Traffic Accident Claims in Hong Kong

Three things people believe that the statutes do not say

Each of these three misconceptions is on its own enough to make someone with a live claim give up. Here is each one against the provision.

Misconception 1: "You must report to the police immediately, or it does not count." Sections 56(2A) and (3) of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) say "as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident". Twenty-four hours is a statutory ceiling, not a target — but it is not "immediately" either, and a driver who believes the duty is already broken often simply does not report at all.

Misconception 2: "Three years, and after that the claim is gone." Section 27(3) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) opens with the words "Subject to section 30". Section 27(4) runs the three years from the date the cause of action accrued or from the date of the plaintiff's knowledge, whichever is later. Section 30(1) then gives the court a general power to override the limit. Three years is a starting point, not a door that closes by itself. (The limitation section below takes this provision by provision.)

Misconception 3: "The other driver's insurer says the policy is void, so nobody pays." Section 10(1) of Cap. 272 says close to the opposite: the insurer must pay the judgment "notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy". That provision is the backbone of motor compensation in Hong Kong, and most consumer accounts leave it out entirely.

At the scene: the statute imposes three duties, with three different triggers

Section 56 is not a single "report to the police" rule. It is three duties, three triggers and two penalty levels. Separating them is what tells you which one your accident falls into.

1. Stop (section 56(1))

Two points. First, paragraph (a) speaks of personal injury caused "to a person other than the driver of that vehicle" — so where the only injured person is you, the driver, paragraph (a) is not engaged (though subsection (3) below is). Second, paragraph (b) is wider than most people assume: besides another vehicle, it reaches a "specified animal" and "any other thing not being in or on that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby" — railings, lamp posts and road signs included. Section 56(7) defines the animals:

Penalty (section 56(5)): "A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 12 months." Under Schedule 8 to the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221), a level 3 fine is $10,000.

2. Give particulars — but only "if required" (section 56(2))

The operative words are "if required". The subsection does not create a free-standing duty to volunteer your details. But section 56(6) also makes it an offence to knowingly make a false statement in supplying those particulars. In short: you need not offer, but what you do say must be true.

3. Report the accident — within 24 hours (sections 56(2A) and (3))

Property damage (section 56(2A)):

Injury (section 56(3)):

Three points worth reading slowly.

• The limit is 24 hours, not "immediately". Both subsections use the same formula: "as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident".
• The injury trigger includes the driver's own injury. Subsection (3) says "injury to any person including the driver". A driver who injures only himself and concludes that there is nothing to report is squarely inside subsection (3) — subject to the closing exception, "unless the driver is incapable of doing so by reason of injuries sustained by him in the accident".
• The property-damage trigger is not the other party's absence. Subsection (2A) is triggered where the driver "for any reason does not give the particulars mentioned in subsection (2)". If the other party is present and you gave nothing, you must still report; if the other party is absent but you gave the particulars to someone with reasonable grounds for requiring them, the trigger in (2A) is on its face not met.

Penalty (section 56(6)): "A person who contravenes subsection (2), (2A) or (3) or who knowingly makes a false statement in supplying particulars under subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 4 and to imprisonment for 6 months." A level 4 fine is $25,000 under Schedule 8 to Cap. 221.

In one line. Stopping is unconditional; particulars must be given only when required, but never falsely; the report must be made within 24 hours at the latest, and any injury — including your own — triggers it.

What does the Ordinance attach to a late report? Section 56(6) creates an offence — a level 4 fine and six months' imprisonment. That is the consequence the Ordinance provides for a breach of section 56. What decides the compensation claim is elsewhere: Cap. 272 s.10(2) sets out when the insurer need not pay on a judgment (notice of the proceedings, execution stayed pending appeal, pre-event cancellation, and the policy limit), and Cap. 347 s.27 sets the limitation start. Neither is conditioned on whether the accident was reported.

