Traffic Accident Claims in Hong Kong

Three things people believe that the statutes do not say

Each of these three misconceptions is on its own enough to make someone with a live claim give up. Here is each one against the provision.

Misconception 1: "You must report to the police immediately, or it does not count." Sections 56(2A) and (3) of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) say "as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident". Twenty-four hours is a statutory ceiling, not a target — but it is not "immediately" either, and a driver who believes the duty is already broken often simply does not report at all.

Misconception 2: "Three years, and after that the claim is gone." Section 27(3) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) opens with the words "Subject to section 30". Section 27(4) runs the three years from the date the cause of action accrued or from the date of the plaintiff's knowledge, whichever is later. Section 30(1) then gives the court a general power to override the limit. Three years is a starting point, not a door that closes by itself. (The limitation section below takes this provision by provision.)

Misconception 3: "The other driver's insurer says the policy is void, so nobody pays." Section 10(1) of Cap. 272 says close to the opposite: the insurer must pay the judgment "notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy". That provision is the backbone of motor compensation in Hong Kong, and most consumer accounts leave it out entirely.

At the scene: the statute imposes three duties, with three different triggers

Section 56 is not a single "report to the police" rule. It is three duties, three triggers and two penalty levels. Separating them is what tells you which one your accident falls into.

1. Stop (section 56(1))

"Where, owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road, an accident occurs whereby— (a) personal injury is caused to a person other than the driver of that vehicle; or (b) damage is caused to— (i) a vehicle other than that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby; (ii) a specified animal (other than one in or on that vehicle or a trailer drawn by that vehicle); or (iii) any other thing not being in or on that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby, the driver of that vehicle shall stop."

Two points. First, paragraph (a) speaks of personal injury caused "to a person other than the driver of that vehicle" — so where the only injured person is you, the driver, paragraph (a) is not engaged (though subsection (3) below is). Second, paragraph (b) is wider than most people assume: besides another vehicle, it reaches a "specified animal" and "any other thing not being in or on that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby" — railings, lamp posts and road signs included. Section 56(7) defines the animals:

"In this section— specified animal (指明動物) means any horse, cattle, ass, mule, sheep, pig, goat, cat or dog."

Penalty (section 56(5)): "A person who contravenes subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 12 months." Under Schedule 8 to the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221), a level 3 fine is $10,000.

2. Give particulars — but only "if required" (section 56(2))

"In the case of any such accident, the driver of the vehicle shall, if required, give to any police officer or to any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring the following particulars— (a) his name and address; (b) the name and address of the owner of the vehicle; and (c) the registration or identification mark or number of the vehicle."

The operative words are "if required". The subsection does not create a free-standing duty to volunteer your details. But section 56(6) also makes it an offence to knowingly make a false statement in supplying those particulars. In short: you need not offer, but what you do say must be true.

3. Report the accident — within 24 hours (sections 56(2A) and (3))

Property damage (section 56(2A)):

"If, in the case of an accident referred to in subsection (1)(b), the driver of the vehicle for any reason does not give the particulars mentioned in subsection (2), he shall report the accident in person at the nearest police station or to any police officer as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident."

Injury (section 56(3)):

"If the accident involves injury to any person including the driver, the driver shall report the accident in person at the nearest police station or to any police officer as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident, unless the driver is incapable of doing so by reason of injuries sustained by him in the accident."

Three points worth reading slowly.

• The limit is 24 hours, not "immediately". Both subsections use the same formula: "as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident".
• The injury trigger includes the driver's own injury. Subsection (3) says "injury to any person including the driver". A driver who injures only himself and concludes that there is nothing to report is squarely inside subsection (3) — subject to the closing exception, "unless the driver is incapable of doing so by reason of injuries sustained by him in the accident".
• The property-damage trigger is not the other party's absence. Subsection (2A) is triggered where the driver "for any reason does not give the particulars mentioned in subsection (2)". If the other party is present and you gave nothing, you must still report; if the other party is absent but you gave the particulars to someone with reasonable grounds for requiring them, the trigger in (2A) is on its face not met.

Penalty (section 56(6)): "A person who contravenes subsection (2), (2A) or (3) or who knowingly makes a false statement in supplying particulars under subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 4 and to imprisonment for 6 months." A level 4 fine is $25,000 under Schedule 8 to Cap. 221.

In one line. Stopping is unconditional; particulars must be given only when required, but never falsely; the report must be made within 24 hours at the latest, and any injury — including your own — triggers it.

What does the Ordinance attach to a late report? Section 56(6) creates an offence — a level 4 fine and six months' imprisonment. That is the consequence the Ordinance provides for a breach of section 56. What decides the compensation claim is elsewhere: Cap. 272 s.10(2) sets out when the insurer need not pay on a judgment (notice of the proceedings, execution stayed pending appeal, pre-event cancellation, and the policy limit), and Cap. 347 s.27 sets the limitation start. Neither is conditioned on whether the accident was reported.

At the scene and afterwards: what to do in practice

This section is practical advice, not statutory duty. The duties above come from the section; the steps below come from what evidence a claim needs. Nothing in Cap. 374 requires you to take photographs or find witnesses.

• Safety and medical attention first. Call an ambulance if anyone is hurt; do not move a seriously injured person unless their position is an immediate danger.
• Where someone is killed or seriously injured, do not move vehicles or tidy the scene without a police officer's authority. Section 57(1) of Cap. 374:

> "Subject to subsection (2), if owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road an accident occurs in consequence of which any person is killed or seriously injured or serious damage is caused to any vehicle or thing, any person who without the authority of a police officer moves or otherwise interferes with any vehicle involved in the accident or any part of any such vehicle or does any other act which destroys, alters or conceals any evidence of the accident commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 6 months."

Section 57(2) supplies a defence: it is a defence for the person charged to prove that the vehicle was moved or interfered with "for the purpose of saving life, extinguishing fire or meeting any other emergency". So while nothing requires you to photograph the scene or find witnesses, something does forbid you from altering it.

• See a doctor the same day or the next, even if the injury feels minor. Soft-tissue injuries and whiplash often emerge days later, and the first consultation record is frequently the strongest evidence later. Severe or worsening pain, numbness, weakness or any loss of consciousness warrants immediate attendance at A&E.
• Photograph widely. Vehicle positions, damage, road surface, signals, markings and landmarks, from several angles and distances.
• Take witness contact details on the spot. They are almost impossible to recover afterwards.
• Notify your own insurer. Many policies require notification within a stated period, commonly seven days. That is a contractual obligation and it is a wholly different thing from the statutory seven days in Cap. 272 s.10(2)(a) discussed below — different starting point, different consequence. Notification is not an admission of liability.

