The Labour Tribunal: Which Claims It Takes and How They Run

What you are actually exchanging by going there

What the Labour Tribunal gives you is speed, low cost and informality. What you hand over is a lawyer's right of audience, the filter of the rules of evidence, and any second look at the findings of fact. None of the three is a matter of practice; each is written into the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25).

Put the three provisions side by side:

• Section 23(2): "A barrister or solicitor shall have a right of audience before the tribunal only if he is—(a) acting on his own behalf as a claimant or a defendant; or (b) appearing before the tribunal on behalf of an offender for the purpose of section 42."
• Section 27(2): "The rules of evidence shall not apply to proceedings in the tribunal, which may receive any evidence which it considers relevant."
• Section 35(2): on an appeal the Court of First Instance may draw inferences of fact and make orders as to costs, but "may not—(i) reverse or vary any determination made by the tribunal on questions of fact; or (ii) receive further evidence."

The third is the hardest to repair. Findings of fact made in a process where the rules of evidence are expressly disapplied cannot afterwards be reopened in the Court of First Instance, and that court will not take fresh evidence either. Whether the pay slip, the roster or the message record goes in on the hearing day is, in practice, a one-off.

The thirty-second version

• What is this place? — a body created by s.3(1) of Cap. 25, which describes it as "a court of record"; the Ordinance's long title describes it as "a tribunal having limited civil jurisdiction".
• Is my claim in? — read the Schedule, and only the Schedule. Section 7(1) is one sentence: "The tribunal shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine the claims specified in the Schedule."
• What separates the three forums? — in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 only, the Cap. 25 Schedule hands away "a claim specified in the Schedule to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)" — all three paragraphs of that Schedule, (a), (b) and (c). $15,000 is the ceiling on paragraph (c) itself, not a floor on the Labour Tribunal. The proviso to paragraph 1 of the Cap. 338 Schedule then shuts the Small Claims Tribunal out of both. The three interlock; they are not a menu.
• Are there time limits? — more than one. Section 32J(2) of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) draws a 9-month jurisdictional line for Part VIA claims; and after an award, review and leave to appeal run on separate clocks with different starting events.

Scope of this article: this article describes the general provisions of the Ordinances it quotes. It does not and cannot decide whether any individual reader's claim falls within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, how a claim should be drafted, or whether there is a ground of appeal — those turn on the specific facts and are the work of a practising solicitor. Nothing is said here about actual listing or waiting times, hearing lengths, or any Judiciary performance figure.

1. Whether you are in: the Schedule, item by item, is the whole of it

Section 7(1) defines no category of claim itself. It only points at the Schedule. So whether you are in is always a question of reading the Schedule.

What the Schedule lists

<table>

<caption>Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25), version in force 28 March 2025, Schedule: the claims the Tribunal may hear. Limited to the Schedule as it stands in that version. Paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 each close with the words "other than a claim specified in the Schedule to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)."; those words are omitted from the table below and taken up in section 2.</caption>

<thead>

<tr><th>Schedule paragraph</th><th>Claim the Tribunal may hear</th></tr>

</thead>

<tbody>

<tr><td>Para. 1(a)</td><td>A money claim arising from "the breach of a term, whether express or implied or (if relevant) arising by force of section 10(1) of the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608), of a contract of employment, whether for performance in Hong Kong or under a contract to which the Contracts for Employment Outside Hong Kong Ordinance (Cap. 78) applies"</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 1(aa)</td><td>"the breach of a term, whether express or implied or (if relevant) arising by force of section 10(1) of the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608), of a contract of apprenticeship"</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 1(b)</td><td>"the failure of a person to comply with the provisions of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608) or the Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap. 47),"</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 2</td><td>"A claim for contribution under section 26(2)."</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 3</td><td>A negative provision removing claims founded in tort (below)</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 4</td><td>Any question as to "the right of an employee to a severance payment under Part VA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57)" or "the amount of such payment"</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 5</td><td>Any question as to "the right of an employee to payment of wages by a person other than his employer under Part IXA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57)" and "the amount of such payment"</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 6</td><td>"Notwithstanding paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5", claims transferred to the Tribunal under s.8(3) of Cap. 453 or ss.7 or 10 of Cap. 338</td></tr>

<tr><td>Para. 7</td><td>"A claim for remedies under Part VIA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57)."</td></tr>

<tr><td>Paras. 8, 9</td><td>Repealed (135 of 1997 ss.4 and 14)</td></tr>

</tbody>

</table>

Section 8 allows the list to be changed: "The Legislative Council may, by resolution, amend the Schedule."

The one class the Schedule expressly removes: tort

Paragraph 3 is drafted harder than the rest:

"Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for a sum of money (whether liquidated or unliquidated), or otherwise in respect of a cause of action, founded in tort whether arising from a breach of contract or a breach of a duty imposed by a rule of common law or by any enactment."

This site's reading (s.7(1) read with Schedule paragraph 3): the provision works on the concept of a cause of action, not an event. One episode can generate both a contractual and a tortious cause of action; what decides whether it is in the Tribunal is the cause of action sued on. This reading is offered on the text alone; nothing is said about how any individual claim should be characterised.

A second express exclusion: bankruptcy and winding-up petitions

Section 8A(1): the Tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear or determine — "(a) any claim brought by way of a bankruptcy petition under the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) or by way of a petition for winding up under the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32); or", and "(b) any claim submitted to proof in a bankruptcy or winding up under those Ordinances."

