation to any property in Hong Kong used wholly or primarily for human habitation — so the rule itself is a partial commencement, covering only residential-use property.) That is a common feature of tenancy transactions, and section 49(1)(c) makes compliance with section 45 a precondition of referring the dispute to the Authority in the first place.

A deposit claim falls within none of the proviso's limbs, so "$75,000 or less means the Small Claims Tribunal" holds for deposits. It does not travel to other claim types. A money lender's claim, an employment claim or a defamation claim stays out of the Tribunal however small it is.

Will the $75,000 move? It can, and without amending the body of the Ordinance. Cap. 338 section 6: "The Legislative Council may, by resolution, amend the Schedule." The Schedule — the $75,000 with it — is amendable by resolution. The figure stated here is the one standing in the text this article works from.

The District Court: above $75,000

Cap. 336 section 32(1):

The $3,000,000 is not simply "what you are asking for". Section 32(2) defines the computation:

So admitted set-offs, admitted debts and admitted contributory negligence come off before the figure is tested. A tenant claiming HK$3,050,000 who admits HK$100,000 of arrears is claiming HK$2,950,000 for this purpose, and remains within the District Court.

How does section 32(1) coexist with Cap. 338 section 5(2)? On their face they collide: one gives the District Court jurisdiction up to $3,000,000, the other says a claim within the Small Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction is not actionable in any other court. The hinge is Cap. 336 section 40:

So the money jurisdiction in Part 4 of Cap. 336 ("Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure", which contains both section 32 and section 40) expressly gives way to Cap. 338. Above $75,000 goes to the District Court is not a convention; it is what sections 40 and 5(2) produce together.

Above $3,000,000 does not automatically mean the Court of First Instance either. Cap. 336 section 34(1):

Same device as Cap. 338 section 9(1) — abandon the excess — and section 34(3) spells out the price: "The judgment of the Court in an action limited under this section is in full discharge of all demands in the cause of action." Abandoned is abandoned.

Possession is a separate track and does not follow the money limit at all. Cap. 336 section 35:

Note "whichever is the least". The section names three figures — the annual rent, the rateable value determined under Cap. 116, and the annual value — takes the lowest of them, and tests that against $320,000. It is not a rateable-value test alone. This $320,000 limit and the $3,000,000 in section 32(1) run independently.

Both are movable, like the $75,000. Cap. 336 section 73A: "The amounts mentioned in sections 32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 49, 52, 53A(5), 68B and 69B may be amended by resolution of the Legislative Council."

Filing in the wrong forum need not mean starting again. Cap. 336 section 42: "The Court may, either of its own motion or on the application of any party, order at any stage the transfer to the Court of First Instance or the Lands Tribunal of all or part of any action or proceedings before it which are within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance or the Lands Tribunal, as the case may be." The Lands Tribunal has the matching provision in Cap. 17 section 8A(1): "The Tribunal may transfer to the Court of First Instance or the District Court any proceedings instituted before the Tribunal which are within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance or the District Court, but which—(a)are not within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or(b)the Tribunal considers should in the interests of justice be so transferred." Section 8A(2): "Proceedings may be transferred under subsection (1) at any stage."

The Lands Tribunal: an enumerated jurisdiction, not a "tenancy court"

The Lands Tribunal is often described as the tenancy court. The Ordinance does not say that. Cap. 17 section 8 confers jurisdiction subsection by subsection. The one closest to this article is section 8(6):

The money orders are in section 8(8), and they are conditional:

The opening words carry the whole point. The section 8(8) money orders hang off an application for possession or ejectment, or an application for a new tenancy under Part IV. Without such an application, there is no section 8(8).

So how does a tenant with a deposit claim and nothing else reach the Lands Tribunal? Two routes:

• Cap. 338 section 5(3) — "A claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal may be brought in another court if there is included in such claim a claim for some other relief, redress or remedy, other than a claim for costs." Join the deposit claim to a possession or ejectment application and section 5(2)'s monopoly no longer bites.
• Transfer. Cap. 17 section 8(8A): "The Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to determine any claim or counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim transferred to it under section 7 or 10 of the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)."

Two further subsections matter to a tenant:

• Section 8(8AA) — "The Tribunal has jurisdiction, on an application, to determine whether any tenancy is a regulated tenancy for the purposes of Part IVA of the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7)." Cap. 7 section 120AAE is to the same effect: "A person having an interest in any premises may apply to the Tribunal to determine whether or not a tenancy for the premises is a regulated tenancy for the purposes of this Part."
• Section 8(9) — "In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall have the same jurisdiction to grant remedies and reliefs, equitable or legal, as the Court of First Instance." This is one source of the Tribunal's power to grant equitable relief, including relief against forfeiture.

Section 8 is not the whole of the Tribunal's tenancy jurisdiction. Section 8(5) is an open-ended provision:

Cap. 7 is one such Ordinance — section 8(5) speaks of an Ordinance, not a section; what is vested in the Tribunal is Cap. 7, and section 127A is the provision inside it that does the vesting. Section 127A sits in Part V:

Part V does not mean non-domestic tenancies, and this is an easy thing to get wrong. Section 121(1) starts from every tenancy: "Save as otherwise provided in this section, this Part shall apply to every tenancy (which expression shall wherever it occurs in this Part include sub-tenancies unless the context otherwise requires) whether the same be effected orally or in writing and notwithstanding any provision in such tenancy, including any provision purporting specifically to exclude the provisions of this Part." Sections 121(2) and (3) then remove classes one by one. Section 121(2)(c) removes "a tenancy to which Part IV applies" — the line is drawn by Part, not by residential-versus-commercial use. And section 116(2)(a) in turn puts a tenancy "to which Part I, II or IVA applies" outside Part IV. Put the two together: a regulated tenancy of a subdivided unit (Part IVA) is a domestic tenancy, but because it is not a Part IV tenancy, section 121(2)(c) does not remove it from Part V. How Part V and Part IVA overlap is not something this article concludes on (see item 7 of Matters this article does not address), but equating Part V with non-domestic tenancies is not an accurate statement of the test.

