The Small Claims Tribunal Playbook: From Filing to Getting Paid

What an award actually does

Many people assume that winning at the Small Claims Tribunal means being paid. It does not. The Ordinance disposes of the point in one sentence — and that sentence also decides which court's rules and which fee scale govern everything that follows. Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338, version in force 28 March 2025), section 32:

So the tribunal decides; the District Court enforces — except that rule 12 of the Small Claims Tribunal (General) Rules (Cap. 338A) lets the section 32 application to enforce the award itself be commenced in the tribunal. Apart from that step, everything in the enforcement section below therefore runs on the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336 sub. leg. H, version in force 28 March 2025) and the District Court (Fees) Rules (Cap. 336 sub. leg. C, version in force 1 October 2021) — not on the tribunal's own fee schedule.

Two things travel with the award. Interest — and it runs from two different dates. Section 33(1) lets the tribunal "include in the amount of an award interest at the rate specified in subsection (4) on the whole or any part of the sum claimed for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the award"; section 33(2) adds that the power may be exercised "whether or not interest is expressly claimed", at any time after the award where the omission was inadvertent, and where the award was made in the defendant's absence. Pre-award interest is money most claimants never ask for. Section 33(3) then provides that an award carries interest at the rate specified in subsection (4) on the aggregate amount, or so much of it as remains unsatisfied, "from the date of the award until satisfaction", and section 33(4) fixes that rate as "the rate from time to time applicable to judgment debts under section 50 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)". Cap. 336 section 50(1) provides that judgment debts "are to carry simple interest— (a) at the rate the Court orders; or (b) in the absence of an order, at the rate the Chief Justice determines by order", on the total or the part that remains unpaid, "from the date of the judgment until payment", and section 50(2) allows different rates for different periods. So it is simple interest, and the rate comes from a court order or a Chief Justice order — not from Cap. 338. Costs — section 24(1) lets the tribunal award costs and expenses, "which may include" two things. That is an inclusive list, not a definition:

Note what is not named: legal fees. They are not awarded because section 19(2) bars lawyers from appearing (below), not because section 24(1) defines costs so as to exclude them — "may include" does not exclude anything. Section 24(3) adds that an award of costs "shall be enforceable in the same manner as any other award of the tribunal".

Is my claim within the Tribunal's jurisdiction?

The gateway: Schedule paragraph 1, proviso and all

Jurisdiction lives in the Schedule; section 5(1) merely says the tribunal "shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims specified in the Schedule". What actually decides cases is paragraph 1 — a monetary head followed by a proviso listing seven exclusions:

Taken one at a time, because each of them really does turn people away:

• (a) Defamation. A group-chat message, an online review — even if all you want is $3,000 of lost business, the tribunal cannot hear it.
• (b) Maintenance agreements within the meaning of Cap. 192 section 14. Family Court territory.
• (c) Licensed money lenders suing for money lent. This limb is drafted against the lender: a licensed money lender may not use the tribunal to recover money lent, or to enforce any agreement or security made or taken in respect of money lent. Cap. 163 section 2 defines a money lender as "every person whose business (whether or not he carries on any other business) is that of making loans or who advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on that business", excluding persons specified in Part 1 of Schedule 1 and, as respects loans specified in Part 2 of Schedule 1, the person making such a loan; section 3 provides that the Ordinance "shall not apply to— (a) an authorized institution within the meaning of the Banking Ordinance (Cap. 155)" — a term which under Cap. 155 section 2(1) covers not only "a bank" but also "a restricted licence bank" and "a deposit-taking company".
• (ca) Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board. The Cap. 453 Schedule gives the Board jurisdiction over claims whose right of action arose on or after 17 September 2021 (or not wholly before), "made by not more than 10 claimants for a sum of money not exceeding $15,000 per claimant", arising from breach of a contract of employment or apprenticeship, failure to comply with the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608) or the Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap. 47), severance-payment questions, or Part IXA wage questions.
• (d) Labour Tribunal. Cap. 25 section 7(2) closes the loop from the other side: "Save as is provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any court in Hong Kong." One exception runs the other way — Schedule paragraph 1A: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (d) of the proviso to paragraph 1, the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim transferred to the tribunal under section 10(2) of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)."
• (e) Estate Agents Authority. Cap. 511 section 49(1) requires three things together: (a) "there is a dispute between a licensed estate agent and 1 or more of his clients as regards a commission or other fee of such agent"; (b) the dispute "relates to the amount of the commission or other fee or the manner in which it is to be calculated or is payable"; and (c) "the requirements of section 45 are complied with in relation to the commission or other fee". Even then the dispute goes to the Authority only "with the agreement of such agent and his client or, where appropriate, each of his clients", and section 49(2) lets the Authority decline jurisdiction where the amount exceeds the prescribed amount or for any other reason. So limb (e) is not "all property-agency disputes", nor even all commission disputes — only one actually referred under section 49 and not declined is pushed out of the tribunal by it. Read broadly, the limb sends money claims out of the tribunal that belong in it.
• (f) Costs-only proceedings. A freestanding action for the costs of a dispute where nothing was ever commenced in the tribunal. This does not contradict section 24, which is about costs in proceedings before the tribunal.