Who pays? How compulsory third-party insurance works

Hong Kong's system is not "the government pays". It is: the law compels the vehicle to be insured, and then the Ordinance makes the insurer actually pay. Both halves sit in Cap. 272.

First half: the vehicle must be insured (section 4)

"Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance it shall not be lawful for any person to use, or to cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the user of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Ordinance."

Penalty (section 4(2)(a)):

"If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall be liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 12 months, and a person convicted of an offence under this section shall (unless the court for special reasons thinks fit to order otherwise) be disqualified from holding or obtaining a licence to drive a motor vehicle for such period as the court may determine being not less than 12 months nor more than 3 years from the date of conviction."

Section 4(4) contains exemptions (State and Government vehicles, police purposes, certain public-officer functions) and allows an owner who has deposited $2,000,000 with the Director of Accounting Services, and not required its return, to fall outside section 4 in defined circumstances.

"Road" is not confined to public roads. Sections 4(1) and 6(1)(b) both speak of use "on a road", and section 3(1) extends the whole Ordinance beyond them:

"For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to private roads, other than private roads in areas wholly or mainly used for the carrying on of construction work or industry, as they apply to roads and, for that purpose, the provisions of any other Ordinance which relate, in any way, to the provisions of this Ordinance shall apply accordingly."

So an estate's private roads and a car park's internal roadways are inside the compulsory insurance regime. What is carved out is the private road in an area wholly or mainly used for construction work or industry.

Second half: how much the policy must cover (section 6(1)(b) and Cap. 272A reg. 27)

Section 6(1)(b) requires a policy which:

"insures such person, persons or classes of persons as may be specified in the policy in respect of any liability which may be incurred by him or them in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle on a road and arising out of one event for an amount not less than that as may be prescribed:"

The prescribed amount is fixed by regulation 27 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A):

"For the purpose of section 6(1)(b) of the Ordinance, the amount of $100 million is prescribed."

That is $100 million arising out of one event — the statutory floor of protection for a third-party claim, and a figure rarely quoted in consumer coverage.

But section 6(1) carries a proviso that is the seam between this guide and the employees' compensation guide. The policy need not cover:

"liability in respect of the death arising out of and in the course of his employment of a person in the employment of a person insured by the policy or of bodily injury sustained by such a person arising out of and in the course of his employment; or"

In other words: a delivery driver, bus driver or taxi driver injured or killed in the course of employment is not necessarily covered by the motor policy at all. Those cases usually run through the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282) instead — see "Next steps".

That is not the only limb of the proviso. Paragraph (iii) provides that the policy need also not cover:

"any contractual liability."

Third half: the insurer's duty to satisfy the judgment (section 10)

This is the provision that turns a judgment into money. Section 10(1):

"If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under section 6(3) in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under section 6(1)(b) (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability, including any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any law relating to interest on judgments."

So once the injured person has judgment against the insured, the insurer cannot escape merely by saying the policy was avoided or cancelled.

But section 10(2)(a) attaches a statutory notice requirement that is easily missed:

"in respect of any judgment, unless before or within 7 days after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgement was given, the insurer had notice of the bringing of the proceedings; or"

Those seven days and the seven days in your own policy are different animals:

Cancellation before the accident is section 10's own exit. Section 10(2)(c) provides that no sum is payable:

"in connection with any liability, if before the happening of the event which was the cause of the death or bodily injury giving rise to the liability the policy was cancelled by mutual consent or by virtue of any provision contained therein, and either— (i) before the happening of the said event the certificate of insurance was surrendered to the insurer, or the person in whose favour the certificate was issued made a statutory declaration stating that the certificate had been lost or destroyed; or (ii) after the happening of the said event, but before the expiration of a period of 14 days from the taking effect of the cancellation of the policy, the certificate was surrendered to the insurer, or the person in whose favour the certificate was issued made such a statutory declaration as aforesaid; or (iii) either before or after the happening of the said event, but within the said period of 14 days, the insurer has as commenced proceedings under this Ordinance in respect of the failure to surrender the certificate; or"

Note how this differs from section 10(1). Section 10(1) is about an insurer who avoids or cancels and must pay anyway. Paragraph (2)(c) is about a policy already cancelled by mutual consent or under its own terms before the event, where the certificate was then surrendered (or declared lost, or proceedings commenced for the failure to surrender) inside the stated periods. Every one of those elements must be present before the paragraph relieves the insurer.

Two further limits in section 10 are worth knowing. Section 10(2)(d) caps the insurer's obligation at the amount covered by the policy of insurance "after deducting therefrom any amount which is either paid or due and payable by the insurer under the policy (otherwise than by virtue of the judgment) in respect of the same event". Section 10(3) lets an insurer escape entirely by obtaining, in an action commenced before or within three months after the proceedings, a declaration that it was entitled to avoid the policy for non-disclosure or material misrepresentation. The proviso to that subsection is narrower than it is usually stated to be: it is not a free-standing duty to notify, but a condition on the insurer's benefit, and it bites only "as respects any judgement obtained in proceedings commenced before the commencement of that action". Where it does bite, the insurer keeps the benefit only if, before or within 7 days after commencing that action, it has given notice to the plaintiff in those proceedings "specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely" — and the person so notified "shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto". So where the insurer moves first, no notice is owed at all.

Fourth: the passenger, and the right to demand insurance particulars (sections 12 and 13)

Two sections of Cap. 272 answer the questions readers ask most often, and neither is widely reported.

A passenger's claim cannot be signed away in advance. Section 12(2) provides that where a person uses a motor vehicle on a road in circumstances requiring insurance under section 4(1), and another person is carried in or upon the vehicle, "any antecedent agreement or understanding between them (whether intended to be legally binding or not) shall be of no effect" so far as it purports or might be held to negative or restrict the user's liability to persons so carried, or to impose conditions on enforcing it — and:

"the fact that a person so carried has willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence on the part of the user shall not be treated as negativing any such liability of the user."

Section 12(3)(a) extends "carried in or upon" to "a person entering or getting on to, or alighting from, the vehicle". Section 12(1)(c) separately makes a policy restriction by reference to "the number of persons that the vehicle carries" of no effect as respects the liabilities section 6(1)(b) requires to be covered.