So the two cases separate — by Part, not by use:

• A tenancy to which Part V applies (in practice most often an office or a shop, but the scope is fixed by sections 121(2) and (3), not by what the premises are used for) — the Lands Tribunal takes it under section 8(5) together with Cap. 7 section 127A(a), which lets the Tribunal "entertain and determine any dispute or difference which may arise under this Part between a landlord and a tenant, or a tenant and a sub-tenant, or any of them, including any dispute as to the rent that is payable for, or the right to possession of, any premises". This route does not run through section 8(8) and needs no possession element: section 127A(a) is an independent source of jurisdiction.
• A tenancy to which Part IV applies — an ordinary domestic tenancy — has had its own dispute provisions largely repealed, leaving Cap. 17 sections 8(6) and (8), which do require a possession or ejectment element.

The answer below, that a bare deposit claim cannot reach the Lands Tribunal, is an answer about Part IV domestic tenancies. A deposit or rent dispute under a Part V tenancy travels by section 127A(a), and this article does not run the two together.

Then read section 8(10), which qualifies both of the above:

Most of the Part IV and Part V machinery that gave residential tenants security of tenure was repealed in 2004. The section 8(6) and (8) powers survive; the renewal system they were built around does not. An ordinary residential tenant in Hong Kong today has no statutory right of renewal when the term expires — regulated tenancies of subdivided units aside, on which see below.

One table

Three limits on this table, to be held alongside it:

• Section 129(1) is not just a "$100,000 or less rateable value" test. The section also requires a tenancy "at will or for any term not exceeding 7 years", premises "upon which no fine has been reserved or made payable", the term or interest having ended or been duly determined, a demand for possession by the owner, and refusal or neglect to quit. The row above states only one of the entry gateways, not the full list — see the full list in "District Court: small tenements recovery" below.
• The first three rows are the route for a Part IV domestic tenancy. A dispute under a Part V tenancy — including the rent payable and the right to possession — has an independent route under Cap. 17 section 8(5) with Cap. 7 section 127A(a), which is not subject to the section 8(8) possession requirement. See above.
• The third row is not a dead end. A plaintiff above $3,000,000 may abandon the excess under Cap. 336 section 34(1) and stay in the District Court; the price is section 34(3) — the judgment is "in full discharge of all demands in the cause of action". The same device exists above $75,000 under Cap. 338 section 9(1).

Working the numbers — a combination that really happens. Rent HK$18,000 a month, deposit two months, HK$36,000. The tenant moves out; the landlord keeps the whole deposit, says the unit needs HK$50,000 of repairs and counterclaims.

• Tenant's side: HK$36,000, which is $75,000 or less → Small Claims Tribunal, and only there.
• Landlord's counterclaim: HK$50,000, also inside the band → the same tribunal can deal with it.
• What if the counterclaim were HK$90,000? Cap. 338 section 10(1): "Where any counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim in proceedings in the tribunal is a monetary claim which is not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the tribunal shall order that the proceedings on the counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim be transferred to the Board, the Labour Tribunal, the Lands Tribunal, the District Court or the Court of First Instance." Only the counterclaim proceedings are transferred — the tenant's own claim does not leave. Section 10(2) goes on: where such an order is made and judgment on the claim is given for the claimant, execution on it shall, unless the tribunal otherwise orders, be stayed until the transferred counterclaim proceedings have been determined.
• A landlord who wants to stay may abandon the excess. Section 10(3): "Where a defendant has a counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim which exceeds the monetary amount mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Schedule and which, but for the excess, would be within the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the defendant may abandon the excess and thereupon the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim, so, however, that the defendant shall not recover in the counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim an amount exceeding that mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Schedule." The HK$15,000 abandoned is genuinely gone; it cannot be pursued in a second claim. Section 10(4) says so: "Where a tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine a counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim by virtue of this section, the award of the tribunal on the counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim shall be in full discharge of all demands in respect thereof, and judgment shall be deemed to be entered accordingly."

(These figures are worked from the statutory limits quoted above, to show how the provisions operate. They are not an assessment of any reader's case.)

Behind the Door: Lawyers, Costs, Appeals

These three differ completely between the forums, and none of them depends on the amount. People choose a forum on the amount and are caught here.

Lawyers

Small Claims Tribunal: barristers and solicitors have no right of audience. Cap. 338 section 19(2):

That is not a suggestion that you need not instruct one — a lawyer cannot appear for you at all, unless acting on their own behalf as a party or in section 35A insulting-behaviour proceedings. A solicitor can prepare your submissions and your bundle.

But a bar on lawyers appearing is not the same as a requirement that you appear yourself. Section 19(1) sets out positively who has a right of audience:

Three limbs matter to a landlord-and-tenant reader. (b) where the landlord is a limited company, an officer or servant of it appears. (c) a partnership appears by one of its members. (d), the important one — with the tribunal's leave you may authorise in writing someone who is not counsel or a solicitor to appear as your representative. So it is inaccurate to say you have to stand up yourself: section 19(2) bars barristers and solicitors, while section 19(1)(d) opens a door that requires leave.

Section 16(1) is the companion: "The hearing of proceedings in the tribunal shall be conducted in an informal manner."

Lands Tribunal: the Ordinance assumes legal representation. Cap. 17 section 12(8) defines a "legal representative" as counsel or a solicitor conducting litigation on behalf of a party, and sections 12(3) and (4) allow the Tribunal to order a legal representative to meet wasted costs. Section 10(5)(a) at the same time provides:

How we read it: both forums are told to be informal, but one is informality without lawyers and the other is informality with them. That distinction shapes your preparation far more than the amount in dispute does.

Costs: winning may not get your legal fees back

Small Claims Tribunal. Section 24(1):

Read what is awardable: expenses necessarily incurred and salary or wages lost in attending the hearing, plus the same for a witness. Legal fees are not mentioned — consistently with section 19(2), because no lawyer appears.

What does the opening "Subject to subsection (2)" point to? Section 24(2): "In making an award of costs under this section, the tribunal shall include a direction as to the amount to be paid by each party who is liable to pay costs." It is a duty to give a direction, not a second monetary ceiling.