"Recovery of land" is not on that list. A possession claim falls outside the tribunal not because the proviso excludes it, but because the head itself is confined to a monetary claim. Suing for arrears of rent is a monetary claim; adding a demand for possession takes the action outside paragraph 1.

The second gateway: statutory debts

Paragraph 2 is rarely mentioned and genuinely useful if what you are chasing is a statutory charge or contribution:

The Schedule closes with: "For the purposes of this paragraph, penalty (罰金) shall not include a fine imposed on the conviction of any person for an offence."

Within jurisdiction means nowhere else

Section 5(2) and (3) are a pair and neither works without the other:

A pure money claim of $75,000 or less is therefore not a claim you may choose to bring in the tribunal — it is one you may bring only there. But if the same claim also seeks some other relief, redress or remedy (other than costs), subsection (3) reopens the courthouse door. Section 5(4) adds that, subject to the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), the jurisdiction extends to claims that arose before the Ordinance commenced.

Owed more than $75,000: no splitting, but you may abandon the excess

Two sections, read together. Section 8:

Section 9(1) and (2):

So an $85,000 debt can be pursued as $75,000. What the section says the award then does is operate "in full discharge of all demands in respect of the claim", with judgment deemed entered accordingly. If you do not want to abandon the excess, the claim goes to the District Court: section 32(1) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) gives that court general jurisdiction over contract, quasi-contract and tort actions where the amount claimed does not exceed $3,000,000.

The defendant has the same option. Section 10(3) gives a defendant an almost identically worded right to abandon the excess on a counterclaim. Section 10(1) runs the other way: where a counterclaim or set-off and counterclaim is a monetary claim outside jurisdiction, the tribunal shall order the counterclaim transferred to the Board, the Labour Tribunal, the Lands Tribunal, the District Court or the Court of First Instance. Section 10(2) then stays execution on any judgment for the claimant until the transferred proceedings are determined, unless the tribunal orders otherwise.

The whole case can also be moved. Section 7 lets the tribunal, at any stage and either of its own motion or on a party's application, transfer proceedings to any of those bodies, "whereupon the practice and procedure" of that body applies. Section 11 deals with costs after a transfer: costs both before and after, subject to any order of the tribunal, are in the discretion of the body to which the proceedings are transferred.

Timing: the deadlines the statute actually fixes

The appeal "7 days" is three deadlines, not one

This is where people lose an appeal they still had. Section 28(1) first restricts the grounds: the decision must be challenged "on any ground involving a question of law alone" or "on the ground that the claim was outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal" — findings of fact are not appealable. Then section 28(2):

Three limbs; satisfying any one of them is enough:

• 7 days from service of the written award; or
• if you ask the tribunal for its reasons within that same 7 days, the clock restarts and runs 7 days from service of the reasons; or
• such time as the Registrar of the High Court extends on good cause.