At the scene and afterwards: what to do in practice

This section is practical advice, not statutory duty. The duties above come from the section; the steps below come from what evidence a claim needs. Nothing in Cap. 374 requires you to take photographs or find witnesses.

• Safety and medical attention first. Call an ambulance if anyone is hurt; do not move a seriously injured person unless their position is an immediate danger.
• Where someone is killed or seriously injured, do not move vehicles or tidy the scene without a police officer's authority. Section 57(1) of Cap. 374:

> "Subject to subsection (2), if owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road an accident occurs in consequence of which any person is killed or seriously injured or serious damage is caused to any vehicle or thing, any person who without the authority of a police officer moves or otherwise interferes with any vehicle involved in the accident or any part of any such vehicle or does any other act which destroys, alters or conceals any evidence of the accident commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 6 months."

Section 57(2) supplies a defence: it is a defence for the person charged to prove that the vehicle was moved or interfered with "for the purpose of saving life, extinguishing fire or meeting any other emergency". So while nothing requires you to photograph the scene or find witnesses, something does forbid you from altering it.

• See a doctor the same day or the next, even if the injury feels minor. Soft-tissue injuries and whiplash often emerge days later, and the first consultation record is frequently the strongest evidence later. Severe or worsening pain, numbness, weakness or any loss of consciousness warrants immediate attendance at A&E.
• Photograph widely. Vehicle positions, damage, road surface, signals, markings and landmarks, from several angles and distances.
• Take witness contact details on the spot. They are almost impossible to recover afterwards.
• Notify your own insurer. Many policies require notification within a stated period, commonly seven days. That is a contractual obligation and it is a wholly different thing from the statutory seven days in Cap. 272 s.10(2)(a) discussed below — different starting point, different consequence. Notification is not an admission of liability.

Who pays? How compulsory third-party insurance works

Hong Kong's system is not "the government pays". It is: the law compels the vehicle to be insured, and then the Ordinance makes the insurer actually pay. Both halves sit in Cap. 272.

First half: the vehicle must be insured (section 4)

Penalty (section 4(2)(a)):

Section 4(4) contains exemptions (State and Government vehicles, police purposes, certain public-officer functions) and allows an owner who has deposited $2,000,000 with the Director of Accounting Services, and not required its return, to fall outside section 4 in defined circumstances.

"Road" is not confined to public roads. Sections 4(1) and 6(1)(b) both speak of use "on a road", and section 3(1) extends the whole Ordinance beyond them:

So an estate's private roads and a car park's internal roadways are inside the compulsory insurance regime. What is carved out is the private road in an area wholly or mainly used for construction work or industry.

Second half: how much the policy must cover (section 6(1)(b) and Cap. 272A reg. 27)

Section 6(1)(b) requires a policy which:

The prescribed amount is fixed by regulation 27 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A):

That is $100 million arising out of one event — the statutory floor of protection for a third-party claim, and a figure rarely quoted in consumer coverage.

But section 6(1) carries a proviso that is the seam between this guide and the employees' compensation guide. The policy need not cover:

In other words: a delivery driver, bus driver or taxi driver injured or killed in the course of employment is not necessarily covered by the motor policy at all. Those cases usually run through the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282) instead — see "Next steps".

That is not the only limb of the proviso. Paragraph (iii) provides that the policy need also not cover:

Third half: the insurer's duty to satisfy the judgment (section 10)

This is the provision that turns a judgment into money. Section 10(1):

So once the injured person has judgment against the insured, the insurer cannot escape merely by saying the policy was avoided or cancelled.

But section 10(2)(a) attaches a statutory notice requirement that is easily missed:

Those seven days and the seven days in your own policy are different animals:

Cancellation before the accident is section 10's own exit. Section 10(2)(c) provides that no sum is payable:

Note how this differs from section 10(1). Section 10(1) is about an insurer who avoids or cancels and must pay anyway. Paragraph (2)(c) is about a policy already cancelled by mutual consent or under its own terms before the event, where the certificate was then surrendered (or declared lost, or proceedings commenced for the failure to surrender) inside the stated periods. Every one of those elements must be present before the paragraph relieves the insurer.