Lands Tribunal. Cap. 17 section 12(1):

That is an at-large discretion — ordinary civil litigation costs. A losing party can be ordered to pay the other side's legal costs, and those costs routinely exceed the amount in dispute. A HK$36,000 deposit fight in a costs-shifting forum is not a HK$36,000 risk.

One carve-out is worth remembering, Cap. 7 section 119R, for proceedings under Part IV:

Appeals: narrow on both sides

Small Claims Tribunal. Section 28(1):

A question of law alone, or want of jurisdiction. A finding of fact you disagree with, a witness you thought unreliable — not grounds. And section 28(3): "A refusal by the Court of First Instance to grant leave to appeal shall be final."

The time limit is 7 days, and it is the easiest thing in this article to lose a right by. Cap. 338 section 28(2):

Taken in turn: the clock starts on the day the written award or order is served on you; if within that same 7 days you ask the tribunal for its reasons, the clock restarts and runs 7 days from service of the reasons; and limb (iii) allows the Registrar of the High Court to extend "on good cause" — but an extension has to be applied for; it is not automatic.

There is a second tier above that, and it is 7 days too. Cap. 338 section 29A(1):

The threshold is much higher than at the first tier: not merely a question of law, but a question of law of general public importance. Section 29A(2) requires the application to be in the prescribed form setting out the question of law and to be lodged with the Registrar of the High Court; section 29A(3): "A refusal by the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal shall be final."

An appeal does not stop enforcement. Section 31:

Lands Tribunal. Cap. 17 section 11(2):

Again a point of law, and leave is generally required first — but section 11AA(1) itself opens "Subject to subsection (2)", and subsection (2) is precisely an exception: "Subject to subsection (4), an appeal lies as of right to a presiding officer from a judgment, order or decision of a registrar." In other words, an appeal against a judgment, order or decision of a registrar (as distinct from the Tribunal itself) lies as of right, without leave, subject to subsection (4) — it is only an appeal against a decision of the Tribunal itself that needs leave under section 11AA(1). Section 11AA(1): "Subject to subsection (2), no appeal may be made under section 11(2) unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Tribunal or the Court of Appeal." The threshold is section 11AA(6):

Beyond that there is nothing. Section 11AB: "No appeal lies from a decision of the Court of Appeal as to whether or not leave to appeal to it should be granted."

Review has a one-month window. Section 11A(1): "The Tribunal may, within 1 month from the date of any decision by it, decide to review that decision and, on such grounds as it may think sufficient, may set aside, reverse, vary or confirm it."

Who most needs this: anyone who assumes that a wrong outcome can be appealed. Both forums answer largely the same way — law, not fact — and an appeal against the Tribunal's own decision generally requires leave, with a refusal of leave being final (an appeal against a registrar's decision, by contrast, lies as of right). The preparation has to happen at the first hearing.

Interest

The interest provisions are forum by forum, and they are not interchangeable. Which one applies depends on which door you went through.

Small Claims Tribunal — Cap. 338 section 33. This is the provision a deposit claim actually uses, because that is the forum a deposit claim goes to. Section 33(1):

So interest can run from the date the cause of action arose, not from the award. For a tenant chasing a deposit, that is the day it should have been returned. Section 33(2) widens it further:

Limb (a) is worth remembering: you do not have to have claimed interest in your filing for the tribunal to award it. Interest after the award is in section 33(3): "An award shall carry interest at the rate specified in subsection (4) on the aggregate amount thereof, or on such part thereof as for the time being remains unsatisfied, from the date of the award until satisfaction." The rate itself is in section 33(4): "The rate of interest specified for the purposes of subsections (1) and (3) shall be the rate from time to time applicable to judgment debts under section 50 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)." — Cap. 336 section 50 is not among the provisions read for this article, so no rate is stated here.

District Court — Cap. 336 section 49. Section 49(1):

The same structure: it runs from the date when the cause of action arose. One subsection bears directly on the money thresholds above — section 49(7): "In determining, for the purposes of section 32, 33, 36 or 37, whether an amount exceeds or is less than the amount specified in those sections, the Court shall not take account of any interest that may be ordered under this section or of any order for interest made under this section." Interest is left out when the $3,000,000 is tested.

Lands Tribunal — Cap. 17 section 12B(1). This one governs the Lands Tribunal and neither of the other two:

What the three share is that interest reaches back to the cause of action; what differs is how the rate is fixed and which body may award it. Compensation payable by a subdivided-unit sub-tenant is the exception: Cap. 7 section 120AAZK(10) expressly disapplies Cap. 336 section 49 and Cap. 17 section 12B — see below.

Limitation: the clock the introduction referred to

The introduction said that the expensive part of choosing the wrong forum is discovering it months later, with a limitation period running throughout. The period itself is in none of the chapters above; it is in the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347). Section 4(1):

A claim for the return of a deposit is founded on simple contract and falls in section 4(1)(a) — six years, running from the date the cause of action accrued. Where the tenancy is under seal, section 4(3) applies instead: "An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance."

Why this belongs next to the forum question: filing in a body that cannot hear your claim does not stop the clock — Cap. 338 section 5(2) will not help you. That is the concrete content of the sentence in the introduction.

(Nothing is said here about when any particular cause of action accrues, or about the postponement, acknowledgment and part-payment provisions of Cap. 347 — see item 12 of Matters this article does not address.)

How a Tenancy Ends

1. Expiry of the term

A fixed term ends when it ends, and for an ordinary domestic tenancy (Part IV) or a Part V tenancy the Ordinance requires no notice from either party. The point to watch is what follows: if the tenant stays and the landlord keeps taking rent, a periodic tenancy may arise, and ending that is a question of notice.

A regulated tenancy of a subdivided unit is different. The expiry of a Part IVA first term is not simply the end of it: section 120AAS(1) requires the landlord to make a second term offer within the offer period, and section 120AAW(2) treats the offer as made and accepted where the landlord does not. So the idea that the term simply ends and nobody has to say anything is wrong for a Part IVA first term — see Renewal: no offer means an offer below.

2. Notice — what the Ordinance says, and what it does not

Cap. 7 section 115 defines "notice to quit" for Part IV (domestic tenancies) as:

The definition fixes no period. It refers the length of notice back to the tenancy's own express or implied provisions.