Where the other driver will not say whether he was insured, section 13 makes the answer compellable. Section 13(1):

"Any person against whom a claim is made in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under section 6(1)(b) shall, on demand by or on behalf of the person making the claim, state whether or not he was insured in respect of that liability by any policy having effect for purposes of this Ordinance, or would have been so insured if the insurer had not avoided or cancelled the policy, and, if he was or would have been so insured, give such particulars with respect to that policy as were specified in the certificate of insurance issued in respect thereof under section 6(3)."

Section 13(2):

"If, without reasonable excuse, any person fails to comply with the provisions of this section, or wilfully makes any false statement in reply to any such demand as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an offence."

So the demand can be made by you or on your behalf, it reaches the certificate particulars, and refusing it without reasonable excuse — or answering it falsely — is an offence.

The bankruptcy or winding up of the driver or fleet operator does not extinguish the section 6(1)(b) liability. Section 11:

"Where a certificate of insurance has been issued under section 6(3) in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, the happening in relation to any person insured by the policy of any such event as is mentioned in section 2(1) or (2) of the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Ordinance (Cap. 273) shall, notwithstanding anything in that Ordinance, not affect any such liability of that person as is required to be covered by a policy under section 6(1)(b), but nothing in this section shall affect any rights against the insurer conferred by that Ordinance on the person to whom the liability was incurred."

The long title of Cap. 273 states its purpose: "To confer on third parties rights against insurers of third party risks in the event of the insured becoming insolvent, and in certain other events."

No insurance, hit-and-run, stolen vehicle: the Motor Insurers' Bureau

No Ordinance establishes the MIB — but four pieces of Hong Kong legislation name it: the Rules of the High Court, the Rules of the District Court, the Legal Aid Ordinance and the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance. Each tells you something practical.

• The court can order a defendant to pay part of the money before trial, and the Bureau's involvement is what makes some defendants eligible. Order 29, rule 11(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A) allows the court, on an application under rule 10, to order "the respondent" — defined in that paragraph as the defendant against whom the order is sought — to make an interim payment. The person ordered to pay is the defendant, not the Bureau. Rule 11(2) is a negative gate on that power, and it is where the Bureau appears:

> "No order shall be made under paragraph (1) in an action for personal injuries if it appears to the Court that the defendant is not a person falling within one of the following categories, namely— (a) a person who is insured in respect of the plaintiff’s claim or whose liability in respect of the plaintiff’s claim will be met by the following person— (i) an insurer under section 10 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272); or (ii) an insurer who is a party to an agreement with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong; or (iii) the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong; (b) a public authority; or (c) a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment."

The Bureau in paragraph (2)(a)(iii) therefore figures as the person who will meet the defendant's liability, which is what brings the defendant inside the category — not as the payer under the order. Note category (c) as well: a wholly uninsured private defendant with the means to pay is himself inside the gate.

Rule 11(3) defines the agreement referred to:

> "In paragraph (2)(a)(ii), agreement (協議) means the domestic agreement between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong and the insurance companies and Lloyd’s underwriters authorized to carry on motor vehicle insurance business in Hong Kong, made on 1 February 1981, as amended from time to time."

Order 29, rule 11 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336 sub. leg. H) is to the same effect, with two immaterial differences of wording: its rule 11(1)(c) reads “2 or more defendants” where Cap. 4 sub. leg. A reads “two or more defendants”, and its rule 11(2)(a)(i) has no closing “or”.

• Legal aid can cover negotiating with the MIB, even where no proceedings are issued. Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5:

> "5. Negotiations prior to the issue of legal proceedings, including mediation, and for the payment of compensation by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau for which no legal proceedings are issued."

• There is a separate MIB-administered fund for insurer insolvency. Schedule 1 item 2 to the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance (Cap. 628), in full:

> "The Insolvency Fund administered by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong that protects claims under a policy as defined by regulation 2 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A)."

The closing words are what tie the fund to motor policies as Cap. 272 sub. leg. A defines them.

• The Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Fund is established by Ordinance. Section 3(1) of the Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance (Cap. 229): "There is hereby established a fund for assisting traffic accident victims and their dependants." What the fund pays out is in section 4:

> "There shall be paid from the fund— (a) all moneys payable to traffic accident victims and their dependants in accordance with the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme approved by the Legislative Council together with any amendments to the Scheme or any replacement of the Scheme which may be approved by the Legislative Council; (b) any refund of levies made under section 5(9); and (c) the cost of any administration fee charged under section 12."

So the Fund is statutory, while the Scheme — its eligibility rules, deadlines and rates — is approved by the Legislative Council and sits outside the Ordinance’s text. In an uninsured, hit-and-run or stolen-vehicle case, Cap. 229 is a second avenue to ask about alongside the Bureau.

The MIB's arrangements sit outside the legislation. The MIB's scope of compensation, its application procedure, its deadlines, and the earlier-notification requirement often mentioned in consumer coverage all derive from agreements between the MIB, the Government and the insurance industry — the domestic agreement of 1 February 1981 named in O. 29 r. 11(3) being one of them. Those agreements are not part of the statute book.

Limitation: three years is a starting point, not a door that closes by itself

If one section of this article is worth reading slowly, it is this one. Someone who assumes "more than three years, so there is no point asking" may be giving up a claim that is still alive.

Layer one: three years from when?

Section 27(1) sets the scope:

"This section applies to any action for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty (whether the duty exists by virtue of a contract or of provision made by or under an Ordinance or imperial enactment or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance or breach of duty consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the plaintiff or any other person."

Then section 27(3) — note its opening words:

"Subject to section 30, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5)."

Then section 27(4):

"Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is 3 years from— (a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or (b) the date (if later) of the plaintiff’s knowledge."

The weight is on paragraph (b). The period is not three years from the accident; it is three years from accrual or from the plaintiff's knowledge, whichever is the later. The Ordinance then spends three subsections defining knowledge. Section 27(6):

"In this section, and in section 28, references to a person’s date of knowledge are references to the date on which he first had knowledge of the following facts— (a) that the injury in question was significant; and (b) that that injury was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty; and (c) the identity of the defendant; and (d) if it is alleged that the act or omission was that of a person other than the defendant, the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant, and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant."

Section 27(7) defines what makes an injury significant:

"For the purposes of this section an injury is significant if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment."