The Small Claims Tribunal (Forms) Rules (Cap. 338 sub. leg. C, version in force 24 March 2022) print the first two limbs on the face of the award itself. Form 6 (Form of Award/Order) carries a note "For attention of parties":

The third limb — extension on good cause — appears only in the Ordinance, not on the form.

The chain does not stop at the Court of First Instance. Section 29(3) provides that "[s]ubject to section 29A, the decision of the Court of First Instance shall be final", and section 29A(1) is that exception: a party aggrieved by the CFI's decision on an appeal heard by leave under section 28 "may, within 7 days after the date of the decision, apply to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal and, if the Court of Appeal considers that a question of law of general public importance is involved, it may grant leave". Section 29A(3) makes a refusal by the Court of Appeal final. That is a third 7-day clock, and the shortest-tempered of the three. Two further points: section 28(3) makes a refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance final; section 28(4) provides that nothing in section 28 "shall affect any right of appeal under section 50 of the High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4)" — Cap. 4 section 50 is headed "Appeal in cases of contempt of court", not a general reserve route around subsection (3).

And one that is easy to miss: applying for leave does not stop enforcement. Section 31 provides that filing an application for leave to appeal under section 28 or section 29A "shall not operate as a stay of execution of an award or order unless the tribunal, the Court of First Instance or Court of Appeal, as the case may be, otherwise orders".

Review: two different clocks

Section 27A lets an adjudicator review his own award, reopen and rehear the claim wholly or in part, call or hear fresh evidence, and confirm, vary or reverse. Read section 27A(1) from its first words: "Except where a party has filed an application for leave to appeal and does not agree to withdraw the application", an adjudicator may review within 14 days of the award. File Form 9 and refuse to withdraw it, and the review route closes. Section 27A(1) bounds the review power; section 27A(2) then says how it may be exercised — (a) by the adjudicator "of his own motion", or (b) "on the application of a party within 7 days". Note that subsection (2)(b) fixes no starting point for those 7 days; Form 6’s note (i) supplies one, requiring the Form 8C application to be made "within 7 days after the date of the award or order". The Ordinance itself leaves the anchor to the form. So the two clocks differ: the outer frame is 14 days, a party has 7, and both sit inside subsection (1). Two more features are worth knowing: section 27A(3) provides that exercising the review power is no bar to a later appeal; and section 27A(5) lets an adjudicator transfer the review to another adjudicator, who then has all the powers and functions he would have had if he had originally heard the claim. So "review means the same adjudicator looks again" is not the rule.

Fees: the schedule, the electronic discount, and a remission power

The Small Claims Tribunal (Fees) Rules (Cap. 338 sub. leg. B, version in force 22 May 2025) set every fee. The items an ordinary claimant meets:

Item 10A deserves a line of its own: service is charged per address, at $10 each. Several defendants, or several addresses for one defendant, and it multiplies.

If you cannot afford the fee, rule 4 of the same Rules is the least-known provision in the whole scheme:

Reduce, remit or defer — and it reaches any fee in the Schedule.

Electronic filing carries a 20% discount. The Small Claims Tribunal is one of four tribunals specified as a "court" for the purposes of the Court Proceedings (Electronic Technology) Ordinance by the Schedule to the Court Proceedings (Electronic Technology) (Specification of Tribunals) Rules (Cap. 638 sub. leg. G) — the others being the Labour Tribunal, the Lands Tribunal and the Competition Tribunal. Rule 3 of the Court Proceedings (Electronic Technology) (Small Claims Tribunal) Rules (Cap. 638 sub. leg. H) authorises the use of an e-system "for a proceeding in the Tribunal conducted under the SCTO for which the use of electronic technology has been implemented under an implementation notice". On fees, the Court Proceedings (Electronic Technology) (Small Claims Tribunal) (Electronic Fees) Rules (Cap. 638 sub. leg. I, in operation 31 October 2024; version in force 22 May 2025), rule 4(1):