Two further limits in section 10 are worth knowing. Section 10(2)(d) caps the insurer's obligation at the amount covered by the policy of insurance "after deducting therefrom any amount which is either paid or due and payable by the insurer under the policy (otherwise than by virtue of the judgment) in respect of the same event". Section 10(3) lets an insurer escape entirely by obtaining, in an action commenced before or within three months after the proceedings, a declaration that it was entitled to avoid the policy for non-disclosure or material misrepresentation. The proviso to that subsection is narrower than it is usually stated to be: it is not a free-standing duty to notify, but a condition on the insurer's benefit, and it bites only "as respects any judgement obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action". Where it does bite, the insurer keeps the benefit only if, before or within 7 days after commencing that action, it has given notice to the plaintiff in those proceedings "specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely" — and the person so notified "shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto". So where the insurer moves first, no notice is owed at all.

Fourth: the passenger, and the right to demand insurance particulars (sections 12 and 13)

Two sections of Cap. 272 answer the questions readers ask most often, and neither is widely reported.

A passenger's claim cannot be signed away in advance. Section 12(2) provides that where a person uses a motor vehicle on a road in circumstances requiring insurance under section 4(1), and another person is carried in or upon the vehicle, "any antecedent agreement or understanding between them (whether intended to be legally binding or not) shall be of no effect" so far as it purports or might be held to negative or restrict the user's liability to persons so carried, or to impose conditions on enforcing it — and:

Section 12(3)(a) extends "carried in or upon" to "a person entering or getting on to, or alighting from, the vehicle". Section 12(1)(c) separately makes a policy restriction by reference to "the number of persons that the vehicle carries" of no effect as respects the liabilities section 6(1)(b) requires to be covered.

Where the other driver will not say whether he was insured, section 13 makes the answer compellable. Section 13(1):

Section 13(2):

So the demand can be made by you or on your behalf, it reaches the certificate particulars, and refusing it without reasonable excuse — or answering it falsely — is an offence.

The bankruptcy or winding up of the driver or fleet operator does not extinguish the section 6(1)(b) liability. Section 11:

The long title of Cap. 273 states its purpose: "To confer on third parties rights against insurers of third party risks in the event of the insured becoming insolvent, and in certain other events."

No insurance, hit-and-run, stolen vehicle: the Motor Insurers' Bureau

No Ordinance establishes the MIB — but four pieces of Hong Kong legislation name it: the Rules of the High Court, the Rules of the District Court, the Legal Aid Ordinance and the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance. Each tells you something practical.

• The court can order a defendant to pay part of the money before trial, and the Bureau's involvement is what makes some defendants eligible. Order 29, rule 11(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A) allows the court, on an application under rule 10, to order "the respondent" — defined in that paragraph as the defendant against whom the order is sought — to make an interim payment. The person ordered to pay is the defendant, not the Bureau. Rule 11(2) is a negative gate on that power, and it is where the Bureau appears:

> "No order shall be made under paragraph (1) in an action for personal injuries if it appears to the Court that the defendant is not a person falling within one of the following categories, namely— (a) a person who is insured in respect of the plaintiff’s claim or whose liability in respect of the plaintiff’s claim will be met by the following person— (i) an insurer under section 10 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272); or (ii) an insurer who is a party to an agreement with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong; or (iii) the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong; (b) a public authority; or (c) a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment."

The Bureau in paragraph (2)(a)(iii) therefore figures as the person who will meet the defendant's liability, which is what brings the defendant inside the category — not as the payer under the order. Note category (c) as well: a wholly uninsured private defendant with the means to pay is himself inside the gate.

Rule 11(3) defines the agreement referred to:

> "In paragraph (2)(a)(ii), agreement (協議) means the domestic agreement between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong and the insurance companies and Lloyd’s underwriters authorized to carry on motor vehicle insurance business in Hong Kong, made on 1 February 1981, as amended from time to time."