Section 27(8) deals with constructive knowledge and expert advice:

"For the purposes of this section and section 28 a person’s knowledge includes knowledge which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire— (a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or (b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek, but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice."

Why this matters to a reader. The injuries that most often arrive late in road accidents — whiplash, disc herniation, post-traumatic psychiatric conditions — are frequently not diagnosed as significant, or not attributed to the collision, until well after the event. The statute expressly ties the starting point to that moment, not to the day of the crash.

Layer two: the court's power to override (section 30)

Section 30(1):

"If it appears to the court that it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed having regard to the degree to which— (a) the provisions of section 27 or 28 prejudice the plaintiff or any person whom he represents; and (b) any decision of the court under this subsection would prejudice the defendant or any person whom he represents, the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates."

Section 30(3) lists the factors the court must consider:

"In acting under this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case and in particular to— (a) the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the plaintiff; (b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced by the plaintiff or the defendant is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had been brought within the time allowed by section 27 or 28, as the case may be; (c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent, if any, to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant; (d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action; (e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; (f) the steps, if any taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice and the nature of any such advice he may have received."

Layer three: disability (section 22)

Section 22(1) opens:

"If on the date when any right of action accrued for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired:"

Section 22(2) adjusts that period for personal injury and fatal accident actions:

"If the action is one to which section 27 or 28(3) applies subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “3 years”."

Section 22(3) defines disability:

"For the purposes of this section and section 22A, a person shall be deemed to be under a disability while he is an infant or of unsound mind, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions of this subsection, a person shall be conclusively presumed to be of unsound mind while he is detained in pursuance of any Ordinance or imperial enactment authorizing the detention of persons of unsound mind, including persons convicted of offences or awaiting trial, or while he is receiving treatment voluntarily under the provisions of the Mental Health Ordinance (Cap. 136)."

So a person who was a minor at the date of the accident has three years running from the date the disability ends. Full age is fixed by section 2(1) of the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 410): "As from the commencement of this Ordinance a person shall attain full age on attaining the age of 18 years."

Two things in section 22(1) have to be read to the end. First, majority is not the only starting date. The period runs "from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred". Where a child dies before reaching 18, the period runs from the death — not from a birthday that never arrives.

Second, section 22(1) carries four provisos, and proviso (a) can remove the extension altogether:

"(a) this section shall not affect any case where the right of action first accrued to some person (not under a disability) through whom the person under a disability claims; (b) when a right of action which has accrued to a person under a disability accrues, on the death of that person while still under a disability, to another person under disability, no further extension of time shall be allowed by reason of the disability of the second person; (c) no action to recover land or money charged on land shall be brought by virtue of this section by any person after the expiration of 30 years from the date on which the right of action accrued to that person or some person through whom he claims; (d) this section shall not apply to any action to recover a penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way thereof, by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment, except where the action is brought by an aggrieved party."

Layer four: where the injured person dies part-way

Section 27(5):

"If the person injured dies before the expiration of the period in subsection (4), the period as respects the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate of the deceased by virtue of section 20 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) shall be 3 years from— (a) the date of death; or (b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge, whichever is the later."

Layer five: fatal accident actions (section 28)

Section 28(1): "This section has effect subject to section 30."

Section 28(3):

"An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought after the expiration of 3 years from— (a) the date of death; or (b) the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought, whichever is the later."

So it is not simply "three years from death" — it is the later of death and the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought.

Section 28(2), however, is a separate and harder bar:

"An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall not be brought if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Ordinance or in any other Ordinance, or any other reason); and where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 27, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 30."

If the deceased could no longer have sued at the date of death, the family cannot bring a Fatal Accidents Ordinance action either.

But section 30(2) is a gateway as much as a limit, and it is read the wrong way round more often than any other provision in this Ordinance. In full:

"The court shall not under this section disapply section 28(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 27; so that if, for example, the person injured could at his death no longer maintain an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) because of the time limit under the Carriage by Air Ordinance (Cap. 500), the court has no power to direct that section 28(2) shall not apply."

Read the "except where". What is excluded is disapplication where some other Ordinance's time limit did the barring — the subsection supplies its own example. What is permitted is disapplication where the reason was "the time limit in section 27", which is exactly the position of a road accident family whose relative's own three-year personal injury period had run before the death. In that case, and subject to the court's discretion under section 30(1), the court does have power to direct that section 28(2) shall not apply. Section 30(6) then carries the direction into the Fatal Accidents Ordinance itself:

"A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 28(2) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22)."

None of this is automatic — section 30(1) is discretionary and the section 30(3) factors govern how it is exercised. Where it was the deceased's own delay that ran the clock out, section 30(4) redirects the enquiry to him:

"In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 27, he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased."

Section 30(5) then provides that where a time limit depends on the date of knowledge of someone other than the plaintiff, the section 30(3) factors apply with appropriate modifications, references to the plaintiff including that person. The point is narrower and it matters: a family whose relative died more than three years after the collision has not necessarily hit a closed door.

Fatal accident limitation is its own code, not an appendix to section 27. Section 28(4):

"Subsection (3) shall not apply to an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by or under any Ordinance other than this Ordinance, and section 27 shall not apply to an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22)."

Section 28(5):

"An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be one to which section 22 applies, but otherwise sections 22 to 26, inclusive, and Part IV shall not apply to the action."

So section 27 does not govern the fatal claim; the disability extension in section 22 does; sections 23 to 26 and Part IV do not.

Where there is more than one beneficiary, the clock is run against each of them separately. Section 29(1) applies the section where an action is brought for the benefit of more than one person. Section 29(2):

"Section 28(3)(b) shall be applied separately to each of them, and if that would debar one or more of them, but not all, the court shall direct that any person who would be so debarred shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought unless it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of that person it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation (whether in consequence of section 22, or an agreement between the parties not to raise the defence, or otherwise)."

One dependant being out of time therefore does not sink the action: that person is excluded and the others go on.

Where the driver concealed his identity, section 26 separately postpones the limitation period for fraud or deliberate concealment.

Property damage: six years, but only where the claim is property alone

Pure property loss — vehicle repair, contents — runs under section 4(1):

"The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say—"

Paragraph (1)(a) is "actions founded on simple contract or on tort;" — a claim confined to vehicle and property loss is an action founded on tort, and the period is six years.