If it is in the Schedule, it generally cannot go to an ordinary court

Section 7(2): "Save as is provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any court in Hong Kong."

Jurisdiction here is therefore exclusive. Subsections 7(3) to (6) each provide that "Subsection (2) shall not operate to prevent the transfer of any claim to the tribunal in accordance with any rules made under" s.73B, s.73C, s.73D or s.73E of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) — those four sections being the rule-making powers in relation to the District Court's jurisdiction under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, the Disability Discrimination Ordinance, the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance and the Race Discrimination Ordinance respectively. Cap. 25 confers no power of transfer of its own; it stands out of the way, and the power lies in those rules.

The same set of claims meets a matching sentence at the exit. Section 10(3): "This section shall not apply to any claim transferred to the tribunal in accordance with any rules made under section 73B of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)." Subsections 10(4), (5) and (6) repeat it for ss.73C, 73D and 73E. So for a claim that arrived under those four sets of rules, the s.10 route out — declining jurisdiction and transferring — is closed.

2. How the three forums interlock, and where the $15,000 line actually lives

This is the part most easily got wrong. The $15,000 figure is not in Cap. 25. Cap. 25 states no monetary amount at all — no ceiling, and no floor.

Where the $15,000 line really comes from: paragraph (c) of the Cap. 453 Schedule

Cap. 453 is built the same way as Cap. 25. Section 5(1): "Subject to subsection (3), the Board shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine the claims specified in the Schedule." Section 5(2) then makes that exclusive: "Save as is provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the Board shall be actionable in any court." That is wider than the equivalent in Cap. 338, which reads "in any other court in Hong Kong". Section 5(3) removes, as Cap. 25 Schedule paragraph 3 does, claims founded in tort, and also "any claim submitted to proof in a bankruptcy or winding up".

So whether the Board is in is likewise a question of reading its Schedule. That Schedule opens: "Subject to any provision in this Ordinance (including section 7), the Board shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine a claim—", and paragraph (c) reads:

"the right of action of which arose on or after 17 September 2021, or not wholly before that date, and made by not more than 10 claimants for a sum of money not exceeding $15,000 per claimant, which arises from—"

Five sources of claim then follow at (i) to (v): breach of a term of a contract of employment; breach of a term of a contract of apprenticeship; "the failure of a person to comply with the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608) or the Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap. 47)"; any question as to a Part VA severance payment; and any question as to payment of wages by a person other than the employee's employer under Part IXA.

The same Schedule has paragraphs (a) and (b) for earlier accrued rights of action. The dividing line is not before against after, but wholly against not wholly: paragraph (a) covers a claim "the right of action of which arose wholly before 25 June 1997", not more than 5 claimants at not more than $5,000 each; paragraph (b) a claim "the right of action of which arose wholly before 17 September 2021 (but not wholly before 25 June 1997)", not more than 10 claimants at not more than $8,000 each. "$15,000" is therefore a line keyed to when the right of action arose, not a fixed feature of the landscape.

The Schedule itself can be changed. Cap. 453 s.6: "The Commissioner may by notice in the Gazette amend the Schedule." (Cap. 25 requires a resolution of the Legislative Council — s.8, above.)

How Cap. 25 hands those claims across — and in which paragraphs

The Cap. 25 Schedule uses the same closing words in three places only:

"other than a claim specified in the Schedule to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)."

Those three places are paragraph 1 (the words sit after subparagraph (b), at the level of paragraph 1), paragraph 4, and paragraph 5.

Paragraphs 2, 3, 6 and 7 carry no such words.

What follows: paragraph 7 has no monetary floor

Paragraph 7 reads, in full: "A claim for remedies under Part VIA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57)." There is no "other than" tail.

This is not an open question. Four groups of provisions settle it.

• The Board has only what its Schedule gives it. Cap. 453 s.5(1): "Subject to subsection (3), the Board shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine the claims specified in the Schedule." The Schedule then opens with the same limitation — "Subject to any provision in this Ordinance (including section 7), the Board shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine a claim—" — before setting out paragraphs (a), (b) and (c). Outside those paragraphs the Board has no jurisdiction.
• None of items (i) to (v) under any of those paragraphs is a claim for Part VIA remedies. They are: breach of a term of a contract of employment; breach of a term of a contract of apprenticeship; "the failure of a person to comply with the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608) or the Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap. 47)"; a Part VA severance payment question; and a Part IXA question as to wages payable by someone other than the employer. The Cap. 25 Schedule itself keeps the two things apart: paragraph 1(b) uses precisely that third form of words, and a claim for Part VIA remedies is given a paragraph of its own.
• Cap. 25 hands nothing away in paragraph 7. The words "other than a claim specified in the Schedule to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)." appear in paragraphs 1, 4 and 5 and nowhere else.
• Cap. 57 names the Labour Tribunal directly. Section 32J(1): "Subject to this section, the Labour Tribunal established under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25) shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine a claim made by an employee under this Part in accordance with this Part and with that Ordinance." Section 32J(5): "Apart from a transfer under subsection (3), neither the Court of First Instance nor the District Court has jurisdiction over a claim under this Part." The Board is not mentioned anywhere in Part VIA.