Order 29, rule 11 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336 sub. leg. H) is to the same effect, with two immaterial differences of wording: its rule 11(1)(c) reads “2 or more defendants” where Cap. 4 sub. leg. A reads “two or more defendants”, and its rule 11(2)(a)(i) has no closing “or”.

• Legal aid can cover negotiating with the MIB, even where no proceedings are issued. Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5:

> "5. Negotiations prior to the issue of legal proceedings, including mediation, and for the payment of compensation by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau for which no legal proceedings are issued."

• There is a separate MIB-administered fund for insurer insolvency. Schedule 1 item 2 to the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance (Cap. 628), in full:

> "The Insolvency Fund administered by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong that protects claims under a policy as defined by regulation 2 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A)."

The closing words are what tie the fund to motor policies as Cap. 272 sub. leg. A defines them.

• The Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Fund is established by Ordinance. Section 3(1) of the Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance (Cap. 229): "There is hereby established a fund for assisting traffic accident victims and their dependants." What the fund pays out is in section 4:

> "There shall be paid from the fund— (a) all moneys payable to traffic accident victims and their dependants in accordance with the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme approved by the Legislative Council together with any amendments to the Scheme or any replacement of the Scheme which may be approved by the Legislative Council; (b) any refund of levies made under section 5(9); and (c) the cost of any administration fee charged under section 12."

So the Fund is statutory, while the Scheme — its eligibility rules, deadlines and rates — is approved by the Legislative Council and sits outside the Ordinance’s text (see "Matters this article does not address"). In an uninsured, hit-and-run or stolen-vehicle case, Cap. 229 is a second avenue to ask about alongside the Bureau.

What the legislation does not say, this article does not say either. The MIB's scope of compensation, its application procedure, its deadlines, and the earlier-notification requirement often mentioned in consumer coverage all derive from agreements between the MIB, the Government and the insurance industry — the domestic agreement of 1 February 1981 named in O. 29 r. 11(3) being one of them. Those agreements are not part of the statute book, and no statement is made about them here (see "Matters this article does not address").

Limitation: three years is a starting point, not a door that closes by itself

If one section of this article is worth reading slowly, it is this one. Someone who assumes "more than three years, so there is no point asking" may be giving up a claim that is still alive.

Layer one: three years from when?

Section 27(1) sets the scope:

Then section 27(3) — note its opening words:

Then section 27(4):

The weight is on paragraph (b). The period is not three years from the accident; it is three years from accrual or from the plaintiff's knowledge, whichever is the later. The Ordinance then spends three subsections defining knowledge. Section 27(6):

Section 27(7) defines what makes an injury significant:

Section 27(8) deals with constructive knowledge and expert advice:

Why this matters to a reader. The injuries that most often arrive late in road accidents — whiplash, disc herniation, post-traumatic psychiatric conditions — are frequently not diagnosed as significant, or not attributed to the collision, until well after the event. The statute expressly ties the starting point to that moment, not to the day of the crash.

Layer two: the court's power to override (section 30)

Section 30(1):

Section 30(3) lists the factors the court must consider:

Layer three: disability (section 22)

Section 22(1) opens:

Section 22(2) adjusts that period for personal injury and fatal accident actions:

Section 22(3) defines disability:

So a person who was a minor at the date of the accident has three years running from the date the disability ends. Full age is fixed by section 2(1) of the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 410): "As from the commencement of this Ordinance a person shall attain full age on attaining the age of 18 years."

Two things in section 22(1) have to be read to the end. First, majority is not the only starting date. The period runs "from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred". Where a child dies before reaching 18, the period runs from the death — not from a birthday that never arrives.

Second, section 22(1) carries four provisos, and proviso (a) can remove the extension altogether:

Layer four: where the injured person dies part-way

Section 27(5):

Layer five: fatal accident actions (section 28)

Section 28(1): "This section has effect subject to section 30."