Across the provisions read for this article — Cap. 7 Parts IV, IVA, V and VI, and Caps 17, 219, 336, 338 and 347 — none prescribes a notice period for ending an ordinary residential periodic tenancy. Part V once contained such provisions; sections 122, 124 and 127 were repealed by the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 (16 of 2004). The familiar "one month for a monthly tenancy, six months for a yearly one" and "notice must expire at the end of a complete period" are common-law rules, not provisions of any of those chapters. In practice the reliable answer is in your own tenancy agreement.

Service, by contrast, is statutory. Cap. 7 section 119Y(1):

Section 119Y(2) adds that a certificate purporting to be signed by the person who effected service is prima facie evidence of the facts of service stated in it. So registered post is not a legal requirement — it is an evidential convenience. Four methods are permitted: personal service, post, leaving it with an adult occupier, and affixing a copy to a prominent part of the premises.

3. Break clauses

"Live term" and "dead term" are market vocabulary; neither expression appears in Cap. 7 in either language. A break clause works exactly as drafted — the form of notice, its length, and the earliest date it can be given. The Ordinance neither adds requirements here nor supplies a clause where the tenancy has none.

So what if there is no break clause and the tenant wants out early? This is the commonest situation of all, and the answer has two halves:

• A regulated tenancy of a subdivided unit (Part IVA) has a statutory exit. Sections 120AAZH(1) to (3) give the tenant a right to terminate that does not depend on the agreement — 30 days' written notice, with a termination date no earlier than the last day of the first year of the term. Two further routes exist under section 120AAZ(3)(b) (no written tenancy agreement) and Schedule 7 section 6(2) (no repairs). See Regulated Tenancies of Subdivided Units below.
• For an ordinary domestic tenancy (Part IV) or a Part V tenancy, none of Caps 7, 17, 219, 336, 338 and 347 as read for this article gives the tenant any statutory right to terminate early. With no break clause, what is left is the route under "4. Agreement" above — negotiate it, and record it in writing.

And what happens if the tenant simply leaves? Whether rent continues to fall due, whether the landlord can recover the shortfall, how the deposit is treated, and whether the landlord must try to re-let to reduce the loss are questions of contract and common law. They are outside all of the chapters read for this article, and nothing is stated about them (see item 13 of Matters this article does not address). The one thing that can be said with confidence is that the proposition that moving out by itself ends the tenancy has no support in any of those chapters.

4. Agreement

The parties can agree to end early at any time, for any reason or none, in writing. In practice the agreement records the end date, how the deposit is handled, the condition on handover, and a mutual release.

5. Breach and forfeiture — 15 days, and the subsection everybody stops short of

This is where the mistakes are.

Step one: does your tenancy contain a condition for forfeiture? If not, the Ordinance supplies one.

An ordinary domestic tenancy sits in Cap. 7 Part IV. Section 116(1): "Subject to subsection (2), this Part applies to any domestic tenancy— (a)notwithstanding any provision in such tenancy, including any provision purporting generally or specifically to exclude this Part; and(b)including any domestic tenancy to which Part I or II has ceased to apply." (Section 116(2)(a) excludes a tenancy "to which Part I, II or IVA applies")

Section 116(2) removes several further classes beyond (a), not individually mentioned above, and they matter for whether any of this applies to your tenancy at all. Section 116(2)(b) excludes a tenancy of land unbuilt on. Section 116(2)(ba) excludes a tenancy of agricultural land. Section 116(2)(bb) excludes a tenancy where the landlord is the employer and the tenant is the employee in possession of the premises under employment terms requiring vacation on ceasing employment. Section 116(2)(bc) excludes a tenancy "held from the Government, the Hong Kong Housing Authority, the Hong Kong Housing Society or the Hong Kong Settlers Housing Corporation Limited, or a sub-tenancy created out of such a tenancy". Section 116(2)(bd) excludes a tenancy "in writing created after 18 December 1981 for a fixed term of 5 years or longer which contains no provision—(i)for earlier determination by the landlord otherwise than by forfeiture; and(ii)for any premium or fine or for any increase in the rent during the fixed term". Section 116(2)(c) excludes premises subsisting under a section 4 order, and section 116(2)(d) excludes a tenancy entered into under an authority under section 53(7A)(a)(ii). In other words: unbuilt land, agricultural land, employee accommodation, a tenant renting from the Government, the Housing Authority, the Housing Society or the Settlers Housing Corporation, a tenant on a qualifying long fixed-term lease, and premises affected by a section 4 order or a section 53(7A)(a)(ii) authority all sit outside Part IV altogether — including the forfeiture and notice provisions discussed below — and need to look elsewhere for the rules that apply.

Section 117(3) has a lead-in that cannot be dropped, because it limits what the subsection reaches. The lead-in is:

The asterisk points to Cap. 7's editorial note: "Commencement date: 27 December 2002." So section 117(3) applies only to a tenancy entered into on or after 27 December 2002. A tenancy entered into earlier and still running does not get its condition from this subsection. Every tenancy signed today is of course inside the limit, but the sentence is part of the provision.

After the lead-in comes section 117(3)(a):

Section 117(3)(b) covers the other drafting:

So the 15 days is the implied forfeiture trigger, not a grace period given to the tenant to catch up. The two are easily inverted.

Tenancies outside Part IV sit in Part V (in practice most often an office or a shop, but the scope is fixed by the provisions rather than by use — see above). Section 121(1): "Save as otherwise provided in this section, this Part shall apply to every tenancy (which expression shall wherever it occurs in this Part include sub-tenancies unless the context otherwise requires) whether the same be effected orally or in writing and notwithstanding any provision in such tenancy, including any provision purporting specifically to exclude the provisions of this Part." Section 121(2)(c) removes "a tenancy to which Part IV applies" and section 121(2)(a) removes "a tenancy for a fixed term of 3 years or more the agreement for which contains no provision for earlier determination of the same other than for breach of any of the provisions of the agreement or under a provision of the tenancy allowing forfeiture or determination following the destruction, or partial destruction, of or damage to the premises". Part V removes Government tenants too: section 121(2)(h) removes "a tenancy held from the Government". Section 126 is Part V's counterpart provision:

Step two: must the landlord serve a notice before re-entering? It depends which covenant is used.