This site's reading (Cap. 25 s.7(1) and Schedule paragraph 7, Cap. 453 s.5(1) and its Schedule, and Cap. 57 s.32J(1) and (5) read together): a claim for Part VIA remedies cannot fall to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board at any amount. $15,000 is the ceiling on paragraph (c) of the Cap. 453 Schedule; it is not an entry floor for the Labour Tribunal. A $3,000 Part VIA remedies claim goes to the Labour Tribunal, exactly as a $300,000 one does. Whether a particular claim is a Part VIA claim at all — that is, whether it answers one of the three descriptions in s.32A(1) — is a matter for a practising solicitor on the facts.

The third forum: the Small Claims Tribunal is shut out of both

Paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338) gives that tribunal "Any monetary claim founded in contract, quasi-contract or tort where the amount claimed is not more than $75,000, whether on balance of account or otherwise:" — but the proviso immediately following states: "Provided that the tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to hear and determine—", and two of its limbs are the other two forums:

• limb (ca): "any action that lies within the jurisdiction of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board established by section 3 of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453);"
• limb (d): "any action that lies within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal established under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25);"

And within its own scope the Small Claims Tribunal is itself exclusive — s.5(2): "Save as provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any other court in Hong Kong."

That exclusivity has to be read with the subsection that follows it. Section 5(3) is one of the things "provided in this Ordinance": "A claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal may be brought in another court if there is included in such claim a claim for some other relief, redress or remedy, other than a claim for costs." So a claim otherwise inside the Small Claims Tribunal's scope, which also seeks some other relief, redress or remedy, is not held there by s.5(2). Cap. 25 s.7(2) has no equivalent — ss.7(3) to (6) are about transfers in, not about a release for mixed relief — so the two exclusivity clauses are not symmetrical.

The door is not sealed, though. Paragraph 1A: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (d) of the proviso to paragraph 1, the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim transferred to the tribunal under section 10(2) of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)."

<table>

<caption>The three-forum interlock. Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25), version in force 28 March 2025; Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453), version in force 17 September 2021; Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), version in force 28 March 2025.</caption>

<thead>

<tr><th>From</th><th>To</th><th>Provision</th></tr>

</thead>

<tbody>

<tr><td>MECAB</td><td>Labour Tribunal</td><td>Cap. 453 s.8(3) (on declining jurisdiction, the Board "shall" transfer); caught by Cap. 25 Schedule para. 6</td></tr>

<tr><td>Small Claims Tribunal</td><td>Labour Tribunal</td><td>Cap. 338 s.7 (transfer), s.10(1) (counterclaim); caught by Cap. 25 Schedule para. 6</td></tr>

<tr><td>Small Claims Tribunal</td><td>MECAB</td><td>Cap. 338 ss.7 and 10(1), which name the Board first among the destinations; caught by Cap. 453 s.5(1A)</td></tr>

<tr><td>Labour Tribunal</td><td>Court of First Instance, District Court or Small Claims Tribunal</td><td>Cap. 25 ss.10(1), 10(2); caught by Cap. 338 Schedule para. 1A. For a Part VIA claim, only the first two (Cap. 57 s.32J(3))</td></tr>

<tr><td>District Court</td><td>Labour Tribunal</td><td>Cap. 25 s.7(3)–(6), under rules made under Cap. 336 ss.73B–73E</td></tr>

</tbody>

</table>

Three provisions about not engineering the amount

• Cap. 453 s.8(2): where a fresh claim by a claimant against a defendant, aggregated with "a claim (if any) brought previously by the same claimant against the same defendant which is pending or being heard before the Board", "exceeds the monetary amount mentioned in the Schedule", the Board "may decline jurisdiction in relation to both such claims" — both, not just the later one.
• Cap. 453 s.9: "No claim shall be split or divided and pursued in separate proceedings before the Board for the sole purpose of bringing the sum claimed in each of such proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board." Cap. 338 s.8 is drafted the same way.
• Cap. 453 s.10(1) allows the opposite move deliberately: "Where a claimant has a claim which exceeds the monetary amount mentioned in the Schedule and which, but for the excess, would be within the jurisdiction of the Board, the claimant may abandon the excess, and thereupon the Board shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine the claim." The price is in s.10(2)(a): "the claimant shall not recover in the claim an amount exceeding the monetary amount mentioned in the Schedule".

The ceiling: Cap. 25 states none

Paragraphs 1 to 7 of the Cap. 25 Schedule state no monetary limit for any category. Section 38(3) confirms it from the other direction: "The final award or order may be enforced under subsection (2)(b) even though the award or order has been given for an amount that is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court."

This site's reading (s.38(3)): the provision expressly contemplates awards larger than the District Court's own jurisdiction and preserves enforceability for exactly that case. An Ordinance drafted for a capped tribunal would not need that sentence.

3. Time limits: the Ordinances run more than one clock

One before filing (Part VIA), one on listing, and two after the award — and they do not start on the same event.

What Part VIA is

Part VIA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) is headed "Employment Protection". Section 32A(1) sets out the three descriptions under which "An employee may be granted remedies against his employer under this Part":

• (a) where the employee "has been employed under a continuous contract for a period of not less than 24 months ending with the relevant date and he is dismissed by the employer because the employer intends to extinguish or reduce any right, benefit or protection conferred or to be conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance";
• (b) where the employee is employed under a continuous contract and, with that same intention, the employer "without his consent and, in the absence of an express term in his contract of employment which so permits, varies the terms of his contract of employment";
• (c) where the employee "is dismissed by the employer other than for a valid reason within the meaning of section 32K and in contravention of" s.15(1), 21B(2)(b), 33(4B) or 72B(1) of Cap. 57, s.6 of the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance (Cap. 59), or s.48 of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282), "whether or not the employer has been convicted of an offence in respect of the dismissal".

