Hong Kong Domestic Violence Injunctions: Eligibility, Urgent Orders and Arrest Powers

Under the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance (Cap. 189) , a spouse or former spouse, a listed relative, or a cohabitant/former cohabitant may apply for an injunction if the statutory conditions are met. Section 2 defines a cohabitation relationship as one that—

the opposite sex) who live together as a couple in an intimate relationship;

and

That definition was added by 18 of 2009. The parenthesis is not the whole of it: “who live together as a couple in an intimate relationship” is the half that decides cases. Same-sex cohabitants and former cohabitants can therefore use the section 3B route, but the statutory cohabitation relationship itself still has to be proved.

The Court of Final Appeal has written out the same definition. In Ng Hon Lam Edgar v Secretary for Justice (FACV 4/2024, [2024] HKCFA 30, Court of Final Appeal, 26 November 2024) at ¶99, the joint judgment of Ribeiro and Fok PJJ says:

The judgment writes the short title as Domestic and Cohabitation Relationship Violence Ordinance, in the singular, a word away from the Ordinance's own short title.

What that case was, stated plainly. It was an inheritance appeal about the Intestates' Estates Ordinance (Cap. 73) and the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Ordinance (Cap. 481). The outcome: at ¶143 the Court unanimously dismissed the Secretary for Justice's appeal, and at ¶131 made an order nisi that the Secretary for Justice bear the costs of the appeal. The Court was describing Cap. 189 while deciding a different question, and decided nothing under Cap. 189; the passage is not the ratio of a Cap. 189 case.

The current Judiciary webpage describes the cohabitation limb as a partner or former partner “in a cohabitation relationship, who is of opposite sex”. This site's summary: that wording is narrower than the authentic section 2 and narrower than the definition the Court of Final Appeal set out at ¶99. The legislation prevails. The Judiciary's domestic-violence injunction guide explains forms and Registry procedure; a Hong Kong solicitor can advise on individual eligibility.

Depending on the statutory conditions, an injunction may contain non-molestation, ouster, re-entry and approved-programme provisions. An authorization of arrest is separate and is not automatically attached to every injunction. Even without one, conduct that is independently an offence — assault occasioning actual bodily harm under section 39 of the Offences against the Person Ordinance (Cap. 212), say, or an act of intimidation prohibited by section 24 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) — falls within the general criminal law, and sections 50(1)(a) and 50(1A) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) provide the power of a police officer to apprehend without warrant.

Cap. 189 has three principal routes:

“Relative” and “cohabitation relationship” have detailed statutory definitions: section 3A(2) lists the classes of relative one by one, and the section 2 definition requires that the two persons “live together as a couple in an intimate relationship”. Whether an application falls inside a route is decided on those statutory words and on the evidence in the case. Falling outside one Cap. 189 route does not prevent the criminal law from applying to independently criminal conduct.

“Molestation” is a fact-sensitive legal concept; it does not automatically include every insult, argument or financial disagreement. Whether non-physical conduct is sufficient depends on the complete facts. Messages, call records, medical material, photographs, banking or location records may show context, but obtaining evidence should not increase physical danger.

D v L [2014] HKFC 26, FCMC 8507/2013 was an application under section 3 (spouses), heard in chambers by Deputy District Judge K K Pang, judgment 13 March 2014. The judgment's operative header reads IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, that is, the District Court.

At §34, on the word “molest”:

This site's summary: the judgment records the second sentence as not disputed between the parties, and the authority it gives after the colon is a practitioner annotation to Cap. 189 rather than a decided case, so it is not written here as the court's own statement of law. At §35 the judgment reproduces a passage of another Hong Kong decision, P v C (Ouster and Domestic Violence) [2007] HKFLR 195 at 202, ¶¶22–23:

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This site's summary: the three formulations in that extract are the definitions counsel referred the judge to; the judgment does not record any court as having “adopted” them.

On the facts, §§22–30 record repeated forced entry and damage (§25 records the back door and the lock thereof being damaged), and §3(iv) separately records pestering by repeated telephone calls and text messages. At §37:

The outcome. At §53 the court refused the respondent's application to discharge the ex-parte injunction. At §54 it ordered:

At §55 the court held that because the application was made pursuant to the Ordinance costs should follow the event, rather than the costs-in-the-cause order usual for an interlocutory injunction. The paragraph 1(b) the applicant had originally sought — restraining the respondent from remaining within 250 metres of her or her residence — was rejected by the Court; she was nonetheless held substantially successful on both applications:

That costs order was a costs order nisi, becoming absolute 14 days after the date of the judgment.