Rule 2 defines the concessionary period as "the period of 3 years beginning on the earliest date specified under section 32(2) of the Ordinance in relation to the Tribunal". The Schedule maps each e-matter onto its Cap. 338B item — filing, summonses, amended documents, writs of execution, setting aside, review and leave to appeal are all in — and rule 4(2) provides that no e-fee is payable for item 9 (a copy of a document obtained from an e-system). Rule 6 sets the rounding; rule 8 gives the Registrar the same power to reduce, remit or defer.

One limit to note: rule 5 of Cap. 638 sub. leg. H provides that "Only a registered user or an Organization User account holder may send a document to the Tribunal by means of an e-system."

Who may appear: not simply "parties in person"

"No lawyers at the Small Claims Tribunal" is true, but it is half the rule. Section 19 in full:

Three practical consequences:

• The bar on lawyers is statutory (s. 19(2)), not a courtroom convention, and it catches even a lawyer who is a public officer. The subsection carries two exceptions on its face: proceedings "under section 35A for insulting behaviour", and a lawyer "acting on his own behalf as a claimant or defendant".
• A company need not send its director: an officer or servant will do (s. 19(1)(b)). A partnership sends a partner (s. 19(1)(c)).
• Most usefully, paragraph (d): an elderly, infirm or non-English/Chinese-speaking party may authorise a non-lawyer representative in writing to appear — with the tribunal's leave.

The hearing, as the Ordinance describes it

Informal, and the tribunal digs. Section 16:

Subsection (3) is the one people underestimate: the adjudicator shall inquire into what he considers relevant, whether or not you raised it. Not knowing the legal vocabulary is therefore not a handicap. Turning up without documents is.

The rules of evidence do not apply. Section 23, in its entirety, is two subsections:

WhatsApp screenshots, chat logs, handwritten receipts, a friend's written account — material that might be excluded elsewhere as hearsay or for want of form is for the adjudicator to admit if he considers it relevant. Note that section 23 creates no offence and imposes no penalty in respect of false evidence. Only two provisions in Cap. 338 impose a penalty here — section 35 and section 35A — and neither is about false evidence. Section 35(1) — a person served with a summons under section 16 who "refuses or neglects, without sufficient cause, to appear or produce any documents required by the summons to be produced" or who "refuses to be sworn or give evidence" shall forfeit a fine not exceeding level 2 as the adjudicator may direct — $5,000 under Schedule 8 to the Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221); section 35(3) extends the same to a person present before the tribunal who refuses to be sworn or to give evidence, and section 35(2) bars any fine unless a reasonable sum for expenses was paid or tendered at the time of service. Section 35(4) lets an adjudicator direct that a fine, less costs, be applied towards indemnifying the party injured, "without prejudice to the right of the party so injured to institute civil proceedings in respect of the injury". Section 35A deals with insulting behaviour, punishable summarily by a fine at level 3 ($10,000) and imprisonment for 6 months. Section 35B is not a third offence but a collection power: to enforce payment of a fine or give effect to a sentence of imprisonment, "an adjudicator shall have the powers of a judge". Criminal liability for false testimony, if any, arises outside Cap. 338.

A claim need not be written. Section 12(1) requires proceedings to be commenced by filing a claim with the registrar, and section 12(2) requires it to be in writing in the prescribed form, in English or Chinese, signed by or on behalf of the claimant — but subsection (3) provides an exception:

Section 13 sets out what a claim must contain: the name and address of each claimant (and, in a representative claim, of each person represented); the name and address of each defendant; the sum claimed by each claimant or person represented; and "such particulars of the claim as are reasonably sufficient to inform the defendant of the ground for the claim and the manner in which the amount claimed by each claimant or person represented has been calculated". The defendant's address is a statutory requirement (see section 13). Section 14(2) sets out the methods of service: personal delivery; leaving the documents with someone for the defendant at his last known place of residence or business; posting them to him there; or such other manner as the registrar directs — of these, leaving the documents at an address and posting them there depend on an address, but personal delivery and service in such other manner as the registrar directs do not.