Whose job is it to prove what?

Subsections (2) and (3) of s.32A add a further layer: the employee does not have to prove the employer's intention under (a) or (b) directly — once dismissal or variation of contract terms is established as a fact, the law presumes the employer had that intention, and the burden shifts to the employer to rebut it by showing a valid reason within the meaning of s.32K. Section 32A(2): "an employee who has been dismissed by the employer shall, unless a valid reason is shown for that dismissal within the meaning of section 32K, be taken to have been so dismissed because the employer intends to extinguish or reduce any right, benefit or protection conferred or to be conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance." Section 32A(3) states the same presumption for a variation of contract terms: "unless a valid reason is shown for that variation within the meaning of section 32K, be taken to be a variation of the terms of the contract of employment by the employer by reason that the employer intends to extinguish or reduce any right, benefit or protection conferred or to be conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance."

The burden for the (c) route sits in s.32A(4) and (5): the employee does not have to prove the employer's intention for the (i)/(ii) limbs (s.32A(4)(a)); and for three of the (c) route's sub-cases — dismissal in contravention of s.21B(2)(b), of s.72B(1), or of s.6 of the Factories and Industrial Undertakings Ordinance (Cap. 59) — s.32A(5) states the employee "shall be entitled to remedies under this Part if and only if" the employee did the protected thing within the 12 months before the dismissal. That 12-month condition does not extend to dismissal in contravention of s.15(1), s.33(4B), or s.48 of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282); s.32A(5) says nothing about those three. Separately, s.32A(4)(b) provides that "an employee who has been dismissed by the employer shall be taken to have been dismissed without a valid reason unless a valid reason is shown for that dismissal within the meaning of section 32K."

What counts as a "valid reason"? Section 32K lists five, in full: "it shall be a valid reason for the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee or the variation of the terms of the contract of employment with the employee was by the reason of—(a) the conduct of the employee; (b) the capability or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind that the employee was employed by the employer to do; (c) the redundancy of the employee or other genuine operational requirements of the business of the employer; (d) the fact that the employee or the employer or both of them would, in relation to the employment, be in contravention of the law, if the employee were to continue in the employment of the employer or, were to so continue without that variation of the terms of his contract of employment; or (e) any other reason of substance, which, in the opinion of the court or the Labour Tribunal, was sufficient cause to warrant the dismissal of the employee or the variation of the terms of that contract of employment."

This site's reading (ss.32A(2)–(5) and 32K): reading s.32A(1) alone suggests the employee has to prove the employer's state of mind. In fact, once dismissal or variation of terms is established as a fact, the law presumes that intent — the burden shifts to the employer, who must make out one of s.32K's five categories to rebut it.

Where does jurisdiction sit? Section 32J(1) is explicit: "Subject to this section, the Labour Tribunal established under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25) shall have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear and determine a claim made by an employee under this Part in accordance with this Part and with that Ordinance." Section 32J(5) closes the alternatives: "Apart from a transfer under subsection (3), neither the Court of First Instance nor the District Court has jurisdiction over a claim under this Part."

"Relevant date" is defined in s.32F

Both of the periods below run from the relevant date, and that term is defined in s.32F — not in s.32I or s.32J: "For the purposes of and subject to this Part, relevant date (有關日期)—(a) in relation to the termination of employment of an employee, has the same meaning as in section 2(1); and (b) in relation to the employer varying the terms of the contract of employment of an employee, means the date on which that variation takes effect."

The s.2(1) definition then splits by how the employment ended — among them "where the employee’s contract of employment is terminated by notice in accordance with section 6, the date on which that notice expires", "where the employee’s contract of employment is terminated by payment in lieu of notice in accordance with section 7, the date up to which such wages are calculated", "where the employee is employed under a contract for a fixed term and that term expires, the date on which that term expires", and "where the employee’s contract of employment is terminated other than in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance, the date of termination". The day the clock starts is fixed by the mode of termination, not by the day a letter was received or the last day worked.

Before filing: nine months for a Part VIA remedies claim

Section 32I of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) provides that an employee is not entitled to remedies under that Part unless — "(a) the employee has made a claim for such remedies by notice in writing given to the employer before the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the relevant date, or within such extended period not exceeding 6 months as the Commissioner may permit; or (b) a question as to the right of the employee to such remedies has been made the subject of a claim filed with the Registrar of the Labour Tribunal in accordance with Part 4 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25) before the end of the period of 9 months beginning with the relevant date."

Section 32J(2) puts the same point as a matter of jurisdiction: "The Labour Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear or determine a claim under this Part if the relevant date in respect of that claim falls more than 9 months before the date on which the claim is filed with the Registrar of the Labour Tribunal, unless the parties to the claim, by a memorandum signed by them and filed with the Registrar, have agreed that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction."

Two further subsections narrow where a Part VIA claim can go. Section 32J(3): such a claim "may be transferred under section 10 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25) but may be so transferred only to the Court of First Instance or the District Court." Section 32J(5): "Apart from a transfer under subsection (3), neither the Court of First Instance nor the District Court has jurisdiction over a claim under this Part."

This site's reading (Cap. 25 s.10(2) read with Cap. 57 s.32J(3)): s.10(2) offers three destinations — the Court of First Instance, the District Court and the Small Claims Tribunal — but for a Part VIA claim s.32J(3) leaves only the first two. The point is made on the text alone.