The qualification carries more weight than the rule. Section 27(1) applies wherever the damages claimed "consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries", and section 27(2) then provides:

"Section 4 shall not apply to an action to which this section applies."

So in the ordinary road accident, where one action claims for the injury and for the repair bill and the broken spectacles together, section 4 is disapplied outright and the whole claim — property heads included — runs on the three-year section 27 clock. Six years is available only where the action claims no personal injury at all. An injured claimant who assumes six years for the repairs and files in year four loses the property heads with the rest.

In one line. Three years is the norm, not a wall: the clock can start at the date of knowledge, the court can override, and disability extends. But the converse must be equally clear — every one of those depends on judicial discretion or on facts you have to prove. None is automatic. The right response is not to rely on an extension; it is to take your documents to a solicitor even when you think you are out of time, because identifying the starting point is itself a legal question.

What can be claimed

"General damages" is a common law classification and does not appear in the legislation; "special damages" is a term the rules of court use. Order 18, rule 12(1A) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A):

"Subject to paragraph (1B), a plaintiff in an action for personal injuries shall serve with his statement of claim— (a) a medical report; and (b) a statement of the special damages claimed."

What happens if a plaintiff does not comply? Rule 12(1B) answers exactly that:

"Where the documents to which paragraph (1A) applies are not served with the statement of claim, the Court may— (a) specify the period of time within which they are to be provided; or (b) make such other order as it thinks fit (including an order dispensing with the requirement of paragraph (1A) or staying the proceedings.)"

In other words: missing the medical report or the special damages statement does not void the claim automatically — the Court can fix a fresh deadline, waive the requirement outright, or stay the proceedings.

Rule 12(1C) defines that statement as "a statement giving full particulars of the special damages claimed for expenses and losses already incurred and an estimate of any future expenses and losses (including loss of earnings and of pension rights)". The Chinese text of the rules renders the term 專項損害賠償 — not the 特殊損害賠償 in common consumer usage. The Rules of the District Court are in corresponding terms.

General damages — pain, suffering and loss of amenities of life, assessed by the court against the injury, the course of treatment and the residual effects.

Special damages — losses capable of being itemised: medical expenses, travel to treatment, past loss of earnings, future loss of earnings, care costs, vehicle repair or write-off, damaged contents, and the cost of alternative transport.

One procedural right few claimants know about: interim payments. In a personal injury action you need not wait until the end of trial to see any money. Order 29, rule 11(1) of the Rules of the High Court:

"If, on the hearing of an application under rule 10 in an action for damages, the Court is satisfied— (a) that the defendant against whom the order is sought (in this paragraph referred to as the respondent) has admitted liability for the plaintiff’s damages; or (b) that the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed; or (c) that, if the action proceeded to trial, the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the respondent or, where there are two or more defendants, against any of them, the Court may, if it thinks fit and subject to paragraph (2), order the respondent to make an interim payment of such amount as it thinks just, not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the Court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account any relevant contributory negligence and any set-off, cross-claim or counterclaim on which the respondent may be entitled to rely."

Order 29, rule 11 of the Rules of the District Court is in corresponding terms. Note the closing words of paragraph (1): the ceiling on an interim payment is already net of whatever apportionment for the claimant's own fault the court thinks relevant. Note also that paragraph (2) is a negative gate — in a personal injuries action no such order may be made unless the defendant falls within one of three categories (insured, or with his liability met by a motor insurer or the Motor Insurers' Bureau; a public authority; or a person whose means and resources enable him to make the payment). It is quoted in full in the Bureau section above.

A discovery rule written for road accidents. Order 25, rule 8(1)(a) sets out directions that take effect automatically once pleadings are deemed closed:

"there shall be discovery of documents within 14 days in accordance with Order 24, rule 2, and inspection within 7 days thereafter, save that where liability is admitted, or where the action arises out of a road accident, discovery shall be limited to disclosure by the plaintiff of any documents relating to special damages;"

In a road accident action, in other words, the automatic discovery obligation falls on the plaintiff and is confined to the special damages documents. Rule 8(1)(d) adds:

"photographs, a sketch plan and the contents of any police accident report shall be receivable in evidence at the trial and shall be agreed if possible;"

Which is the answer to a question the practical section above leaves open: no Ordinance requires you to photograph the scene, but the rules of court expressly contemplate that photographs, a sketch plan and the police accident report will be in evidence at trial.

Apportionment: the statute's own term is 共分疏忽

This is a wording point, but it affects how you search for the law. Most consumer writing uses 共同疏忽. The section that creates the doctrine — section 21 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) — is headed "Apportionment of liability in case of contributory negligence", and the Chinese text of that heading and of section 21(10) uses 共分疏忽. The string 共同疏忽 does not appear anywhere in the Chinese text of Cap. 23. (Both spellings exist in the statute book: 共分疏忽 appears in Cap. 23, Cap. 300 and Cap. 336; 共同疏忽 appears in Cap. 4 sub. leg. A and Cap. 336 sub. leg. H, the two sets of rules of court. The Ordinance that creates the doctrine uses 共分疏忽.)

Section 21(1):

"Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage, but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant’s share in the responsibility for the damage: Provided that— (a) this subsection shall not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract; (b) where any contract or enactment providing for the limitation of liability is applicable to the claim, the amount of damages recoverable by the claimant by virtue of this subsection shall not exceed the maximum limit so applicable."

Three things to notice.

First, the operative concept is "fault", which is wider than negligence. Section 21(10):

"fault (過失) means negligence, breach of statutory duty or other act or omission which gives rise to a liability in tort or would, apart from this section, give rise to the defence of contributory negligence."

So a breach of statutory duty can itself amount to fault and be apportioned, without proof of common law negligence. Seatbelts and helmets have their statutory root in section 10 of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374): section 10(1) empowers the Secretary to make regulations “permitting or requiring the provision or use of specified safety equipment by persons driving, riding in or on, or using, any class of vehicle”, and section 10(4) says what that equipment is—

"The following shall be specified safety equipment for the purposes of this section— (a) crash helmets; (b) safety belts and means of securing safety belts; (c) fire fighting equipment."

The wearing duty itself therefore sits in regulations made under section 10, whose text is outside the chapters listed in Sources for this article.

Second, the court must record the undiminished total. Section 21(2):

"Where damages are recoverable by any person by virtue of subsection (1) subject to such reduction as is therein mentioned, the court shall find and record the total damages which would have been recoverable if the claimant had not been at fault."

