Being Chased for a Debt: the Five Laws That Actually Bind a Collector

The question many people ask

Fifteen calls a day. A call to your supervisor. A poster with your photograph in the lobby. Red paint on the door. Search online and you will find people saying collection agencies are regulated, and people saying Hong Kong has no rules at all.

Neither is accurate. The accurate statement is: Hong Kong has no statute governing debt collection, but a collector is bound by a good deal of law — all of it found somewhere else. Getting that distinction right is what tells you what to say when you call the Police, where a complaint actually goes, and when a debt can no longer be sued on.

If you are in immediate danger, call the Police (999). Everything else starts below.

The one-line position: there is no Hong Kong debt-collection statute

Start with an absence, because it explains a great deal.

No Hong Kong ordinance creates an offence of harassing a debtor, and none regulates debt-collection conduct as such. In the entire Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap. 163), the English text contains not one instance of "harass", "intimidate", "molest" or "pester"; the Chinese text contains not one instance of 滋擾, 騷擾, 纏擾 or 恐嚇.

Do not turn that into the wrong inference. Cap. 163 does create offences: ss. 5(3), 24, 29, 30 and 30A, with s. 31 fixing the liability of a company’s officers. The heaviest is s. 24, headed "Prohibition of excessive interest rates":

Section 24(4): on summary conviction a fine of $500,000 and 2 years; on indictment, a fine of $5,000,000 and 10 years. Section 24(2) makes an agreement or security at more than that rate unenforceable.

That 48 per cent figure is not a fixed constant, and it does not bind every borrower. Section 24(3) lets the Legislative Council alter the rate by resolution, but its proviso adds: "in relation to any agreement for the repayment of any loan or for the payment of interest on any loan which is in force at the date when such rate is so altered, the rate so specified as at the coming into force of such agreement shall continue to apply" — an agreement already in force keeps the old rate rather than jumping to the new one. Section 24(5) carries a further exemption, irrelevant to most readers but worth knowing: "Nothing in this section shall apply to— (a) a loan specified in paragraph 12 in Part 2 of Schedule 1; or (b) as respects such loan, any person who makes such loan", and paragraph 12 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 specifies: "A loan made to a company that has a paid up share capital of not less than $1,000,000 or an equivalent amount in any other approved currency." For that kind of company-borrower, nothing in s. 24 — the offence or the unenforceability — applies at all, so "Any person (whether a money lender or not)... commits an offence" is not the unconditional statement it reads as.

The accurate statement is narrower: no section of Cap. 163 makes a method of collection an offence in itself. The closest it comes is s. 29(6) and (7), which penalise a lender who ignores a written demand from a borrower or a surety — see "What you have in your hand" below.

So what takes over when collection crosses a line is five general regimes, each with its own threshold and its own defences. None of them reduces to "collecting a debt aggressively is a crime". Each is set out below.

1. Intimidation: Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200), s. 24

The section is headed "Certain acts of intimidation prohibited". In full:

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Four things routinely go unread:

• It is not confined to bodily harm. "with any injury to the person, reputation or property" — a threat to ruin your name, or to damage your car, sits in the section alongside a threat to hurt you.
• It is not confined to you. Limb (b) reaches "any third person", and even the reputation or estate of a deceased person.
• The intent limb is wider than merely frightening you. Limb (ii) is "to cause the person so threatened or any other person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do". Pressuring you into doing something the law does not require of you — signing a repayment undertaking on the spot, for instance — falls inside that limb.
• "I never said it to his face" is not a defence. Section 26 is headed "No defence to prove that the threat was not made directly": where the threat was "made or published in some manner with the intention that it should reach the person whom it was intended to alarm, or (as the case may be) whose conduct was intended to be affected", and "it did reach such person", the indirectness is no answer. Relayed through your mother or your colleague, it still counts.

The penalty is in s. 27:

Level 1 is $2,000. That conversion is not a convention but a provision: s. 113B(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) states: "Where an Ordinance provides for a fine for an offence by reference to a level, the fine applicable for the offence is the amount shown for that level in Schedule 8.". (The same route fixes every other level used below — level 2 $5,000, level 3 $10,000, level 4 $25,000, level 5 $50,000, level 6 $100,000.) The custodial exposure, not the fine, is the operative part.