If the other side does not turn up. Section 17 allows the claimant to apply for judgment, supported if necessary by an affidavit verifying the facts relied on — but section 17(4) imposes a check: no judgment may be entered against a defendant "unless the tribunal is satisfied that a copy of the written claim and the notice of hearing have been served on the defendant under section 14(2)". Conversely, if you were the absent party, section 32A is your route: the tribunal may set aside the award or order "on the application of that party, on such terms as it thinks just", and the application "shall be made within 7 days after the hearing or such further period as the tribunal may allow" (Form 8D).

Two further provisions police abuse of process. Section 25 lets the tribunal dismiss at any time a claim it considers frivolous or vexatious, "on such terms as to payment of costs as it may think fit". Section 26A provides that where a party fails to comply with an order within a specified time, the tribunal may dismiss that party's claim or counterclaim, stay the proceedings, or enter judgment against the party, on such terms as it thinks just.

After you win: enforcement in the District Court

Everything starts from section 32 — the award is enforced in the District Court, in the same manner as a judgment of that court. So the rulebook below is Cap. 336 sub. leg. H and the fee scale is Cap. 336 sub. leg. C.

The whole menu first: Order 45, rule 1

How many ways there are to enforce a money judgment is something the rules themselves enumerate. Cap. 336H, Order 45, rule 1(1):

Seven, and rule 1(3) adds that paragraphs (1) and (2) are "without prejudice to any other remedy available to enforce such a judgment or order as is therein mentioned". What follows covers the routes an ordinary claimant actually uses — but it is worth knowing how long the list is.

A timing trap: after 6 years you need leave

The 12 years in Cap. 347 section 4(4) is the limitation period for bringing an action upon a judgment. Issuing a writ of execution is a different question, governed by Cap. 336H, Order 46, rule 2:

So once the judgment is six years old, the writ cannot simply be issued: leave must be sought first. Rule 4(2) requires the application to be supported by an affidavit, and rule 2(3) provides that where leave is granted "and the writ is not issued within one year after the date of the order granting such leave, the order shall cease to have effect". Treating the 12-year figure as twelve comfortable years is a misreading — the comfortable window is six.

Step one: find out what the debtor has — examination

Rules of the District Court, Order 48, rule 1(1):

The Court may also order production of relevant books or documents. Rule 1(2) requires the order to be served personally on the judgment debtor and on any officer of a corporation ordered to attend. Cost: Cap. 336C Schedule item 16(d) — on sealing "an order for the examination of a judgement debtor (or an officer thereof)", $630.00.

Step two: match the tool to what you found

Note to the table: the "Execution" head of Cap. 336C Schedule Part 1 prices the act of sealing, not the remedy. Item 16, "On sealing—", covers (a) a warrant for arrest of a defendant or for the attachment of property before judgment, (b) "a writ of execution or writ of possession", (c) "a prohibitory order", (d) "an order for the examination of a judgement debtor (or an officer thereof)" and (e) "a prohibition order", each $630.00; item 22 prices sealing "a notice in Form No. 80 under Order 50, rule 11(2)" at $630.00. There is no item named for garnishee proceedings, for a charging order as such, or for a bankruptcy petition. A blank fee entry in the table above therefore does not mean free — what is payable depends on which document that step ends up sealing, and neither instrument maps the two for a lay reader.