That is practically useful: the judgment will show both the total that would have been recoverable and the reduction, so you can see how your figure was arrived at.

Third, fatal claims are reduced proportionately too. Section 21(4):

"Where any person dies as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person or persons, and accordingly if an action were brought for the benefit of the estate under section 20 the damages recoverable would be reduced under subsection (1), any damages recoverable in an action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be reduced to a proportionate extent."

Note also proviso (a) to section 21(1): the subsection "shall not operate to defeat any defence arising under a contract".

Three further subsections bear directly on road accidents. Section 21(3) sends contribution between multiple wrongdoers to a different Ordinance:

"The Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance (Cap. 377) shall apply in any case where 2 or more persons are liable or would, if they had all been sued, be liable by virtue of subsection (1) in respect of the damage suffered by any person."

Where two drivers are both at fault, apportionment between them is Cap. 377's subject. Section 21(4A) carries the same proportionate reduction into a section 20C loss-of-society award:

"Where an action is brought under section 20C for the loss of the society of another in circumstances where any damages recoverable by that other in proceedings brought by him would be reduced under subsection (1) of this section, any damages awarded for such loss shall be reduced to a proportionate extent."

And section 21(6) provides that where the case is tried with a jury, it is the jury that determines the undiminished total and the extent of the reduction.

Fatal accidents: three distinct routes

The estate, the dependants, and those entitled to bereavement damages are three different claims, arising under two Ordinances.

Who brings the action is settled first, by Cap. 22 s.5. Section 5(1):

"An action under this Ordinance shall be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the deceased."

Section 5(2):

"If— (a) there is no executor or administrator of the deceased; or (b) no action is brought within 6 months after the death by and in the name of an executor or administrator of the deceased, the action may be brought by and in the name of all or any of the persons for whose benefit an executor or administrator could have brought it."

Section 5(3): "Not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject-matter of complaint." So the fatal claim is in principle brought once, by the executor or administrator. Only where there is none, or none has sued within six months of the death, may the beneficiaries sue in their own names.

1. The dependants' loss of support (Cap. 22 s.3)

"If death is caused to any person (the deceased) by any wrongful act, neglect or default which is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the deceased to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then subject to section 4(2) an action for damages may be brought for the benefit of the dependants of the deceased against the person who would have been liable in damages to the deceased in respect of that wrongful act, neglect or default."

Who counts as a "dependant" is defined by Cap. 22 s.2(1), and the list is wider than most readers assume — paragraphs (a) to (j):

"dependant (受養人), in relation to a deceased person, means— (a) the wife, husband, former wife or former husband of the deceased and any person whose marriage to the deceased has been annulled or declared void; (b) a concubine lawfully taken by the deceased before 7 October 1971; (c) any person who— (i) was living with the deceased in the same household immediately before the date of his death; and (ii) had been living with the deceased in the same household for at least 2 years before that date, as the husband or wife of the deceased; (d) any parent or other ascendant of the deceased; (e) any person (not being a parent of the deceased) who, during any marriage to which that person was a party, treated the deceased as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; (f) any child or other descendant of the deceased; (g) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, during any marriage to which the deceased was at any time a party, was treated by the deceased as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; (h) any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the deceased; (i) any person who is, or is the issue of, a brother or sister of a grandparent of the deceased; (j) any godchild or godparent of the deceased according to Chinese custom"

Funeral expenses are also not confined to the estate's route. Section 6(5):

"In assessing damages in any action brought under this Ordinance the funeral expenses of the deceased person, if such expenses have been incurred by the parties for whose benefit the action is brought, shall be taken into account."

2. The estate's own claim (Cap. 23 s.20)

Causes of action already vested in the deceased survive for the benefit of the estate, subject to four limits in section 20(2), not one or two. Under section 20(2)(a) the damages "shall not include any exemplary damages;". Section 20(2)(b) then has three sub-paragraphs. Under section 20(2)(b)(i) the damages shall, where the death was caused by the same act or omission:

"(i) be calculated without reference to any loss or gain to his estate consequent on his death, except that a sum in respect of funeral expenses may be included;"

So funeral expenses can form part of the estate's claim, but what the estate gains or loses by reason of the death does not.

Section 20(2)(b)(ii) requires that the damages:

"not include any damages in respect of loss of ability to render services after his death;"

Section 20(2)(b)(iii) is the "lost years" head, often the largest single item in the estate's claim after a fatal road accident:

"not include any damages for loss of property, whether income or otherwise, in respect of any period after his death, except in so far as the court is satisfied that, but for the act or omission that gave rise to the cause of action, the deceased would have achieved an accumulation of wealth by the time that he would otherwise have died, in which case damages may be awarded in respect of the loss of that wealth: Provided that damages awarded under this sub-paragraph shall be subject to such deduction as the court considers it just to make in the circumstances of any particular case on account of the accelerated receipt of that wealth and in order to avoid over-compensation."

One further subsection explains why these three routes have to be kept apart. Section 20(1A):

"The right of a person to claim under section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) (for bereavement) or under section 20C(1) of this Ordinance (for loss of society) shall not survive for the benefit of his estate on his death."

The bereavement and loss-of-society claims are personal to the claimant: they do not pass into that claimant's own estate on death.

3. Bereavement (Cap. 22 s.4)

Section 4(2):

"A claim for damages for bereavement shall only be for the benefit of such of the following persons as survive the deceased for not less than 30 days—"

Paragraphs (a) to (h) then set out a closed and strictly ordered list, and each paragraph has to be read to its end:

• (a) the spouse — "the wife or husband of the deceased, unless they had been living apart for a continuous period of at least 2 years immediately preceding the death of the deceased; or" (the separation must be for a continuous period);
• (b) children; (c) a spouse who had been living apart; (d) a concubine taken before 7 October 1971;
• (e) where no one can claim under (a) to (d), "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d), any person who— (i) was living with the deceased in the same household immediately before the date of his death; and (ii) had been living with the deceased in the same household for at least 2 years before that date, as the husband or wife of the deceased; or" — both limbs must be satisfied, not the two-year limb alone;
• (f) "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), the parents of the deceased or (if the deceased was illegitimate) his mother; or" — the provision carries the "(if the deceased was illegitimate) his mother" branch;
• (g) "where there is no person by or for whom a claim can be made under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) or (f), but the deceased was at the date of his death a minor, any person who during any marriage to which that person was a party treated the deceased as a son or daughter of the family in relation to that marriage; or" — the person must have treated the deceased as a child of the family during a marriage to which that person was a party, and the deceased must have been a minor at the date of death;
• (h) siblings.