2. Blackmail: Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210), s. 23

Blackmail is not in Cap. 200. It is s. 23 of the Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210) — a distinction that is frequently got wrong.

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Fourteen years — the heaviest exposure in this article apart from arson and s. 60(2) of Cap. 200, where s. 63(1) provides for life imprisonment (next section).

The section then creates a second, separate offence that is much less well known — merely holding the letter is enough:

And the defence sits immediately after it:

Note how subsection (1) is built. A demand with menaces is "unwarranted" by default. That is displaced only if the person making the demand believes both that he has reasonable grounds for the demand and that the menaces are "a proper means of reinforcing the demand". A collector may sincerely believe the money is owed — satisfying (a) — and still fail (b). "But you really do owe it" is not an answer to a blackmail charge.

3. Red paint, glued locks, marked walls, phone barrages: Cap. 200 s. 60, and the Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228)

Section 60 of Cap. 200 is headed "Destroying or damaging property". Subsection (1):

Penalties are in s. 63: other offences under that Part carry "imprisonment for 10 years" on indictment; arson, or an offence under s. 60(2) (endangering life), carries imprisonment for life under s. 63(1).

Two further offences in the same Part need no actual damage at all. Section 61, "Threats to destroy or damage property": "A person who without lawful excuse makes to another a threat, intending that that other would fear it would be carried out,— (a) to destroy or damage any property belonging to that other or a third person … shall be guilty of an offence." Section 62, "Possessing anything with intent to destroy or damage property": "A person who has anything in his custody or under his control intending without lawful excuse to use it or cause or permit another to use it— (a) to destroy or damage any property belonging to some other person … shall be guilty of an offence." Limb (b) of each concerns damaging one's own property in a way known to be likely to endanger another's life, which is further from a collection scenario. "Pay up or the door gets painted" is s. 61 before any paint is opened; arriving with the tin is s. 62. Both fall under s. 63(2) — 10 years on indictment.

But s. 60 cannot be read and left there. The very next section, s. 64, is headed "Without lawful excuse". Note first what s. 64(1) does to its reach: the section "applies to any offence under section 60(1) and any offence under section 61 or 62", but not to one involving a threat, or an intent to use something, to destroy or damage property in a way the person charged knows is likely to endanger life — so it does not reach s. 60(2), the subsection just discussed. Within that reach, s. 64(2) requires a person to be treated as having a lawful excuse in two situations: (a) where he believed the person entitled to consent had consented or would have consented; and (b) where he acted to protect property or a right or interest in property, believing it "was in immediate need of protection" and that the means adopted "were or would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances". Section 64(3) adds: "it is immaterial whether a belief is justified or not if it is honestly held."

This is the classic shape — offence first, defence immediately after. Worth knowing before you report, because the other side will not necessarily go quietly.

Where damage is arguable — water-soluble paint, stickers, chalk — there is a much lower-threshold offence. Summary Offences Ordinance (Cap. 228), s. 8 is headed "Other offences against good order". Its opening words are "Any person who—", its closing words "shall be liable to a fine at level 1 or to imprisonment for 3 months", and paragraph (b) in between reads:

Note that the section reads "without the consent of the owner or occupier". The or is disjunctive: consent from either one defeats the charge. So the question is who owns or occupies the surface in question. The door and walls of your own flat: as a tenant you are the occupier. A wall in the building lobby: the consent that matters is not yours.

Two more sections of the same ordinance, aimed straight at the phone

Section 20 of Cap. 228 is headed "Offences in connection with telephone calls or messages or telegrams". In full:

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Paragraph (c) has the lowest threshold of anything in this article. It needs no threat (Cap. 200 s. 24 does), no demand with menaces (Cap. 210 s. 23 does), and no trader-and-consumer relationship (Cap. 362 s. 13F does). It asks only for persistence, the absence of reasonable cause, and the purpose in (b) — causing "annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety" ((a) states only the message's character, not a purpose). Level 1 is $2,000 (Cap. 221, Schedule 8), plus 2 months.