Cap. 219 section 58(1) lays down a notice procedure:

Three things to take from it:

• the notice must specify the particular breach complained of;
• if the breach is capable of remedy, it must require the lessee to remedy it;
• the standard the section sets is a reasonable time — not a fixed number of days. Any "15 to 30 days" formulation is not this section. The section also requires the landlord to specify the compensation required, limb (c), which is routinely left out of summaries.

Step three — the subsection that gets missed. Section 58(10):

Read what the subsection actually preserves. It says this section does not affect "the law relating to re-entry or forfeiture or relief in case of non-payment of rent" — the words "or relief" (emphasis added here, not in the provision) carry the point. Section 58 is a saving: in the pure arrears case, re-entry, forfeiture and relief are all left to the law outside section 58.

This decides something very concrete: is a tenant who is 20 days late left with no route to relief? No. Section 58(10) removes the section 58 procedure, not relief itself — the words expressly preserve the law relating to relief. In a tenancy dispute the body exercising that general power is the Lands Tribunal, under Cap. 17 section 8(9): "In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall have the same jurisdiction to grant remedies and reliefs, equitable or legal, as the Court of First Instance." Equitable relief against forfeiture for non-payment of rent reaches the Lands Tribunal through that subsection, not through section 58(2). Section 58(13) — "court" includes the Lands Tribunal — governs the section 58 route itself.

So keep the two routes apart: landlord proceeds on the rent covenant → the section 58 notice procedure does not apply (section 117(5)(a), section 58(10)), but relief survives under the Lands Tribunal's general equitable jurisdiction in Cap. 17 section 8(9); landlord proceeds on the annoyance covenant → the whole of section 58 applies, including the section 58(2) application for relief. Reading section 58(10) as leaving a tenant in arrears with no relief at all is the result of stopping halfway through the sentence.

An article that reads section 58(1) and stops sends a tenant in arrears to a procedure that does not govern their case; an article that reads the first half of section 58(10) and stops tells them to give up a right they still have.

But Cap. 7 section 117(5) turns the question over again. Three declarations:

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Who most needs this: a tenant in arrears. Taken in order —

• If the landlord proceeds on section 117(3)(a) or (b) — the rent covenant — section 117(5)(a) subjects it to sections 58(4) and (10), and section 58(10) is the subsection that takes section 58 away. No section 58(1) notice on that route.
• But section 117(5)(c) declares that persistent delay in paying rent is unnecessary annoyance, inconvenience or disturbance. That is the covenant in section 117(3)(e) and (f).
• Section 117(5)(b) places subsections (3)(e) and (f) under sections 58(1) to (13) — the notice procedure and the relief procedure together.

Which means: the same conduct — a tenant who is habitually late — attracts no section 58 notice if the landlord proceeds on the rent covenant, and the full section 58 procedure if the landlord proceeds on the annoyance covenant. This is not academic: section 58(2) is where the tenant applies for relief.

Two points. Relief may be granted or refused, and the court is directed to the parties' conduct in deciding. And relief is not free. Section 58(3):

The landlord's reasonable solicitor's and surveyor's costs are recoverable as a debt. A tenant who wins relief may still receive a bill.

Several closing subsections to keep. Section 58(9) sits alongside section 58(10) as the second carve-out from the section: "Except in subsection (4), this section does not apply to a condition for forfeiture on the bankruptcy of the lessee or on taking in execution of the lessee’s interest." — a forfeiture condition triggered by the lessee's bankruptcy or by execution against the lessee's interest is outside section 58, just as pure arrears are. Section 58(11): "This section has effect notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary." — it cannot be contracted out of. Section 58(13): "In this section, court (法院) includes the Lands Tribunal." — which is how the Lands Tribunal grants relief under it. Section 58(14): "This section shall have effect subject to the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7) and the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)."

(Section 58(4) is the under-lessee vesting power, and the one route section 58(10) preserves for arrears.)

6. Getting the premises back: small tenements recovery

Where the tenancy has ended and the tenant will not leave, the landlord does not necessarily go to the Lands Tribunal. Cap. 7 Part VI is a separate track. Section 129(1):

Three thresholds must all be met, not two — the third is inside the passage quoted above:

• a rateable value at the time of the owner's application not exceeding $100,000;
• a tenancy at will or for a term not exceeding 7 years;
• premises upon which no fine has been reserved or made payable — the words sit in the passage quoted above, between the rateable value and the words "has ended"; where a fine has been reserved or is payable, this track is not available.

The $100,000 is movable too — section 132A: "The Legislative Council may by resolution amend the sums mentioned in sections 129 and 132."

The application carries one compulsory disclosure, and it is the switch for the 60 days below. Section 129(2):

That statement is what turns on the section 131(2) 60-day stay. The owner must say in the application whether the regulated tenancy arises out of another tenancy; if it does, section 131(2) requires the warrant to carry a 60-day stay (unless section 131(3) applies). It is the first thing a tenant should check on the application.

How is the originating summons served? Section 130:

The proviso deserves a pause. Where the defendant cannot be found, and their place of abode is unknown or cannot be entered, posting the summons on a conspicuous part of the premises is deemed good service. Which means — a tenant who is away, or who has already moved out without leaving an address, can be treated as served without ever knowing it, and then falls into the next section for not appearing. It is the most important sentence in this part for a tenant.

If the person summoned does not appear, or shows no cause, section 131(1) follows:

A bailiff may not come at night. The proviso fixes entry between 9 a.m. and 7 p.m. And limb (b) preserves the tenant's cause of action: a landlord who had no lawful right to possession when the warrant issued is not protected by it.

Section 133 goes further:

So a landlord without a lawful right to possession who obtains a warrant is deemed a trespasser by the obtaining of it, even if no entry is ever made — and the tenant who provides two sureties approved by the District Court delays execution until judgment in the action.

The bond that section 133 refers to as given "as hereinafter provided" is set out in section 134:

So the stay is not free: the bond is made to the complainant or his agent, at that complainant's or agent's cost, and can be sued on, while the proviso lets the court in that action give whatever relief on the bond is agreeable to justice.