Twelve months at MECAB

Cap. 453 s.7(1): "Subject to subsection (2), the Board shall not have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear or determine a claim or part of a claim if the right of action arose more than 12 months before the date on which the claim is filed, unless the parties to the claim, by a memorandum signed by them and filed with the registrar, have agreed that the Board shall have jurisdiction."

Section 7 does not stop there, and the two subsections that follow are the way out.

Section 7(2) deals with a claim half of which is out of time: where the right of action "arose partly before and partly after the 12-month period of limitation prescribed by subsection (1)", the Board may, "with the consent of the parties, sever that part of the claim over which it has no jurisdiction and inquire into, hear and determine the part over which it has jurisdiction."

Section 7(3) deals with a claim wholly out of time, and it names three alternative forums: "Nothing in this section shall preclude the institution of proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal, the District Court or the Court of First Instance in respect of a claim which, by reason of the expiration of the limitation period prescribed by subsection (1), is not actionable in accordance with this Ordinance." A claim too old for the Board does not simply disappear; Cap. 453 itself preserves proceedings in the Small Claims Tribunal, the District Court or the Court of First Instance.

After filing: the statutory listing window

Section 13(1)(a) requires the registrar to "fix a place and date for hearing of the claim which shall, unless the parties otherwise agree, be not earlier than 10 days nor later than 30 days from the filing of the claim". That is a rule about the registrar fixing an initial date, not a ceiling: where the presiding officer has specified an extended inquiry period under s.14(2)(b) or (c) and notified the registrar, s.13(3) requires the registrar to fix a new date of hearing to take account of that period. This article makes no statement about actual waiting times.

Seven days after a party fails to appear

• Claimant absent — s.20A(1): "If, upon the hearing of a claim, the claimant does not appear, the tribunal may strike out the claim, without prejudice, however, to the restoration thereof by the tribunal, on the application of the claimant, on such terms as it thinks just." An application to restore must be made under s.20A(2) "within 7 days after the hearing or such further period as the tribunal may allow".
• Defendant absent — s.21 imposes two conditions: the defendant must be one "who has been duly served with a copy of the claim and a notice of hearing" and who then fails to appear, and the Tribunal must be "of the opinion that the facts relating to the claim are sufficiently established", before it may hear and determine the claim in the defendant's absence. Section 21A(1) allows such an award to be set aside on the defendant's application "on such terms as it thinks just", and s.21A(2) uses the same words as s.20A(2): "within 7 days after the hearing or such further period as the tribunal may allow".

After the award: two clocks, two triggers

<table>

<caption>Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25), version in force 28 March 2025: the two post-award time limits compared.</caption>

<thead>

<tr><th></th><th>Review (s.31)</th><th>Leave to appeal (s.32)</th></tr>

</thead>

<tbody>

<tr><td>Made to whom</td><td>The presiding officer who made the award; under s.31(5) he "may transfer the hearing and consideration of a review to another presiding officer who shall have all the powers and functions which he would have if he had originally heard the claim and had prepared the record of proceedings"</td><td>The Court of First Instance (application lodged with the Registrar of the High Court)</td></tr>

<tr><td>Counted from</td><td>"the date of an award or order given or made by him"</td><td>"the date on which the award, order or determination was served on him"</td></tr>

<tr><td>How many days</td><td>The review power itself is bounded by the "within 14 days" in s.31(1), however it is exercised<br>A party's application carries a further limit: "within 7 days" (s.31(2)(b))</td><td>Within 7 days</td></tr>

<tr><td>Extendable?</td><td>Section 31 states no extension mechanism</td><td>Yes — "within such extended time as may be allowed by the Registrar of the High Court on good cause"</td></tr>

<tr><td>What it can do</td><td>"re-open and re-hear the claim wholly or in part and may call or hear fresh evidence and may confirm, vary or reverse his previous award or order" (s.31(1))</td><td>Only on the grounds "erroneous in point of law" or "outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal" (s.32(1))</td></tr>

<tr><td>Anything after it</td><td>Yes — s.31(3): exercising the review power "shall not operate as a bar to appeal by a party against the award or order or thereafter against the determination of the review"</td><td>No — s.32(3): "A refusal by the Court of First Instance to grant leave to appeal shall be final."</td></tr>

</tbody>

</table>

Counting it out (using only the periods the Ordinance states)

Take a presiding officer who gives the award orally at the end of the hearing — the case s.22(3) opens with, "when he has made an award or order orally":

• Day 0 — the oral award is made. The review clock starts here (s.31(1): "within 14 days from the date of an award or order given or made by him").
• Day 7 — the deadline for a party's own application for a review (s.31(2)(b): "on the application of a party within 7 days").
• Day 14 — the review power itself expires (s.31(1)). The same day is the outside limit for reducing an oral award to writing (s.22(3): "not later than 14 days after the date of the award or order").
• The day the written award is served — only now does the leave-to-appeal clock start (s.32(1): "within 7 days after the date on which the award, order or determination was served on him"). Under s.22(4) the registrar serves the written award, and "it shall not be necessary for the party in whose favour an award or order has been made to prove that it reached the party to be served."
• Service day + 7 — the deadline for applying for leave, unless the Registrar of the High Court allows extra time "on good cause".

This site's reading (ss.22, 31 and 32 read together): the two clocks are triggered by different events — the review clock counts from the day the award was made, the appeal clock from the day the written award was served. Because the Ordinance allows an award to be given orally and reduced to writing up to 14 days later, those two dates can be some way apart. The two are asymmetric in another respect as well: s.32(1) expressly provides a route to an extension, and s.31 does not. This is a reading of the statutory text, not a computation of any individual case's time limits.