Banging on the door and leaning on the bell is paragraph (22) of s. 4 of the same ordinance:

Section 4 is headed "Nuisances committed in public places, etc."; it opens "Any person who without lawful authority or excuse—" and closes "shall be liable to a fine at level 1 or to imprisonment for 3 months".

4. Posters and disclosure: Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance (Cap. 486), s. 64

The provision where the full harassment vocabulary — "harassment, molestation, pestering, threat or intimidation" — attaches directly to a collection-shaped act is Cap. 486 s. 64, the disclosure offences added in 2021. (The word "harassment" alone appears elsewhere, including in Cap. 362 s. 13F, discussed below.)

Section 64 is headed "Offences for disclosing personal data without consent", and it has more than one limb. Subsection (1) is aimed at the moment the file changes hands: a person commits an offence who "discloses any personal data of a data subject which was obtained from a data user without the data user’s consent", with an intent "(a) to obtain gain in money or other property, whether for the benefit of the person or another person; or (b) to cause loss in money or other property to the data subject". Section 64(3) sets the penalty at a fine of $1,000,000 and 5 years. A collection agency that takes a debtor's file from a creditor without that creditor's consent and then discloses it is the paradigm case.

For collection conduct itself, the provision is s. 64(3A):

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And "specified harm" is defined in s. 64(6):

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Map that onto a poster in the lobby. A notice carrying your name, your flat number and the amount you owe is a disclosure of personal data; the absence of relevant consent is obvious; and the intent or recklessness element asks whether harassment, molestation, pestering, threat or intimidation was intended or risked — which is precisely the effect such a notice is put up to produce. Calling your workplace to tell colleagues you are in debt is structurally the same act.

Two penalty levels. Section 64(3B): an offence under (3A) is punishable "on conviction to a fine at level 6 and to imprisonment for 2 years" (level 6 = $100,000, Cap. 221 Schedule 8). Where the disclosure actually causes specified harm, the offence is s. 64(3C), and s. 64(3D) provides for "a fine of $1,000,000 and to imprisonment for 5 years" on indictment. Subsection (3C) is not merely consequential: paragraph (a) still requires the same intent or recklessness as (3A), and paragraph (b) then adds that "the disclosure causes any specified harm". Both are needed; harm alone does not lift the offence into the higher tier.

The defences sit in s. 64(4) — four of them: reasonable belief that disclosure was necessary for preventing or detecting crime; disclosure required or authorised by enactment, rule of law or court order; reasonable belief that consent was given — for an offence under (3A) or (3C), the data subject's relevant consent; for an offence under (1), the data user's consent instead, a different thing; and disclosure solely for a lawful news activity with reasonable grounds to believe publication was in the public interest. Section 64(5) then sets the evidential bar low: the matter is taken to be established if "there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue with respect to the matter" and "the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt". The defendant does not have to prove it; he has to raise it.

Complaints go to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data.

The other limb of the same ordinance: calls to your employer, calls to your mother

This is the most common question here, and the answer is not in s. 64 — it is in Data Protection Principle 3 (Schedule 1):

"new purpose" is defined in the same principle as any purpose other than "the purpose for which the data was to be used at the time of the collection of the data" or "a purpose directly related to" it. The emergency-contact number you wrote on a loan application was collected to be contacted in an emergency; whether using it to chase repayment is "directly related" is where the argument lies.