Subdivided units carry an extra layer, below.

The Deposit

Ordinary tenancies: unregulated by these chapters

Across Caps 7, 17, 219, 336, 338 and 347 as read for this article, the only statutory rules on a rental deposit are in Cap. 7 section 120AAZC, and that section applies only to a regulated tenancy of a subdivided unit. For an ordinary residential tenancy the amount, the permitted deductions and the time for return are matters of contract; "return within a reasonable time" is a common-law concept, not a provision of any of those chapters.

What decides these disputes is evidence, not law:

• photograph the unit on the way in and on the way out, same angles, same spots;
• work through the inventory item by item;
• when a deduction is proposed, ask for it itemised and supported by an invoice or quotation;
• keep the final utility and management-fee bills and proof of payment.

(That checklist is this site's practical advice, not a statutory requirement.)

Do not treat the deposit as the last month's rent. Unless the landlord agrees in writing, unpaid rent is unpaid rent — and unpaid rent is exactly what triggers the 15-day forfeiture condition implied by section 117(3).

Regulated tenancies: fully regulated

Cap. 7 section 120AAZC(1): "This section applies if a tenant of a regulated tenancy for a subdivided unit is required to pay to the landlord a rental deposit for the tenancy."

A cap. Section 120AAZC(2):

And drafting around it does not work. Section 120AAZC(3):

What is "2 months’ rent"? The section defines it. Section 120AAZC(6):

Two things follow: it is the monthly rent payable at the commencement of the tenancy, not the rent after any increase; and it is that tenancy's commencement — where the second term tenancy carries a higher rent, the cap for it is measured from the second term's commencement.

The deadline splits two ways, and one of them has no 7 days in it at all. Section 120AAZC(4):

Limb by limb:

• Limb (a)(i) — a first term followed by a second term: the deposit is returned by "the expiry of the term". There is no 7-day element here, and no delivery of vacant possession is called for, because the tenant has not gone anywhere — the tenancy has rolled into its second term. So it is not accurate to say that the deposit on a regulated tenancy always comes back within 7 days.
• Limb (a)(ii) — a second term, or a first term not followed by a second term: vacant possession must be delivered first (on the expiry of the term or on an early termination), and the 7 days runs from that delivery.
• Limb (b): 7 days after settlement of any outstanding money.
• And the closing words: whichever is the later.

So the "7 days" belongs to the move-out; the renewal case is keyed to the expiry of the term.

What may be deducted. Section 120AAZC(5):

Regulated Tenancies of Subdivided Units: a Different Rulebook

The Ordinance's term is subdivided unit; the tenancies it regulates are regulated tenancies.

Which tenancies are caught

Cap. 7 section 120AAB(1):

Section 120AAB(2): "This Part does not apply to the tenancies specified in Schedule 6." And Schedule 6 is itself movable — section 120AAC(1): "The Secretary may, by notice published in the Gazette, amend Schedule 6."

Where it is disputed, the Lands Tribunal determines it (Cap. 17 s. 8(8AA); Cap. 7 s. 120AAE).

The tenant's early termination: 30 days' notice, but not in the first year

Section 120AAZH(1):

Section 120AAZH(2):

And then the subsection that decides it — section 120AAZH(3):

Read the two together: at least 30 days' notice, and a termination date no earlier than the last day of the first year. The first twelve months cannot be escaped — notice given in month 11 still cannot take effect before the first year has run.

What must happen on termination is in section 120AAZH(4): "The tenant must, on or before the date of termination—(a)deliver vacant possession of the subdivided unit to the landlord; and(b)settle all outstanding money payable to the landlord under the tenancy."

Two further tenant routes out:

• No written tenancy agreement. Section 120AAZ(2) lets the tenant demand in writing that the landlord serve a written agreement within 30 days. If the landlord does not, section 120AAZ(3): "If the landlord fails to serve the tenancy agreement on the tenant in accordance with subsection (2), the tenant may elect either—(a)to withhold the payment of rent until the landlord has done so; or(b)to terminate the tenancy by, within 7 days after the specified period, giving the landlord not less than 30 days’ (notice period) prior notice in writing of the termination."
• No repairs. Schedule 7 section 5 implies repairing obligations into every regulated tenancy, in five subsections. Section 5(1): "The landlord must maintain and keep in repair (where applicable)—(a)the drains, pipes and electrical wiring serving the premises exclusively; and(b)windows of the premises." Section 5(2): "The landlord must also keep in repair and proper working order the fixtures and fittings provided by the landlord in the premises." Section 5(3): "On receiving a notice from the tenant for repair of an item referred to in subsection (1) or (2), the landlord must carry out the repair as soon as practicable." Section 5(4) gives the landlord the matching right of entry: "For the purposes of subsection (3), the landlord may, by giving not less than 2 days’ prior notice to the tenant, enter the premises to—(a)inspect the damage;(b)assess the need for the repair; and(c)(as the case requires) carry out the repair."

Section 5(5) is the last subsection, and the one that is lost by stopping at 5(3): "However, if the damage to the item is caused by the wilful or negligent act of—(a)the tenant;(b)an occupier (other than the tenant) of the premises; or(c)a person permitted by the tenant to be on the premises, the landlord is not responsible for the maintenance and repair of the item under subsection (1) or (2)." So where the damage was caused by the wilful or negligent act of the tenant, another occupier, or someone the tenant permitted to be on the premises — a visitor, a person living there — the landlord has no obligation under section 5(1) or (2); and with no obligation there is no failure to fulfil one, so the section 6 route out closes with it.

Then comes the termination right. Schedule 7 section 6(1): "This section applies if the landlord fails to fulfil an obligation under section 5 of this Schedule." Section 6(2): "The tenant may, by giving the landlord not less than 30 days’ prior notice in writing, terminate the tenancy." Section 6(3): "Section 120AAZH(4) applies to a termination under this section." — so vacant possession and settlement of outstanding money are still required on or before the termination date.