Two things to hold together

• Applying for leave can lock the review. Section 31(1) opens: "Except where a party has filed an application for leave to appeal and does not agree to withdraw the application" — a leave application the party will not withdraw takes the review power off the table.
• Neither clock stops enforcement. Section 37 provides that neither a decision by a presiding officer to exercise the review power nor the filing of an application for leave to appeal under s.32 or s.35A "shall operate as a stay of execution of an award or order" unless the presiding officer, the Court of First Instance or the Court of Appeal orders otherwise.

(The sequence above is worked from the periods the Ordinance itself states, to show how the limits operate. It is not an assessment of any individual reader's case.)

4. The limits: what you are actually giving up

1. Who has a right of audience

Section 23(1) is a positive list — the following persons shall have a right of audience before the tribunal:

• (a) a claimant or defendant;
• (b) a tribunal officer;
• (c) an authorized officer;
• (d) "an officer or servant of an unincorporated or incorporated company or a member of a partnership, if the company or partnership is a party";
• (e) "with the leave of the tribunal, an office bearer of a registered trade union or of an association of employers who is authorized in writing by a claimant or defendant to appear as his representative";
• (f) "a public officer, not being a barrister or solicitor, who appears on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, if the Secretary for Justice is a claimant or a defendant."

Section 23(2) then narrows the position of lawyers alone: "A barrister or solicitor shall have a right of audience before the tribunal only if he is—(a) acting on his own behalf as a claimant or a defendant; or (b) appearing before the tribunal on behalf of an offender for the purpose of section 42."

Neither exception helps an ordinary claimant: (a) is a lawyer who is personally a party; (b) is representation of an offender under s.42 (insulting behaviour).

This site's reading (s.23(1) read with s.23(2)): the precise statement is not that representation is banned, but that a barrister or solicitor has no right of audience save in two situations. What s.23 removes is the right of audience of lawyers, not of every representative — a trade union or employers' association office bearer, with the Tribunal's leave and written authority, is on the s.23(1) list. Note also that the whole of s.23 governs the right of audience "before the tribunal"; an appeal is heard in the Court of First Instance and is not governed by this section, and nothing further is said here about rights of audience at court level.

MECAB is drafted more bluntly still. Cap. 453 s.22(2): "No barrister or solicitor, including a barrister or solicitor who is a public officer, whether or not qualified to practise in a court in Hong Kong, shall have a right of audience before the Board unless he is acting on his own behalf as a party." Section 22(1)(d) likewise admits "with the leave of the Board, an office-bearer of a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Ordinance (Cap. 332) or of an association of employers who is authorized in writing by a party to appear as his representative."

2. The rules of evidence do not apply

Section 27(1): "The tribunal may at any time during the hearing of a claim allow a witness or a party to give evidence on oath or unsworn." Section 27(2): "The rules of evidence shall not apply to proceedings in the tribunal, which may receive any evidence which it considers relevant."

This cuts both ways. Read with s.20(3) — "The presiding officer shall investigate any matter which he may consider relevant to the claim, whether or not it has been raised by a party" — it also means the presiding officer may introduce an issue neither side raised. The word is shall, not may.

3. There is no second look at the facts

Section 35(1) sets out the three things the Court of First Instance may do on an appeal it has given leave for: "(a) allow the appeal; (b) dismiss the appeal; or (c) remit the matter to the tribunal with such directions as it thinks fit, which may include a direction to the tribunal for a new hearing."

Section 35(2) draws the line: the Court may draw any inference of fact and make such order as to costs and expenses as it thinks fit, but "may not—(i) reverse or vary any determination made by the tribunal on questions of fact; or (ii) receive further evidence."

Section 35(3): "Subject to section 35A, the decision of the Court of First Instance shall be final." Section 35A(1) is that exception: a party dissatisfied with the Court of First Instance's decision may "within 7 days after the date of the decision, apply to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal and, if the Court of Appeal considers that a question of law of general public importance is involved, it may grant leave." Section 35A(3): "A refusal by the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal shall be final."

4. Costs: not costs following the event

Section 28(1) is a conditional and open-ended list: "Subject to subsection (2), the tribunal may award to a party costs and expenses, which may include—(a) any reasonable expenses necessarily incurred and any loss of salary or wages suffered by that party; and (b) any reasonable sum paid to a witness for the expenses necessarily incurred and any loss of salary or wages suffered by him," followed, at the level of the subsection rather than of limb (b), by the closing words "in attending a hearing of the tribunal or in being interviewed by a tribunal officer." Those closing words qualify both (a) and (b); the Chinese text settles the point by distributing them inside each limb.

Two things follow. First, the words introducing (a) and (b) are "which may include" — the limbs are illustrations, not the boundary of what may be awarded. Second, "any loss of salary or wages" is itself one of the things the provision names, so wages lost by taking time off to attend a hearing are a head in their own right.

Section 28(2) is the condition the opening words refer to: "In making an award of costs under this section, the tribunal shall include a direction as to the amount to be paid by each party who is so liable to pay costs." Section 28(3): "An award of costs shall be enforceable in the same way as any other award made by the tribunal."