Section 28(3):

So it is not simply "three years from death" — it is the later of death and the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought.

Section 28(2), however, is a separate and harder bar:

If the deceased could no longer have sued at the date of death, the family cannot bring a Fatal Accidents Ordinance action either.

But section 30(2) is a gateway as much as a limit, and it is read the wrong way round more often than any other provision in this Ordinance. In full:

Read the "except where". What is excluded is disapplication where some other Ordinance's time limit did the barring — the subsection supplies its own example. What is permitted is disapplication where the reason was "the time limit in section 27", which is exactly the position of a road accident family whose relative's own three-year personal injury period had run before the death. In that case, and subject to the court's discretion under section 30(1), the court does have power to direct that section 28(2) shall not apply. Section 30(6) then carries the direction into the Fatal Accidents Ordinance itself:

None of this is automatic — section 30(1) is discretionary and the section 30(3) factors govern how it is exercised. Where it was the deceased's own delay that ran the clock out, section 30(4) redirects the enquiry to him:

Section 30(5) then provides that where a time limit depends on the date of knowledge of someone other than the plaintiff, the section 30(3) factors apply with appropriate modifications, references to the plaintiff including that person. The point is narrower and it matters: a family whose relative died more than three years after the collision has not necessarily hit a closed door.

Fatal accident limitation is its own code, not an appendix to section 27. Section 28(4):

Section 28(5):

So section 27 does not govern the fatal claim; the disability extension in section 22 does; sections 23 to 26 and Part IV do not.

Where there is more than one beneficiary, the clock is run against each of them separately. Section 29(1) applies the section where an action is brought for the benefit of more than one person. Section 29(2):

One dependant being out of time therefore does not sink the action: that person is excluded and the others go on.

Where the driver concealed his identity, section 26 separately postpones the limitation period for fraud or deliberate concealment.

Property damage: six years, but only where the claim is property alone

Pure property loss — vehicle repair, contents — runs under section 4(1):

Paragraph (1)(a) is "actions founded on simple contract or on tort;" — a claim confined to vehicle and property loss is an action founded on tort, and the period is six years.

The qualification carries more weight than the rule. Section 27(1) applies wherever the damages claimed "consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries", and section 27(2) then provides:

So in the ordinary road accident, where one action claims for the injury and for the repair bill and the broken spectacles together, section 4 is disapplied outright and the whole claim — property heads included — runs on the three-year section 27 clock. Six years is available only where the action claims no personal injury at all. An injured claimant who assumes six years for the repairs and files in year four loses the property heads with the rest.

In one line. Three years is the norm, not a wall: the clock can start at the date of knowledge, the court can override, and disability extends. But the converse must be equally clear — every one of those depends on judicial discretion or on facts you have to prove. None is automatic. The right response is not to rely on an extension; it is to take your documents to a solicitor even when you think you are out of time, because identifying the starting point is itself a legal question.

What can be claimed

"General damages" is a common law classification and does not appear in the legislation; "special damages" is a term the rules of court use. Order 18, rule 12(1A) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A):

What happens if a plaintiff does not comply? Rule 12(1B) answers exactly that:

In other words: missing the medical report or the special damages statement does not void the claim automatically — the Court can fix a fresh deadline, waive the requirement outright, or stay the proceedings.

Rule 12(1C) defines that statement as "a statement giving full particulars of the special damages claimed for expenses and losses already incurred and an estimate of any future expenses and losses (including loss of earnings and of pension rights)". The Chinese text of the rules renders the term 專項損害賠償 — not the 特殊損害賠償 in common consumer usage. The Rules of the District Court are in corresponding terms.

General damages — pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life, assessed by the court against the injury, the course of treatment and the residual effects.

Special damages — losses capable of being itemised: medical expenses, travel to treatment, past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings, care costs, vehicle repair or write-off, damaged contents, and the cost of alternative transport.