The landlord's termination: a prohibition, and the next subsection

Section 120AAZI(1):

Stop there and you reach the wrong conclusion — that the landlord can never terminate mid-term. The next subsection begins "However". Section 120AAZI(2):

Three routes, then. The first two are both of the form if the tenant fails to comply with subsection (x) — and what that subsection requires, and by when, is the part a tenant actually has to know; the terminating provision alone does not show it.

Route one: section 120AAZ(7). It reads "If the tenant fails to comply with subsection (5), the landlord may, by giving the tenant not less than 15 days’ prior notice in writing, terminate the tenancy." What does subsection (5) require? Section 120AAZ(5):

And section 120AAZ(6) names the two things:

So: once the landlord serves the written agreement, the tenant has 15 days to sign and return it and (if rent was withheld) to pay that rent back, free of interest. Fail, and the landlord may terminate on 15 days' notice under section 120AAZ(7). The right to withhold rent comes with a matching duty; they are one mechanism.

Route two: section 4(3) of Part 2 of Schedule 7. It reads "If the tenant fails to comply with subsection (2), the landlord may, by giving the tenant not less than 15 days’ prior notice in writing, terminate the tenancy." The subsection it points to, Schedule 7 section 4(2):

Same shape: once the landlord returns the stamped counterpart, the tenant has 15 days to pay back the withheld rent.

Route three is the Part 4 right of re-entry, below.

At the same time, forfeiture conditions the tenancy invents for itself are void. Section 120AAZI(3):

How does Schedule 7 get into your tenancy? Section 120AAZF(1): "The provisions in Schedule 7 are to be impliedly incorporated into every regulated tenancy." Part 4 of that Schedule sets out the tenant's obligations: section 7, "The tenant must pay the rent to the landlord on or before the due date."; section 8, "The tenant must not make any structural alteration, or permit or suffer any structural alteration to be made, to the premises without the prior consent in writing of the landlord."; section 9, "The tenant must not use the premises, or permit or suffer the premises to be used, for any immoral or illegal purpose."; section 10(1), "The tenant must not do anything, or permit or suffer anything to be done, on the premises that would cause any unnecessary annoyance, inconvenience or disturbance to the landlord or any other person."; section 11(1), "The tenant must not assign or underlet the whole of the premises to another person, or otherwise part with possession of the whole of the premises."; and section 11(2), "The tenant must not underlet part of the premises to another person without the prior consent in writing of the landlord."

Re-entry is Schedule 7 section 12(1):

Section 12(2): "The tenancy of the premises is terminated immediately on the landlord’s re-entry under subsection (1)."

Note the parenthesis in limb (a). A tenant who is lawfully withholding rent under section 120AAZ(3)(a) or Schedule 7 section 4(1) — because the landlord has not served a written agreement, or has not returned the stamped counterpart — cannot be re-entered upon for arrears. That parenthesis is what makes the withholding right usable.

These two subsections are the easiest thing in Part IVA for a landlord to read as authority to change the locks. They are not, and there are two layers of reason, both inside the Ordinance.

First layer: a limb (b) re-entry must run through Cap. 219 section 58 in full. Section 120AAZI(4)(b), quoted below, provides that subsection (2)(b) and sections 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12(1)(b) and (2) of Part 4 of Schedule 7 "have effect subject to section 58 (except section 58(14)) of that Ordinance". That is where the section 58(1) notice procedure attaches — specify the breach, require it to be remedied, specify the compensation, allow a reasonable time. Without that notice and that time, the section 12(1)(b) right is not yet exercisable at all.

Second layer: unlawfully depriving the tenant of occupation is a criminal offence. Section 120AAZO(1) makes it an offence to unlawfully deprive a tenant of a regulated tenancy of occupation of the subdivided unit, and section 120AAZO(2) sets a fine of $500,000 and 12 months' imprisonment on a first conviction. The equivalent for an ordinary domestic tenancy is section 119V. The Ordinance saying that a right of re-entry arises is not a licence to change the locks, cut the utilities or remove the tenant's belongings — section 12(1) says when a right arises, not by what means it may be exercised. See What a Landlord May Not Do below.

Schedule 7 section 10(2) takes the same position as Cap. 7 section 117(5)(c):

And section 58 again splits two ways. Section 120AAZI(4):

Same structure as an ordinary domestic tenancy: the rent limb runs under sections 58(4) and (10), the rest under the whole of section 58.

Renewal: no offer means an offer

Section 120AAR(1):

Section 120AAS(1):

The "offer period" is defined in section 120AA(1) as the second calendar month before the month in which the purported second term tenancy commences. The offer may only be made in Form AR1 (section 120AAS(2)), and section 120AAS(6): "Subject to section 120AAT, a second term offer, once made, remains open for acceptance by the tenant before the expiry of the first term tenancy, and the landlord may not withdraw the offer."

What if the landlord makes no offer? The Ordinance makes it for them. Section 120AAW(2):

But the tenant keeps the exit — section 120AAW(6):

And where the landlord did serve an offer and the tenant does not signify acceptance before the first term expires, section 120AAV(2): "If the tenant fails to notify the landlord of the tenant’s acceptance of the second term offer before the expiry of the first term tenancy, the tenant is taken to have rejected the second term offer."

The cap on the increase. Section 120AAZE(2):