But one thing has to be said plainly, so as not to mislead: contravening a Data Protection Principle is not in itself an offence. The Ordinance says so in terms: s. 64A(1) makes it an offence for a data user "without reasonable excuse" to contravene "any requirement under this Ordinance", punishable by a fine at level 3 — and s. 64A(2) then provides that subsection (1) "does not apply in relation to— (a) a contravention of a data protection principle". The machinery is: the Commissioner investigates (ss. 38–48); the Commissioner may serve an enforcement notice under s. 50 directing the data user to remedy the contravention; and it is contravening the enforcement notice that is the offence (s. 50(8) has an urgency exception: the Commissioner may serve the notice before the investigation is complete if urgent special circumstances warrant it). Section 50A(1)(a): on a first conviction, a fine at level 5 ($50,000, Cap. 221 Schedule 8) and imprisonment for 2 years, plus a daily penalty of $1,000 if the offence continues; s. 50A(1)(b) raises that to level 6 ($100,000) and $2,000 a day on a second or subsequent conviction. Section 50A(3) creates a further offence: intentionally repeating the same act or omission after having already complied with an enforcement notice. Section 50A(2) supplies a defence: it is for the data user charged "to show that the data user exercised all due diligence to comply with the enforcement notice".

Section 66 also gives you a civil route:

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"injury to feelings" is in the statute itself, not a matter to be argued for. Section 66(5) directs that such proceedings "are to be brought in the District Court but all such remedies are obtainable in those proceedings as would be obtainable in the Court of First Instance" — meaning a s. 66 claim is not confined by the $3,000,000 District Court jurisdiction ceiling under Cap. 336 s. 32(1) discussed in "If they sue you, which court?" below: the remedies available are as wide as they would be in the Court of First Instance, even though the proceedings themselves must be brought in the District Court. Section 66(3) sets out two defences for the data user: (a) that it "had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to avoid the contravention concerned"; or (b) where the contravention occurred because the personal data was inaccurate, that the data "accurately record data received or obtained by the data user concerned from the data subject or a third party".

5. Where the collector is a "trader": Trade Descriptions Ordinance (Cap. 362), s. 13F

Section 13F is headed "Aggressive commercial practices":

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Subsection (3) is not a free-standing checklist; it is triggered by a question. It opens: "In determining whether a commercial practice uses harassment, coercion or undue influence, account must be taken of—". The five matters are all on point:

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For example, paragraph (a) is the 3 a.m. call and the twenty calls a day. Paragraph (e), for example, is pay up or we'll have you prosecuted — these are this article's own illustrations, not the wording of the statute itself. Subsection (4) adds that "coercion (威迫) includes the use of physical force", and defines "undue influence" as "exploiting a position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, even without using or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly impairs the consumer’s ability to make an informed decision".

The converse has to be said plainly: a bare threat to sue — "pay or we take you to court" — is not made unlawful by any provision in this article. Cap. 200 s. 24(c) requires a threat "with any illegal act", and bringing a claim in court is not an illegal act. Cap. 362 s. 13F(3)(e) speaks of "any threat to take any action which cannot legally be taken", and it is one of the matters of which account must be taken in deciding whether harassment, coercion or undue influence was used — a factor in that question, not an element of the offence. To engage s. 24 the content of the threat has to fall within limb (a), (b) or (c); to engage s. 13F it has first to pass the trader, consumer and product gates below.

Penalties are in s. 18(1): on indictment, a fine of $500,000 and 5 years; on summary conviction, a fine at level 6 ($100,000, Cap. 221 Schedule 8) and 2 years.

One provision points money back at you. Section 18A, "Power to award compensation": on conviction of an offence under s. 13F (among others), "the court may, in addition to passing any sentence that may otherwise be passed by law, order the person to pay an amount of compensation that it thinks reasonable to any person who has suffered financial loss resulting from that offence", and s. 18A(2) makes that amount "recoverable as a civil debt".

Prosecution is time-limited. Section 19: "No prosecution for an offence under this Ordinance shall be brought after— (a) the expiration of 3 years from the date of commission of the offence; or (b) the expiration of 1 year from the date of discovery of the offence by the prosecutor, whichever is the earlier."

Enforcement runs through s. 14: "The Commissioner may appoint any public officer to be an authorized officer for the purposes of this Ordinance", and the Commissioner "may exercise any of the powers conferred on an authorized officer under this Ordinance"; the powers of entry, inspection and seizure are in s. 15. Section 2 defines "Commissioner" as "the Commissioner of Customs and Excise and any Deputy or Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Excise" — so this is Customs and Excise.