5. Three powers that can end the matter outright

• Section 29: "The tribunal may at any time dismiss a claim which it considers to be frivolous or vexatious on such terms as to payment of costs as it may think fit."
• Section 29A(1): "The tribunal may at any time, either of its own motion or on the application of any party, adjourn the hearing of a claim on such terms as it thinks fit." Section 29A(2) is the consequence: "If any party fails to comply with the requirements of any term that may have been imposed on him under subsection (1), the tribunal may dismiss the claim, stay the proceedings or enter judgment against him as the tribunal may think appropriate." A term attached to an adjournment — produce a document by a date, for instance — can therefore lose the case if it is not met.
• Section 30 allows the Tribunal to order a party to give security for the payment of an award; s.30(5) provides that if a party fails to comply the Tribunal may "(a) dismiss the party’s claim; (b) stay the proceedings; or (c) enter judgment on the claim against the party." The same structure appears at the review stage: s.31(4) allows the presiding officer to order an applicant for review to give security, and s.31(4D): "If a party fails to comply with an order under subsection (4), the presiding officer may dismiss the application for review."

Section 30 is not only a weapon pointed at you, though. Section 30(2): "The tribunal may make the order either of its own motion or on the application of a party." And what s.30(4)(a) is aimed at is a real risk that payment "will be obstructed or delayed" because "the party has disposed of, removed from Hong Kong or lost control of assets belonging to the party" — or is about to, or is at real risk of doing so. A party who fears that winning will not mean being paid can therefore apply, before any award, for the other side to put up security.

5. The procedure, stage by stage, in the provisions

Stage 1: Filing the claim

• How proceedings start — s.11(1): "A proceeding in the tribunal shall be commenced by filing a claim with the registrar."
• Language and signature — s.11(2): "Subject to subsection (3), a claim shall be in writing in the prescribed form, in either the English or Chinese language, and shall be signed by the claimant." Section 11(3): "The registrar may permit a claim to be made orally and shall cause it to be reduced to writing, in the language in which it is made, and shall supply a copy thereof to the claimant."
• How much detail the claim must carry — s.12(d) requires "such particulars of the claim as shall be reasonably sufficient to inform the defendant of the grounds for the claim and of the manner in which the amount claimed by each claimant or person represented has been calculated."
• The filing fee — the Schedule to the Labour Tribunal (Fees) Rules (Cap. 25 sub. leg. B), version in force 1 February 2018, sets the filing fee in four bands by the amount claimed (see stage 6 below).

Stage 2: The tribunal officer's inquiries

• Who does it — s.14(1): "When a claim has been filed, the registrar shall forward a copy thereof to a tribunal officer, who shall prepare a summary of facts relating to the claim."
• What powers they have — s.14(4) empowers the tribunal officer to "interview at any reasonable time any person, including a party, and record a statement from him", to "enter and inspect at any reasonable time any premises in which a party is or has been employed and to examine any part of the premises and any machinery, fittings or equipment therein", and to "require any person to produce at any reasonable time any records, books of account or other documents which the tribunal officer may reasonably consider to be relevant to the claim, and to examine and make copies of such records, books of account or other documents."
• Whether you must answer — s.14(5): "A person who is interviewed by a tribunal officer shall not be compelled to make a statement or to answer any question put to him but the tribunal officer shall record in his summary of facts if any person has refused to be interviewed or to answer any question put to him."
• A statement can become evidence — s.14(7): "A statement made to a tribunal officer may be admitted as evidence of all matters therein if it is produced before the tribunal by the tribunal officer who recorded it and contains a statement by him that subsection (6) was complied with at the time when the statement was recorded."

Stage 3: Conciliation

• No certificate, no hearing — s.15(1): "The tribunal shall not hear a claim until a certificate in the prescribed form signed by a tribunal officer or an authorized officer is filed or produced to the effect that—(a) one or more of the parties has refused to take part in conciliation; (b) conciliation has been attempted but no settlement has been reached; (c) conciliation is unlikely to result in a settlement being reached; or (d) conciliation may prejudice the interests of a party."
• When it must be in — s.15(2): "A certificate under subsection (1) shall be filed with or produced to the tribunal not later than 24 hours before the date fixed for the hearing of the claim."
• Conciliation can resume mid-hearing — s.15(3) permits the Tribunal, "subject to section 16", to adjourn the claim and notify the Commissioner in the prescribed form of the adjournment and the reason for it, where "the tribunal is of the opinion that there is a reasonable likelihood of a settlement of the claim" and "all parties to the claim have agreed to an adjournment for the purpose of conciliation." Section 16 provides: "Every presiding officer, registrar, deputy or assistant registrar, tribunal officer and authorized officer shall ensure that there is no avoidable delay in the determination of a claim and shall have regard to any proceedings in any other court which may result in judgments to the prejudice of the claimant." In other words, an adjournment for conciliation is not open-ended — the Tribunal's own officers must still ensure the claim is not held up by avoidable delay.
• What a settlement is worth — s.15(9): "A settlement filed under subsection (8) shall be treated for all purposes as if it were an award of the tribunal."

Stage 4: The hearing

• Open or closed — s.18: "The hearing of a claim shall be conducted in public unless the presiding officer considers that in the interests of justice the hearing or any part thereof should be in private, in which case he shall order accordingly."
• Form — s.20(1): "The hearing of a claim shall be conducted in an informal manner."
• The presiding officer's own initiative — s.20(2): "The presiding officer may subpoena witnesses, order the production of any document, record, book of account or other exhibit and put to a party or witness such questions as he may think fit."
• There is a record — s.19: "The presiding officer shall keep or cause to be kept a summary, whether by means of shorthand notes or mechanical, digital, electronic or optical means or otherwise, of the evidence, submissions or statements made or given and of any point of law raised at the hearing and of his decision on such point of law."