One procedural right few claimants know about: interim payments. In a personal injury action you need not wait until the end of trial to see any money. Order 29, rule 11(1) of the Rules of the High Court:

Order 29, rule 11 of the Rules of the District Court is in corresponding terms. Note the closing words of paragraph (1): the ceiling on an interim payment is already net of whatever apportionment for the claimant's own fault the court thinks relevant. Note also that paragraph (2) is a negative gate — in a personal injuries action no such order may be made unless the defendant falls within one of three categories (insured, or with his liability met by a motor insurer or the Motor Insurers' Bureau; a public authority; or a person whose means and resources enable him to make the payment). It is quoted in full in the Bureau section above.

A discovery rule written for road accidents. Order 25, rule 8(1)(a) sets out directions that take effect automatically once pleadings are deemed closed:

In a road accident action, in other words, the automatic discovery obligation falls on the plaintiff and is confined to the special damages documents. Rule 8(1)(d) adds:

Which is the answer to a question the practical section above leaves open: no Ordinance requires you to photograph the scene, but the rules of court expressly contemplate that photographs, a sketch plan and the police accident report will be in evidence at trial.

Apportionment: the statute's own term is 共分疏忽

This is a wording point, but it affects how you search for the law. Most consumer writing uses 共同疏忽. The section that creates the doctrine — section 21 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) — is headed "Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence", and the Chinese text of that heading and of section 21(10) uses 共分疏忽. The string 共同疏忽 does not appear anywhere in the Chinese text of Cap. 23. (Both spellings exist in the statute book: 共分疏忽 appears in Cap. 23, Cap. 300 and Cap. 336; 共同疏忽 appears in Cap. 4 sub. leg. A and Cap. 336 sub. leg. H, the two sets of rules of court. The Ordinance that creates the doctrine uses 共分疏忽.)

Section 21(1):

Three things to notice.

First, the operative concept is "fault", which is wider than negligence. Section 21(10):

So a breach of statutory duty can itself amount to fault and be apportioned, without proof of common law negligence. Seatbelts and helmets have their statutory root in section 10 of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374): section 10(1) empowers the Secretary to make regulations “permitting or requiring the provision or use of specified safety equipment by persons driving, riding in or on, or using, any class of vehicle”, and section 10(4) says what that equipment is—

The wearing duty itself therefore sits in regulations made under section 10, whose text is outside the chapters listed in Sources for this article.

Second, the court must record the undiminished total. Section 21(2):

That is practically useful: the judgment will show both the total that would have been recoverable and the reduction, so you can see how your figure was arrived at.

Third, fatal claims are reduced proportionately too. Section 21(4):

Note also proviso (a) to section 21(1): the subsection "shall not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract".

Three further subsections bear directly on road accidents. Section 21(3) sends contribution between multiple wrongdoers to a different Ordinance:

Where two drivers are both at fault, apportionment between them is Cap. 377's subject. Section 21(4A) carries the same proportionate reduction into a section 20C loss-of-society award:

And section 21(6) provides that where the case is tried with a jury, it is the jury that determines the undiminished total and the extent of the reduction.

Fatal accidents: three distinct routes

The estate, the dependants, and those entitled to bereavement damages are three different claims, arising under two Ordinances.

Who brings the action is settled first, by Cap. 22 s.5. Section 5(1):

Section 5(2):

Section 5(3): "Not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint." So the fatal claim is in principle brought once, by the executor or administrator. Only where there is none, or none has sued within six months of the death, may the beneficiaries sue in their own names.

1. The dependants' loss of support (Cap. 22 s.3)

Who counts as a "dependant" is defined by Cap. 22 s.2(1), and the list is wider than most readers assume — paragraphs (a) to (j):

Funeral expenses are also not confined to the estate's route. Section 6(5):

2. The estate's own claim (Cap. 23 s.20)

Causes of action already vested in the deceased survive for the benefit of the estate, subject to four limits in section 20(2), not one or two. Under section 20(2)(a) the damages "shall not include any exemplary damages;". Section 20(2)(b) then has three sub-paragraphs. Under section 20(2)(b)(i) the damages shall, where the death was caused by the same act or omission:

So funeral expenses can form part of the estate's claim, but what the estate gains or loses by reason of the death does not.