But there are three gates, and the third will exclude many readers.

• Trader (s. 2): "any person (other than an exempt person) who, in relation to a commercial practice, is acting, or purporting to act, for purposes relating to the person’s trade or business".
• Consumer: "an individual who, in relation to a commercial practice, is acting, or purporting to act, primarily for purposes that are unrelated to the person’s trade or business" — so a business debt is outside it.
• Product: "any goods or service but does not include any goods or service covered by Schedule 4". And Schedule 4 item 1 excludes goods or services sold or supplied by a person regulated, licensed, registered, recognized or authorized under the Insurance Ordinance (Cap. 41), the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155), the Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance (Cap. 485) or the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571), where the sale or supply is itself regulated under that same ordinance.

So: a bank's credit card balance or personal loan is an excluded product and falls outside Cap. 362. The Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap. 163) is not on the Schedule 4 list — a finance company's loan is not excluded. Nor is what you owe a tutorial centre, a gym or a beauty salon.

Cap. 362 carries its own general defence, and it is a wide one. Section 26, "Defence mistake, accident, etc.", opens "In any proceedings for an offence under this Ordinance" — so it reaches s. 13F. The person charged "is, subject to subsection (2), entitled to be acquitted" if (a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue that the commission of the offence was due to "(A) a mistake; (B) reliance on information supplied to the person charged by another person; (C) the act or default of another person; (D) an accident; or (E) some other cause beyond the control of the person charged", and that the person charged "took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence by— (A) the person charged; or (B) any person under the control of the person charged"; and (b) "the contrary is not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt". "The creditor gave me the figure" is limbs (B) and (C) exactly. Section 26(2) attaches a condition: where the issue raised involves the act or default of another person, or reliance on information supplied by another person, the person charged "shall not, without leave of the court, be entitled to rely on that issue unless, within a period ending 7 clear days before the hearing", he has served on the prosecutor a written notice giving "such information identifying or assisting in the identification of that other person as was then in the possession of the person charged".

Whether an agency's own collection activity is a "commercial practice" in relation to a product supplied by someone else is unsettled — the Ordinance does not address that step.

What you have in your hand: demanding a statement from a money lender (Cap. 163 ss. 19 and 20)

This is a right most borrowers do not know they hold, and it has teeth on both sides — civil and criminal.

Section 19 is headed "Duty of money lender to give information to borrower". Under s. 19(1), a borrower may at any time during the continuance of the agreement, on written demand and on tender of the prescribed fee, require a statement signed by the money lender or his agent showing the date of the loan, the principal, the rate per cent per annum, payments already received and their dates, the amount of every sum due but unpaid with the date it became due and the interest accrued due and unpaid on each, and every sum not yet due with the date it will fall due. Section 19(2) adds a right to a copy of any document relating to the loan or its security.

When the statement arrives, a duty runs the other way, and few borrowers know it. Section 19(1)(e) requires the statement to carry on its face, "in both English and Chinese, prominently and legibly", a notice that the recipient is required by s. 19(1A) to endorse and return the copy. Section 19(1A) is that duty: the borrower or other person supplied with the original and copy "shall, as soon as practicable after being so supplied— (a) endorse on the copy of that statement words to the effect that he has received the original of that statement; and (b) return the copy of that statement as so endorsed to that money lender, who shall then retain it during the continuance of the agreement to which that statement relates". Sending the demand and then filing the statement away leaves a statutory obligation unperformed.

The teeth are in s. 19(4):

Not merely a bar on suing: "to sue for or recover" are the words of the section — and no interest for the period of default. For a debtor who has never been told clearly what is owed, one written demand does three things at once: it produces an itemised account, it puts the lender on a one-month clock, and it suspends the lender's entitlement to recover for as long as the default runs.

And ignoring the demand is itself an offence. Section 29(6):

Section 29(7) does the same for information a surety is entitled to under s. 20(1) or has requested under s. 20(2). The penalty is in s. 32(1)(a): for an offence under s. 29, "a fine at level 6 and to imprisonment for 2 years" — level 6 is $100,000 (Cap. 221, Schedule 8). So s. 19 is not merely a civil lever.