If anyone qualifies under an earlier paragraph, the later ones are never reached.

The amount is in the Ordinance itself, not in any government announcement:

"Subject to subsection (4), the sum to be awarded as damages under this section shall be $253,500."

Where there is more than one claimant, section 4(4): "Where there is a claim for damages under this section for the benefit of 2 or more persons, the sum awarded shall be divided equally between them (subject to any deduction falling to be made in respect of costs not recovered from the defendant)."

That figure moves, and the mechanism by which it moves is in section 4(5):

"The Legislative Council may by resolution amend subsection (3) by varying the sum specified therein."

(The $253,500 in section 4(3) was last amended by L.N. 80 of 2025. It moves by resolution of the Legislative Council, so it is a statutory figure that changes by resolution rather than a fixed sum.)

The same figure caps another head of damages. Section 20C(2) of Cap. 23, on loss of society:

"The total sum awarded as damages under subsection (1) in respect of any injured person— (a) shall not exceed the sum specified in section 4(3) of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22); and (b) shall, where there are 2 or more claimants, be divided equally between them."

But loss of society is not a fourth route for a bereaved family. It is the head available to the relatives of an injured person who survives, and it and bereavement are mutually exclusive. Each Ordinance closes the door from its own side. Cap. 23 s.20C(3):

"Damages shall not be payable by virtue of subsection (1) if the injured person dies as a result of the act, neglect or default referred to in that subsection and his death gives rise to a right to claim damages for bereavement under section 4 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22)."

And Cap. 22 s.4(1):

"An action under this Ordinance may consist of or include a claim for damages for bereavement unless, by reason of the act, neglect or default referred to in section 3, any person has recovered, by action or otherwise, a sum in respect of loss of the deceased’s society under section 20C(1) of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23)."

Section 20C(2) is set out above because it fixes the same $253,500 as the ceiling on loss of society, not because a family can have both arising from one death.

Limitation for fatal claims is Cap. 347 s.28(3) above: the later of the date of death and the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought.

Which court, and can you afford it?

Court levels

District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), section 32(1):

"The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on contract, quasi-contract or tort where the amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed $3,000,000."

Section 32(2) explains how "the amount of the plaintiff's claim" is worked out:

"In this section and in section 34, the amount of the plaintiff’s claim means the amount the plaintiff claims after taking into account— (a) any set-off or any debt or demand the defendant claims or may recover from the plaintiff; (b) any compensation, as defined in section 3 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282), paid to the plaintiff under that Ordinance; and (c) any contributory negligence, that the plaintiff admits in his statement of claim."

The closing words — "that the plaintiff admits in his statement of claim" — attach to paragraph (c) on the face of the English text. What is deducted at this stage is what the pleading concedes.

The two authentic texts are laid out slightly differently here: the Chinese text repeats 「在其申索陳述書中所承認的」 inside each of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) separately, while the English closing words follow (c) alone. This site's reading: this article follows the Chinese text's structure — all three limbs need admission in the pleading before they are deducted. That is a construction of the English text, not something the English text states expressly on its own.

Being above $3,000,000 does not compel a claimant into the Court of First Instance. Section 34(1) lets the plaintiff abandon the excess:

"The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an action that is in excess of the Court’s monetary jurisdiction limit on the plaintiff abandoning the amount of the plaintiff’s claim in excess and the action is one in which the Court otherwise has jurisdiction."

The price is in sections 34(2) and (3): the Court cannot award more than its limit, and its judgment "is in full discharge of all demands in the cause of action". The abandoned part is given up for good.

The traffic also runs the other way. Section 43(3) requires the Court of First Instance to transfer down an action or proceeding, other than a counterclaim, that appears to the Court of First Instance likely to be within the District Court's jurisdiction:

"The Court of First Instance is required to make an order under this section unless it is of the opinion that, by reason of the importance or complexity of any issue arising in the action or proceeding, or for any other reason, the action or proceeding ought to remain in the Court of First Instance."

The Small Claims Tribunal's monetary limit is $75,000 (Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), Schedule, paragraph 1). That is not merely a figure; it is an exclusive forum, and it governs whether you may have a lawyer and whether legal aid is available. Section 5(2):

"Save as provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any other court in Hong Kong."

Section 5(3) is an exception to that: "A claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal may be brought in another court if there is included in such claim a claim for some other relief, redress or remedy, other than a claim for costs."

Section 9(1) contains the Cap. 338 analogue of Cap. 336 s.34(1): a claimant whose claim exceeds the Schedule amount may abandon the excess and bring the claim within the Tribunal's jurisdiction, and section 9(2) makes the Tribunal's award "in full discharge of all demands in respect of the claim".

Rights of audience are set by section 19(1):

"The following persons shall have a right of audience before the tribunal— (a) any party; (b) an officer or servant of a corporation, if the corporation is a party; (c) a member of a partnership, if the persons comprising the partnership are parties; (d) with the leave of the tribunal, any person, other than counsel or a solicitor, who is authorized in writing by a party to appear as his representative; (Amended 14 of 2003 s. 12) (e) a public officer, not being a barrister or solicitor, who appears on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, if the Secretary for Justice is a party."

Note the words "other than counsel or a solicitor" in paragraph (d). Add item 9 of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), which makes "In the Small Claims Tribunal, proceedings under the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)" an excepted proceeding. So a traffic claim at or under $75,000 — most often the pure vehicle-repair claim — belongs in the Small Claims Tribunal, cannot be argued there by a lawyer, and is outside legal aid.

Legal aid

Ordinary legal aid — Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), section 5(1):

"Legal aid to which this section applies shall, subject to and in accordance with this Ordinance, be available for any person whose financial resources do not exceed $452,320, for the civil proceedings mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 2, except proceedings mentioned in Part 2 of that Schedule."

Part 1 of Schedule 2 covers civil proceedings in the Court of Final Appeal, the Court of Appeal, the Court of First Instance and the District Court — and, as noted above, item 5 separately covers pre-action negotiations, including negotiations for compensation paid by the Motor Insurers' Bureau.

The Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme covers a band above that. The financial resources band in section 5A(b) is:

"whose financial resources exceed $452,320 but do not exceed $2,261,600,"

Schedule 3 Part 1 item 1:

"1. In the Court of First Instance or Court of Appeal, civil proceedings brought, by the person seeking legal aid (claimant), for damages in a claim arising from personal injuries to, or the death of, any person (including proceedings for the defence to a counterclaim against the claimant and other proceedings incidental to the civil proceedings); and in a higher court, proceedings that are related to the claim."

Item 2 (District Court):

"2. For a claim for damages arising from personal injuries to, or the death of, a person that, in the opinion of the Director, is likely to exceed the specified amount— (a) civil proceedings brought in the District Court for the claim by the person seeking legal aid (claimant), including proceedings for the defence to a counterclaim against the claimant and other proceedings incidental to the civil proceedings; and (b) proceedings in a higher court that are related to the claim."

That "specified amount" is not defined in section 2. It is defined in Schedule 3, Part 3, paragraph 1 — the interpretation provision for Schedule 3 itself — as "the monetary limit specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)", which is $75,000.

(The financial resources limits in sections 5 and 5A are amended by Legal Notice, most recently L.N. 29 of 2026. The Cap. 336 figure of $3,000,000 and the Cap. 338 figure of $75,000 likewise move by Legal Notice.)

Financial eligibility is only half of it. Section 10(3) imposes a merits threshold:

"A person shall not be granted a legal aid certificate in connection with any proceedings unless he shows that he has reasonable grounds for taking, defending, opposing or continuing such proceedings or being a party thereto …"

The paragraphs (a) to (g) that follow in the same subsection set out further grounds on which the Director may refuse aid.

And one provision decides how much of an award an aided claimant keeps. Section 18A(1) creates the Director's first charge:

"Subject to this section— (a) the amount of a contribution to the extent that it is unpaid; and (b) except where legal aid has been granted under the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme, if the total contribution is less than the net liability of the Director on the aided person’s account, a sum equal to the deficiency, shall be a first charge for the benefit of the Director on any property, whether situated in Hong Kong or otherwise, which is recovered or preserved for the aided person in the proceedings or in any other proceedings in respect of which the person was aided and which, in the opinion of the Director, were substantially related to or connected with the proceedings in which property was recovered or preserved."

So property recovered or preserved in the aided proceedings answers first for any unpaid contribution; and, outside the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme, for any deficiency where the total contribution falls short of the Director's net liability on the aided person's account. But section 18A(5) exempts specific sums from that charge, two of which bear directly on a traffic claim: (a) any interim payment under an order or an agreement having the same effect as an order is excluded outright; and (e) an amount recovered by way of employee's compensation is likewise excluded, except to the extent the charge would apply to the deficiency attributable to a common law claim by the aided person arising out of the same circumstances.

"No win, no fee"

Hong Kong solicitors cannot take court litigation on a purely outcome-contingent basis, and the legal basis for that is the common law of maintenance and champerty — the Legal Practitioners Ordinance contains no provision imposing it. The clearest statutory evidence runs the other way, in the Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609), where the Legislative Council disapplied those doctrines for arbitration specifically. Section 98K:

"The common law offences of maintenance (including the common law offence of champerty) and of being a common barrator do not apply in relation to third party funding of arbitration."

Section 98ZF does the same for an outcome related fee structure agreement for arbitration:

"The common law offences of maintenance (including the common law offence of champerty) and of being a common barrator do not apply in relation to an ORFS agreement for arbitration."

Sections 98K and 98ZF deal with the common law offences. The torts of maintenance and champerty are handled by two further sections. Section 98L:

"The tort of maintenance (including the tort of champerty) does not apply in relation to third party funding of arbitration."

Section 98ZG does the same for an ORFS agreement:

"The tort of maintenance (including the tort of champerty) does not apply in relation to an ORFS agreement for arbitration."

But the door has a stated width. Section 98M:

"Sections 98K and 98L do not affect any rule of law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal."

Section 98ZH makes the same reservation for sections 98ZF and 98ZG:

"Sections 98ZF and 98ZG do not affect any rule of law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal."

So the legislature has opened that door for arbitration and has not opened the same door for court proceedings — and even on the arbitration side a contract may still be contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal, which is exactly what sections 98M and 98ZH preserve.

Frequently Asked Questions

Next Steps

• Was the accident in the course of employment? See employees' compensation — the proviso (i) to Cap. 272 s.6(1) is exactly where the two regimes divide.
• Fell in a mall, a street or other public place? See slip-and-fall and public liability claims .
• Want the at-the-scene checklist? See the car crash checklist . Suspect the other side staged it? See crash-for-cash scams .
• Want to see how the courts actually decide these? See traffic accident compensation case digests .

Sources

• Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374), ss. 10, 56, 57 (version in force 15 September 2025)
• Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272), ss. 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13 (version in force 24 August 2025)
• Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A), reg. 27 (version in force 24 August 2025)
• Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), ss. 4, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 (version in force 9 July 2020)
• Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22), ss. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (version in force 16 May 2025)
• Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23), ss. 20, 20C, 21 (version in force 15 February 2017)
• District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), ss. 32, 34, 43 (version in force 18 August 2024)
• Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336 sub. leg. H), Order 23 rule 1, Order 29 rule 11 (version in force 28 March 2025)
• Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A), Order 18 rule 12, Order 22 rules 3 and 20, Order 23 rule 1, Order 25 rule 8, Order 29 rules 10 and 11, Order 80 rules 10 and 11 (version in force 1 October 2025)
• Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), ss. 5, 5A, 10, 18A, 28, Schedule 2 Part 1, Schedule 2 Part 2, Schedule 3 Part 1, Schedule 3 Part 3 (version in force 27 March 2026)
• Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), ss. 5, 9, 19, Schedule paragraph 1 (version in force 28 March 2025)
• Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221), Schedule 8 (version in force 14 May 2026)
• Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609), ss. 98K, 98L, 98M, 98ZF, 98ZG, 98ZH (version in force 16 December 2022)
• Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance (Cap. 628), Schedule 1 (version in force 23 May 2025)
• Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance (Cap. 229), ss. 3, 4 (version in force 2 August 2012)
• Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Ordinance (Cap. 273), long title (version in force 13 December 2018)
• Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282), ss. 14, 26 (version in force 14 May 2026)
• Civil Liability (Contribution) Ordinance (Cap. 377) (named in Cap. 23 s. 21(3); version in force 20 September 2018)
• Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 410), s. 2 (version in force 13 December 2018)