What a charging order can reach is limited — but not only to the subsection (2) list. The confining provision is Cap. 336 section 52AA(1): a charge may be imposed "only on— (a) an interest held by the judgment debtor beneficially— (i) in an asset of a kind mentioned in subsection (2); or (ii) under a trust; or (b) an interest held by a person as trustee of a trust" meeting one of three further conditions. That power itself carries a precondition: section 52AA(1) opens with the words "Subject to section 25 (which provides that a writ of execution shall not issue against any partnership property except on a judgment against the firm) of the Partnership Ordinance (Cap. 38)" — so where the judgment debtor is a partner, a charge cannot reach partnership property unless the judgment itself is against the firm, not merely against that partner. Subsection (2) then lists the assets: (a) land; (b) securities of specified kinds — Government stock, stock of a body incorporated in Hong Kong, stock of a foreign body or state registered in a register kept in Hong Kong, and units of a unit trust with a Hong Kong register of unit holders; and (c) funds in court. A beneficial interest under a trust is not an asset "of a kind mentioned in subsection (2)" and is still chargeable — reading subsection (2) alone understates the reach. Section 52AB(2) applies the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128) to charging orders; section 52AB(3) gives the charge "the same effect and is enforceable in the same courts and in the same manner as an equitable charge created by the judgment debtor by writing under his hand".

A prohibition order is short-lived. Cap. 336 section 52E(1) gives the District Court jurisdiction to prohibit a person from leaving Hong Kong to facilitate the enforcement, securing or pursuance of "a judgment against that person for the payment of a specified sum of money". The practical constraint is section 52E(5)(a)(i): the order lapses "on the expiry of one month but the Court may, on the application of the judgment creditor or claimant, extend or renew the order for a period which does not exceed, with the initial period of one month and any other period of extension or renewal, 3 months". A copy must be served on the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Police and, if he can be found, the judgment debtor (s. 52E(6)); a person who attempts to leave in contravention "may be arrested by any immigration officer, police officer or bailiff" (s. 52E(7)). Arrest is not the end of it: section 52E(8)(a) requires a person so arrested to "be brought before the Court before the expiry of the day after the day of arrest", and in the money-judgment case under subsection (1)(a) the Court may "make such order, for the examination or imprisonment of that person, under rules of court, as is appropriate". The prohibition order is therefore a gateway to examination and imprisonment, not merely a border stop.

Step three: he will not come, or will not pay — Order 49B

Order 48 can order the debtor to attend. It cannot make him attend, and it cannot make him pay. Cap. 336H, Order 49B — "Execution and Enforcement of Judgment for Money by Imprisonment" — is the part of the chain with teeth, and it is the part most accounts leave out.

Securing attendance, by arrest if necessary. Rule 1(1) provides that where a judgment for a specified sum is wholly or partly unsatisfied, the Court may on the judgment creditor's ex parte application order the debtor to be examined, and to secure his attendance must either (a) order him, by an order served personally on him, to appear with such documents as the Court specifies, or (b) where it appears there is reasonable cause to believe an order under (a) "may be ineffective to secure the attendance of the judgment debtor for examination, order that he be arrested and brought before the Court before the expiry of the day after the day of arrest". If an order under (a) is made and ignored, rule 1(3) allows an arrest order in the same terms.

A second route to a departure prohibition. Rule 1(2): "On an application under paragraph (1), the Court may make an order prohibiting the judgment debtor from leaving Hong Kong." That sits alongside Cap. 336 section 52E rather than replacing it, and it rides on the examination application. Rule 1A(3)(a) allows the same order when an examination is adjourned.

After the examination: imprisonment, or instalments imposed. Rule 1B(1) provides that where the Court is satisfied, following an examination under rule 1A or under Order 48, that the debtor "is able to satisfy the judgment, wholly or partly", or "has disposed of assets with a view to avoiding satisfaction of the judgment", or "has wilfully failed to make a full disclosure", it "may, in its discretion, order the imprisonment of the judgment debtor for a period not exceeding 3 months". Rule 1B(2)(a) is the other half: where the Court is satisfied that the debtor "is able or will be able to satisfy the judgment, wholly or partly, by instalments or otherwise, it may order him to satisfy the judgment in such manner as it thinks fit" — instalments the Court imposes, not instalments the debtor agrees to. Failure to comply lets the creditor apply, on not less than 2 clear days' notice, for imprisonment for up to 3 months (rule 1B(3)(a)).