Note the limit in s. 19(3): subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to a request "made by a borrower less than 1 month after a previous request thereunder relating to the same agreement was complied with". You cannot send one a week.

If you are a guarantor, s. 20 is yours. Section 20(1) requires the money lender, within 7 days after making the agreement, to give the surety — the section says "(if a different person from the borrower)" — a copy of the s. 18(1) note or memorandum, a copy of the security instrument, and a signed statement of the total sum payable and the component amounts with their due dates. Section 20(2) lets the surety require an updated statement at any time; and s. 20(3) imposes the same one-month bar as s. 19(3) does for the borrower — subsection (2) "does not apply to a request made by a surety less than 1 month after a previous request under that subsection relating to the same agreement was complied with". And s. 20(4):

The two consequences are not the same: s. 19(4) suspends recovery from the borrower; s. 20(4) suspends enforcement of the security. One does not substitute for the other.

If the lender is unlicensed, or the rate is extreme. Section 23 is headed "Loan etc. not recoverable unless money lender licensed":

The proviso must travel with it: if the court is satisfied that it would be inequitable for the lender to lose recovery on that ground, the court may order that he is entitled to recover or enforce "to such extent, and subject to such modifications or exceptions" as the court thinks equitable. Unlicensed does not mean automatically written off; it means the court decides.

On rates: s. 24(2) makes an agreement for repayment, an agreement for interest, and any security unenforceable where the effective rate exceeds 48 per cent per annum; and s. 25(3) provides that a rate above 36 per cent per annum raises, by that fact alone, a presumption that the transaction is extortionate — but that presumption is not conclusive. The same subsection continues: "but except where such rate exceeds the rate specified in section 24(1), the court may declare that any such agreement is not extortionate for the purposes of this section if, having regard to all the circumstances relating to the agreement, the court is satisfied that such rate is not unreasonable or unfair." So as long as the rate stays at or below 48 per cent, the court can still find, after weighing all the circumstances, that the transaction is not extortionate. Section 25(1) lets the court reopen an extortionate transaction, and s. 25(2) defines extortionate as requiring payments "grossly exorbitant" or a transaction that "otherwise grossly contravenes ordinary principles of fair-dealing". Section 25(9A) carries the same exemption as s. 24(5): "Nothing in this section shall apply to— (a) a loan specified in paragraph 12 in Part 2 of Schedule 1; or (b) as respects such loan, any person who makes such loan" — so for that same company-borrower, neither the presumption nor the reopening power applies at all.

(Cap. 163 applies to money lenders. Section 3 is headed "Ordinance not to apply to authorized institutions" and has two limbs: "This Ordinance shall not apply to— (a) an authorized institution within the meaning of the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155); or (b) as respects a loan made to such an authorized institution, any person who makes such loan." It is the whole Ordinance that is disapplied, so banks are not within ss. 19 and 20; limb (b) concerns someone lending to a bank and does not touch a debtor.)

When does it become too late? The Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347)

Section 4 is headed "Limitation of actions of contract and tort, and certain other actions". Subsection (1), opening words and paragraph (a):

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An ordinary debt — a card balance, a personal loan, an unpaid account — is founded on simple contract. Six years.

Two qualifications matter, and both are commonly lost.

First, the section says the action "shall not be brought" — it does not say the debt disappears. Nothing in s. 4 extinguishes a simple contract debt. Once the period has run, a creditor may still write and ask; what he loses is the route into court.

Second, the clock can restart. Section 23 is headed "Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment". Subsection (3):

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"acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof" — six years runs again from that date. You are under no obligation to sign anything or make any payment on the spot — you may ask for time to consider or consult a solicitor; this is not just informal advice, it is written into the section itself.

Section 24(1) does, however, impose a form requirement on acknowledgment:

In writing, and signed. Saying "yes, I know I owe it" on a recorded call does not meet the words of s. 24(1). A part payment is not subject to that signature requirement — s. 23(3) treats "acknowledges the claim" and "makes any payment" as alternatives, and s. 24(1) governs only the acknowledgment.