Section 20(2)(b)(ii) requires that the damages:

Section 20(2)(b)(iii) is the "lost years" head, often the largest single item in the estate's claim after a fatal road accident:

One further subsection explains why these three routes have to be kept apart. Section 20(1A):

The bereavement and loss-of-society claims are personal to the claimant: they do not pass into that claimant's own estate on death.

3. Bereavement (Cap. 22 s.4)

Section 4(2):

Paragraphs (a) to (h) then set out a closed and strictly ordered list, and each paragraph has to be read to its end:

• (a) the spouse — "the wife or husband of the deceased, unless they had been living apart for a continuous period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the death of the deceased; or" (the separation must be for a continuous period);
• (b) children; (c) a spouse who had been living apart; (d) a concubine taken before 7 October 1971;
• (e) where no one can claim under (a) to (d), "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d), any person who— (i) was living with the deceased in the same household immediately before the date of his death; and (ii) had been living with the deceased in the same household for at least 2 years before that date, as the husband or wife of the deceased; or" — both limbs must be satisfied, not the two-year limb alone;
• (f) "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), the parents of the deceased or (if the deceased was illegitimate) his mother; or" — the provision carries the "(if the deceased was illegitimate) his mother" branch;
• (g) "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), but the deceased was at the date of his death a minor, any person who during any marriage to which that person was a party treated the deceased as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; or" — the person must have treated the deceased as a child of the family during a marriage to which that person was a party, and the deceased must have been a minor at the date of death;
• (h) siblings.

If anyone qualifies under an earlier paragraph, the later ones are never reached.

The amount is in the Ordinance itself, not in any government announcement:

Where there is more than one claimant, section 4(4): "Where there is a claim for damages under this section for the benefit of 2 or more persons, the sum awarded shall be divided equally between them (subject to any deduction falling to be made in respect of costs not recovered from the defendant)."

That figure moves, and the mechanism by which it moves is in section 4(5):

(The $253,500 in section 4(3) was last amended by L.N. 80 of 2025. It moves by resolution of the Legislative Council, so it is a statutory figure that changes by resolution rather than a fixed sum.)

The same figure caps another head of damages. Section 20C(2) of Cap. 23, on loss of society:

But loss of society is not a fourth route for a bereaved family. It is the head available to the relatives of an injured person who survives, and it and bereavement are mutually exclusive. Each Ordinance closes the door from its own side. Cap. 23 s.20C(3):

And Cap. 22 s.4(1):

Section 20C(2) is set out above because it fixes the same $253,500 as the ceiling on loss of society, not because a family can have both arising from one death.

Limitation for fatal claims is Cap. 347 s.28(3) above: the later of the date of death and the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought.

Which court, and can you afford it?

Court levels

District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), section 32(1):

Section 32(2) explains how "the amount of the plaintiff's claim" is worked out:

The closing words — "that the plaintiff admits in his statement of claim" — attach to paragraph (c) on the face of the English text. What is deducted at this stage is what the pleading concedes.

The two authentic texts are laid out slightly differently here: the Chinese text repeats 「在其申索陳述書中所承認的」 inside each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) separately, while the English closing words follow (c) alone. This site's reading: this article follows the Chinese text's structure — all three limbs need admission in the pleading before they are deducted. That is a construction of the English text, not something the English text states expressly on its own.

Being above $3,000,000 does not compel a claimant into the Court of First Instance. Section 34(1) lets the plaintiff abandon the excess:

The price is in sections 34(2) and (3): the Court cannot award more than its limit, and its judgment "is in full discharge of all demands in the cause of action". The abandoned part is given up for good.