Rule 1C adds the point that matters most: "An order for imprisonment under this Order shall not satisfy or extinguish any judgment debt." Serving the term does not clear the debt.

Bankruptcy: $10,000 is the first of four conditions

Most accounts stop at "judgment debts totalling $10,000 let you petition". The Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6, version in force 14 July 2025), section 6(2), opens "Subject to sections 6A to 6C" and then says a creditor's petition may be presented "if, but only if, at the time the petition is presented" — followed by four conditions:

Condition (b) ("unsecured") and condition (c) ("appears either to be unable to pay or to have no reasonable prospect of being able to pay") are usually harder to satisfy than the money figure — which is exactly what those opening words, "Subject to sections 6A to 6C", are there for.

Section 6A(1) deals only with a debt that is payable immediately, and for that debt narrows condition (c) to two routes: the debt "is payable immediately and either— (a) the petitioning creditor to whom the debt is owed has served on the debtor a demand (known as the statutory demand) in the prescribed form requiring him to pay the debt or to secure or compound for it to the satisfaction of the creditor, at least 3 weeks have elapsed since the demand was served and the demand has been neither complied with nor set aside in accordance with the rules; or (b) execution or other process issued in respect of the debt on a judgment or order of any court in favour of the petitioning creditor, or one or more of the petitioning creditors to whom the debt is owed, has been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part." Limb (b) is the bridge from a small claims award to a petition: you run the enforcement steps above, and the unsatisfied return is itself the proof of condition (c). Section 6A(2), immediately following, separately covers a debt that is not immediately payable, supplying the equivalent statutory-demand route for the "no reasonable prospect of being able to pay" limb of condition (c).

Section 6B(1) relaxes condition (b) directly: a debt "need not be unsecured" if the petition contains a statement by the person entitled to enforce the security that he is willing, if a bankruptcy order is made, "to give up his security for the benefit of all the bankrupt’s creditors", or if the petition "is expressed not to be made in respect of the secured part of the debt" and states the estimated value of that security. So the unsecured requirement is not the hard gate it looks like.

Section 6(4) provides one route round (c) and (d): a petition may still be presented where there are reasonable grounds for believing the debtor intends to depart, or has departed, from Hong Kong knowing or with reasonable cause to believe that his departure would defeat or delay his creditors. And section 6(5) empowers the Financial Secretary, by regulation, to prescribe an amount greater than $10,000 — so the figure is not permanent.

The petition deposit is fixed by rule, and it is a precondition. Bankruptcy Rules (Cap. 6 sub. leg. A), rule 52(1): "Upon the presentation of a petition, the petitioner shall pay to the Official Receiver a deposit of— (a) in the case of a debtor’s petition, the sum of $8,000; or (b) in the case of a creditor’s petition, the sum of $11,250." Rule 52(2) then provides that "[n]o petition shall be received unless the receipt of the Official Receiver for the deposit payable under subrule (1) is produced to the Registrar." Rule 52(3) allows the court, on the Official Receiver's application, to direct further deposits; rule 52(4) applies the deposit to the fees, charges and percentages prescribed in the Bankruptcy (Fees and Percentages) Order (Cap. 6 sub. leg. C). Putting $11,250 up front to chase an award of $75,000 or less is a calculation to do before, not after.

The uncomfortable part

A judgment establishes the debt, opens every route above, and carries interest from the date of the award until satisfaction. What it cannot do is create assets the debtor does not have. The outer limit is generous — Cap. 347 section 4(4) allows an action upon a judgment within 12 years from the date the judgment became enforceable (arrears of interest, 6 years) — but a long limitation period only helps if the debtor eventually has something, and, as above, once 6 years have elapsed a writ of execution cannot issue without the leave of the District Court (Cap. 336H, O. 46, r. 2(1)(a)). Assessing the debtor's ability to pay before filing matters as much as assessing the merits.

Quick reference