Stage 5: The award

• When it comes — s.22(1): "The presiding officer shall deliver his determination of a claim and make such award or order thereon as he may think fit as soon as possible after the conclusion of the hearing of the claim." Section 22(2) allows the reasons to be given orally or in writing.
• From oral to written — s.22(3): "A presiding officer shall, when he has made an award or order orally, reduce it to writing as soon as possible, and in any case not later than 14 days after the date of the award or order."
• Service — s.22(4): "Every written award or order shall be served by the registrar on the parties, and it shall not be necessary for the party in whose favour an award or order has been made to prove that it reached the party to be served." The permitted modes are in s.22(5) and include "sending it by post addressed to him at his last known place of residence or at his place of business".
• Interest — the provision has two halves. Before the award, s.39(1): the Tribunal "may include in the amount of an award interest at the rate specified in subsection (4) on the whole or any part of the amount claimed for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the award." Section 39(2) adds that this power may be exercised "whether or not interest is expressly claimed", and "at any time after the date of the award if it appears to the tribunal that the failure to claim or to award interest was through inadvertence", and where an award is made ex parte against the defendant. After the award, s.39(3): "An award shall carry interest at the rate specified in subsection (4) on the aggregate amount thereof, or on such part thereof as for the time being remains unsatisfied, from the date of the award until satisfaction." Section 39(4) fixes that rate as "the rate from time to time applicable to judgment debts under section 50 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)."

Stage 6: Enforcement, and the fee scales

• How — s.38(1): "A final award or order of the tribunal may be registered in the District Court in the prescribed manner." On registration, s.38(2)(a): it "becomes for all purposes a judgment of the District Court made on the date on which the final award or order was made by the tribunal"; s.38(2)(b): "subject to section 40, may be enforced accordingly."
• Even above the District Court's own limit — s.38(3): "The final award or order may be enforced under subsection (2)(b) even though the award or order has been given for an amount that is beyond the jurisdiction of the District Court."
• Joint and representative claims — s.40(1) requires the amount to be paid into the tribunal and allocated by a presiding officer, "who shall where possible be the presiding officer who heard the claim".

<table>

<caption>Labour Tribunal (Fees) Rules (Cap. 25 sub. leg. B), version in force 1 February 2018, Schedule; Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board (Fees) Rules (Cap. 453 sub. leg. A), version in force 19 March 2020, Schedule.</caption>

<thead>

<tr><th>Item</th><th>Labour Tribunal (Cap. 25 sub. leg. B)</th><th>MECAB (Cap. 453 sub. leg. A)</th></tr>

</thead>

<tbody>

<tr><td>Filing of claim</td><td>"where the claim does not exceed $2,000" $20; "where the claim exceeds $2,000 but does not exceed $5,000" $30; "where the claim exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $10,000" $40; "where the claim exceeds $10,000" $50</td><td>"where the claim does not exceed $2,000" $20; "where the claim exceeds $2,000 but does not exceed $5,000" $30; "where the claim exceeds $5,000" $50</td></tr>

<tr><td>Application for review</td><td>$45</td><td>$45</td></tr>

<tr><td>Application for leave to appeal</td><td>$45</td><td>$45</td></tr>

<tr><td>Registration of an award or order with the District Court</td><td>$20</td><td>$20</td></tr>

<tr><td>Subpoena and copy including service, each witness</td><td>$25</td><td>not listed in the Schedule</td></tr>

<tr><td>Relief from fees</td><td>Rule 4: the registrar "may reduce, remit or defer payment of any fee specified in the Schedule", endorsing the reasons</td><td>Rule 3: the registrar "may reduce, remit or defer payment of any fee specified in the Schedule", endorsing the reasons</td></tr>

</tbody>

</table>

One person claiming for a group

Section 25(1): "Subject to subsection (2), if 2 or more persons have claims against the same defendant, such claims may be brought in the name of one of such persons as the representative of some or all of them." The gap that opening "Subject to subsection (2)" leaves is filled by s.25(2) itself: "The tribunal may, if at any stage of the proceedings, it considers that the bringing of a representative claim may prejudice the defendant, order that the claims of all or any of the persons represented shall be inquired into separately." In other words, bringing a representative claim does not guarantee it stays together through to the end — the tribunal can split it apart, one represented person at a time. Section 25(3) sets out what each represented person is deemed to have authorized the representative to do — including to "call and give evidence and make submissions to the tribunal on any matter arising during the inquiry into the claim", to "agree to a summary of facts prepared by a tribunal officer", to "agree to the holding of and to take part in conciliation", to "agree to a settlement of the claim on such terms as he may think fit", and to "amend the claim in respect of all or any of the individual claims or to abandon the claim". Under s.25(4) that authority "shall not be withdrawn save by leave of the tribunal."

Claims arriving from another forum

Section 15A(1) provides that where a claim is transferred to the Tribunal under s.8(3) of Cap. 453 or s.7 of Cap. 338, "(a) the claim shall upon such transfer be regarded for all purposes as a claim brought under this Ordinance; (b) all requirements under this Ordinance that would have to be fulfilled in relation to the claim before it could be inquired into, heard and determined by the tribunal if it were a claim brought under this Ordinance shall upon such transfer be deemed to have been fulfilled in relation to the claim."