The traffic also runs the other way. Section 43(3) requires the Court of First Instance to transfer down an action or proceeding, other than a counterclaim, that appears to the Court of First Instance likely to be within the District Court's jurisdiction:

The Small Claims Tribunal's monetary limit is $75,000 (Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), Schedule, paragraph 1). That is not merely a figure; it is an exclusive forum, and it governs whether you may have a lawyer and whether legal aid is available. Section 5(2):

Section 5(3) is an exception to that: "A claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal may be brought in another court if there is included in such claim a claim for some other relief, redress or remedy, other than a claim for costs."

Section 9(1) contains the Cap. 338 analogue of Cap. 336 s.34(1): a claimant whose claim exceeds the Schedule amount may abandon the excess and bring the claim within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and section 9(2) makes the Tribunal's award "in full discharge of all demands in respect of the claim".

Rights of audience are set by section 19(1):

Note the words "other than counsel or a solicitor" in paragraph (d). Add item 9 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), which makes "In the Small Claims Tribunal, proceedings under the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)" an excepted proceeding. So a traffic claim at or under $75,000 — most often the pure vehicle-repair claim — belongs in the Small Claims Tribunal, cannot be argued there by a lawyer, and is outside legal aid.

Legal aid

Ordinary legal aid — Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), section 5(1):

Part 1 of Schedule 2 covers civil proceedings in the Court of Final Appeal, the Court of Appeal, the Court of First Instance and the District Court — and, as noted above, item 5 separately covers pre-action negotiations, including negotiations for compensation paid by the Motor Insurers' Bureau.

The Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme covers a band above that. The financial resources band in section 5A(b) is:

Schedule 3 Part 1 item 1:

Item 2 (District Court):

That "specified amount" is not defined in section 2. It is defined in Schedule 3, Part 3, paragraph 1 — the interpretation provision for Schedule 3 itself — as "the monetary limit specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)", which is $75,000.

(The financial resources limits in sections 5 and 5A are amended by Legal Notice, most recently L.N. 29 of 2026. The Cap. 336 figure of $3,000,000 and the Cap. 338 figure of $75,000 likewise move by Legal Notice.)

Financial eligibility is only half of it. Section 10(3) imposes a merits threshold:

The paragraphs (a) to (g) that follow in the same subsection set out further grounds on which the Director may refuse aid.

And one provision decides how much of an award an aided claimant keeps. Section 18A(1) creates the Director's first charge:

So property recovered or preserved in the aided proceedings answers first for any unpaid contribution; and, outside the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme, for any deficiency where the total contribution falls short of the Director's net liability on the aided person's account. But section 18A(5) exempts specific sums from that charge, two of which bear directly on a traffic claim: (a) any interim payment under an order or an agreement having the same effect as an order is excluded outright; and (e) an amount recovered by way of employee's compensation is likewise excluded, except to the extent the charge would apply to the deficiency attributable to a common law claim by the aided person arising out of the same circumstances.

"No win, no fee"

Hong Kong solicitors cannot take court litigation on a purely outcome-contingent basis, and the legal basis for that is the common law of maintenance and champerty — the Legal Practitioners Ordinance contains no provision imposing it (see "Matters this article does not address"). The clearest statutory evidence runs the other way, in the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609), where the Legislative Council disapplied those doctrines for arbitration specifically. Section 98K:

Section 98ZF does the same for an outcome related fee structure agreement for arbitration:

Sections 98K and 98ZF deal with the common law offences. The torts of maintenance and champerty are handled by two further sections. Section 98L:

Section 98ZG does the same for an ORFS agreement:

But the door has a stated width. Section 98M:

Section 98ZH makes the same reservation for sections 98ZF and 98ZG:

So the legislature has opened that door for arbitration and has not opened the same door for court proceedings — and even on the arbitration side a contract may still be contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal, which is exactly what sections 98M and 98ZH preserve.