Section 24(2), however, applies to both:

So a payment needs no signature, but it does have to be made to the creditor or the creditor’s agent — and a payment made by your agent counts as yours.

If they sue you, which court?

Collection ends in court. Hong Kong’s civil jurisdiction is tiered by amount — and the bottom tier is exclusive.

Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338), s. 5, "Jurisdiction of the tribunal":

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Subsection (2) does not say the Tribunal is available; it says "no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any other court in Hong Kong". The scope is set by paragraph 1 of the Schedule:

Subsection (3) is one way out: a claim that includes some other relief beyond costs may be brought elsewhere. But the larger qualification is the proviso to paragraph 1 itself.

The proviso removes seven classes of action from the Tribunal altogether. It opens "Provided that the tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to hear and determine—", and continues:

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Paragraph 1A then opens one window back: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (d) of the proviso to paragraph 1, the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim transferred to the tribunal under section 10(2) of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)."

So "anything under $75,000 must go to the Small Claims Tribunal" is not right: unpaid wages, defamation, a maintenance agreement, an estate agency dispute and a finance company’s loan claim are all outside it.

Sub-paragraph (c) is the one a debtor meets most often. A licensed finance company chasing $20,000 cannot go to the Small Claims Tribunal, only the District Court or above — Cap. 336 s. 32(1) confers jurisdiction on the District Court up to $3,000,000, but not exclusively; Cap. 4 s. 3(2) gives the High Court unlimited civil jurisdiction and could hear it too. For you that difference is practical: different procedure, different costs exposure, and different rules on representation (the Small Claims Tribunal is a no-lawyers forum).

The next tier is the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), s. 32, "General jurisdiction in actions of contract, quasi-contract and tort", subsection (1):

Section 32(2) adds that "the amount of the plaintiff’s claim" means the amount claimed after taking into account three things, each of them qualified by the plaintiff’s own admission in the statement of claim: any set-off, debt or demand claimed or recoverable by the defendant that the plaintiff admits; any employees’ compensation already paid that the plaintiff admits; and any contributory negligence that the plaintiff admits. On the face of the English text, that qualifying clause ("that the plaintiff admits in his statement of claim") trails only after the third limb, but the equally-authentic Chinese text repeats the same qualifier separately at each of the three limbs, unambiguously covering all of them — so the reading given here (all three limbs qualified) is the one confirmed by reading both authentic texts together, not the English text read alone. A set-off the plaintiff does not admit does not reduce the claim.

Above that sits the High Court. High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4), s. 3(2): "Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the High Court shall be a court of unlimited civil and criminal jurisdiction."

Some useful side-rules. Cap. 338 s. 8 forbids splitting a claim into separate proceedings "for the sole purpose of bringing the sum claimed in each of such proceedings within the jurisdiction of the tribunal". Section 9(1) lets a claimant deliberately abandon the excess to get into the Tribunal, but then "the claimant shall not recover in the claim an amount exceeding that mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Schedule" — paragraph 2 being the Schedule's second head of jurisdiction, subject to the same $75,000 ceiling. Section 9(2) then provides: "Where the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim by virtue of this section, the award of the tribunal on the claim shall be in full discharge of all demands in respect of the claim" — the abandoned part is gone for good, exactly like the District Court rule below.

The District Court tier has the identical rule. Cap. 336 s. 34, "Abandonment of part of claim to give Court jurisdiction": the Court has jurisdiction over an action above its monetary limit "on the plaintiff abandoning the amount of the plaintiff’s claim in excess"; s. 34(2) provides that the Court "cannot award to the plaintiff in an action under this section an amount exceeding the Court’s monetary jurisdiction limit for the action"; and s. 34(3) that the judgment "is in full discharge of all demands in the cause of action". A $3,200,000 claim can be kept in the District Court by giving up $200,000 — and the $200,000 is gone for good.

(For how the Tribunal actually works, see the Small Claims playbook .)

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