In the Ordinance the formula is set as a table: the numerator "B – C" sits above a rule, the denominator "C" below it, and "× 100" outside. As laid out there:

```

B – C

A = ───────── × 100

C

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The formula has to be read with its rule: the control percentage A = (B − C) ÷ C × 100. The rule is a division bar, not decoration — flattened onto one line as "A = B – C × 100 C" it gives the wrong number.

The lower of the control percentage and 10%. Section 120AAZE(4) adds that where the control percentage is negative, the second-term rent is to be reduced by at least that percentage.

Sub-tenancies: an extra layer

Many subdivided units are sub-let by an intermediate landlord. What happens to the occupier when the head landlord takes possession?

Section 120AAZJ(2):

Section 120AAZJ(3):

Section 120AAZJ(5):

Sixty days. Cap. 7 section 131(2) does the matching thing on the District Court track, and it runs on the compulsory disclosure in section 129(2) above — the owner must state in the application whether the regulated tenancy is created out of another tenancy:

But read the next subsection — section 131(3):

So the 60-day stay exists when the superior landlord is recovering possession, and not when your own intermediate landlord is.

If the sub-tenant does hold over, section 120AAZK fixes the compensation and closes off several routes at once. Section 120AAZK(2): "Only the following person may recover as a civil debt from the sub-tenant the compensation determined under subsection (3) (compensation) for the sub-tenant’s failure to deliver up vacant possession of the subdivided unit on the termination date—(a)the superior landlord who terminates the superior tenancy; or(b)if the superior landlord in writing waives the right to recover the compensation—the landlord of the regulated tenancy (sub-landlord)." Section 120AAZK(3):

Monthly rent multiplied by the number of months held over, rounded down to a whole number under subsection (4). Payment is due under section 120AAZK(5): "The compensation recoverable by the superior landlord or sub-landlord must be paid by the sub-tenant within 15 days after the date on which the sub-tenant delivers up vacant possession of the subdivided unit."

The next three subsections protect the sub-tenant. Section 120AAZK(6): "The right (if any) of the superior landlord or sub-landlord under common law rules or equitable principles to make further claims against—(a)the sub-tenant; or(b)a surety or guarantor for the sub-tenant’s liabilities under the regulated tenancy, for the sub-tenant’s failure to deliver up vacant possession of the subdivided unit on the termination of the regulated tenancy and trespass to land in respect of the subdivided unit during the holding-over period is abrogated." Section 120AAZK(7): "Also, the right (if any) of the superior landlord or sub-landlord to make claims against any other occupiers (who are residing with the sub-tenant in the subdivided unit during the holding-over period) for—(a)their failure to vacate the subdivided unit on the termination of the regulated tenancy; and(b)their trespass to land in respect of the subdivided unit during the holding-over period, is abrogated." Section 120AAZK(8):

Section 120AAZK(10): "Also, despite section 48 of the High Court Ordinance, section 49 of the District Court Ordinance and section 12B of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, no interest on all or any part of the compensation may be included in the sum for which judgment is given in favour of the superior landlord or sub-landlord (whichever is applicable) against the sub-tenant in the specified proceedings."

Who most needs this: a subdivided-unit tenant whose head landlord is taking possession. The Ordinance reduces your exposure to a formula — rent times months, no interest, no costs, no additional common-law claim, and no separate claim against the family living with you. It is the most concrete protection in Part IVA, and it will not appear anywhere in your tenancy agreement.

(The section 120AAZK(8) costs protection has exceptions: subsection (9) disapplies it where the sub-tenant has conducted the case in a frivolous or vexatious manner, and in respect of the costs of the sub-tenant's own counterclaim.)

What a Landlord May Not Do

Harassment

Changing the locks, cutting the water or electricity, removing the tenant's belongings, turning up daily — these are not "civil disputes". They are offences.

For an ordinary domestic tenancy (Part IV), Cap. 7 section 119V(1):

Section 119V(2) reaches wider:

The defence is in section 119V(3): "A person does not commit an offence under subsection (2) if he proves that he had reasonable grounds for doing the act, or withdrawing or withholding the services, concerned."

Conviction is not the end of it. Section 119V(4):

Limb (b) deserves a pause. The sum forfeited is the difference between the market value of the premises with vacant possession and with the former tenant in possession — that is, the whole economic gain from the eviction, stripped out. It can be a much larger number than the fine.

Regulated tenancies of subdivided units have a parallel: section 120AAZO(1), "If a person unlawfully deprives a tenant of a regulated tenancy for a subdivided unit of occupation of the subdivided unit, the person commits an offence." and section 120AAZO(2): "A person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable on conviction on indictment by the court—(a)on a first conviction, to a fine of $500,000 and to imprisonment for 12 months; and(b)on a second or subsequent conviction, to a fine of $1,000,000 and to imprisonment for 3 years." Section 120AAZO(6) provides for the same compensation and forfeiture-of-value orders.

No endorsement, no rent action

This one is rarely mentioned and matters to both sides. Cap. 7 section 119L(1) requires the landlord of a tenancy to which Part IV applies to lodge "a notice in the specified form" with the Commissioner, who endorses it with the date of receipt and notifies both parties; section 119L(1A) allows lodging free of charge within one month of the event, or at any time on payment of a fee. Then section 119L(2):

Without the endorsement, the landlord cannot maintain an action for the rent. The obligation applies to every Part IV domestic tenancy, not only to subdivided units.

What does the opening "Subject to section 51A(6)" point to? Cap. 7 section 51A(6): "The applicants may in the specified form specify the terms of the tenancy, or sub-tenancy, to which Part IV shall apply and the lodging of the application under this section shall be sufficient compliance with section 119L." So a joint application lodged by landlord and tenant under section 51A is itself sufficient compliance with section 119L, and no separate section 119L(1) notice is needed. Section 51A is not otherwise among the provisions read for this article; nothing is stated here about the rest of it (see item 14 of Matters this article does not address).

The form's number is specified by the Commissioner under section 119X(1) ("The Commissioner may specify the forms to be used under this Part.") — the number is an administrative designation and is not in the Ordinance, so none is given here.

(Subdivided units carry a further notice obligation under sections 120AAZT and 120AAZU; see the stamp duty guide.)

A sub-tenant cannot be better off than the tenant

Cap. 7 section 127B, in Part V:

If the intermediate landlord has no security, neither does the sub-tenant.

But the section speaks only of Part V; it is not a general rule. Its own words are "Nothing in this Part shall afford to any sub-tenant any security of tenure greater than that enjoyed by his principal tenant." — the words "this Part" (emphasis added) are the whole of its reach. Section 127B limits the security of tenure that Part V confers, and says nothing about, and does nothing to, a sub-tenant's position under Part IV or Part IVA. A regulated tenancy of a subdivided unit has a whole set of its own: the 60 days in section 120AAZJ, and the capped compensation with its costs and interest protections in section 120AAZK, all run directly in the sub-tenant's favour and are untouched by section 127B. Section 120AAZA deals separately with the length of a sub-tenancy. Read section 127B as a general rule that a sub-tenant never has protection, and the whole of the Part IVA machinery disappears.