Authorization of arrest was refused, and the reason has to be stated accurately. §39 is the court's statement of the governing principle:

§40 is reported speech about the applicant's leading counsel, Mr Whitehead, including this:

That is a concession by counsel, not a reason the judge gave. The judge's own reason is at §41:

What the case does not decide. It is one Deputy District Judge's decision on one set of facts: it settles nothing on the cohabitation or relative routes, sets no standard for “molestation” or for an authorization of arrest that governs another case, and predicts nothing about any other case.

By comparison, section 1 of the United Kingdom's Domestic Abuse Act 2021 expressly lists controlling, coercive, economic and psychological abuse. Cap. 189 does not reproduce that list: it uses “molestation” and its own statutory conditions. The UK categories can help explain safety risks, but they are not a substitute test for a Hong Kong injunction.

Depending on the application route and statutory conditions, the order may contain:

• a non-molestation provision, restraining the respondent from molesting the applicant. The spouse route (section 3(1)(a) and (b)) and the cohabitation route (section 3B(1)(a) and (b)) each carry a separate provision restraining molestation of a specified minor; the relative route does not. Section 3A(4)(a) allows only “a provision restraining the respondent from molesting the applicant”;
• an ouster provision, excluding the respondent from a specified residence or area;
• a re-entry provision, permitting the applicant to enter and remain in a specified residence; and
• an approved-programme provision, requiring participation in a specified programme.

The sealed order itself records each provision, geographical boundary, commencement and expiry date, service requirement and authorization of arrest. Memory or an oral summary does not replace that controlling text.

Section 10: on this provision the two authentic texts do not say the same thing

The English heading and provision:

The Chinese heading and provision:

This site's reading: “shall not be registered” is a prohibition; 「無須……註冊」 is a dispensation. They point at different consequences for a reader — that such an injunction may not go on the land register at all, or merely that it need not.

Both are authentic texts. Section 10B of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1):

What follows is what each authentic text provides and how section 10B approaches a divergence of this kind. On either reading, one thing neither text changes: a Cap. 189 injunction operates on the person, not by placing an interest on the flat.

The Ordinance's 24-month ceiling is not a single duration for everything in the order. It applies to specified ouster/re-entry provisions and statutory parts including an authorization of arrest. Section 6(1) does not state a universal number for a non-molestation provision, but that does not make every non-molestation provision perpetual. Under section 7(1)(a), a court may on application extend an injunction containing the specified ouster/re-entry provisions; section 7(1)(b) addresses an attached authorization of arrest. That extension power is exercisable only during the injunction's validity period, and section 7(4) bars extension beyond the second anniversary of its grant. Duration, extension, variation and discharge depend on the sealed order and court decision.

In an appropriate emergency, an applicant may ask the court to deal with interim relief without advance notice to the other party. Whether to proceed without notice, what to order, service and the return hearing are matters for the court. Do not delay calling the police, leaving danger or obtaining legal help because of an online explanation.

An order made without notice can be very short-lived, and that matters. On an Ouster/Re-entry Order granted on an ex-parte summons, the Judiciary's application guide says:

This site's summary: that is a Judiciary practice statement, not a statutory rule; what it means for a reader is that an order made without notice is usually not protection to rely on for months, and the return hearing still matters. The same guide also says how to reach a judge urgently:

The Judiciary's application guide and forms say the application is made to the Family Court. On fees, Schedule Part 1 item 1 of the District Court (Fees) Rules (Cap. 336C) sets HK$630 on sealing a writ of summons, an originating summons, an originating ex parte application and any other originating document; the Judiciary guide likewise gives HK$630 for each of the summonses it names. This is a current subsidiary-legislation amount: section 72(2)(c) of the District Court Ordinance permits court rules to regulate fees and costs, so amending those Rules can change it.

The fee can be relieved, and the power sits one rule away. Cap. 336C rule 6:

This site's summary: the rule says the Registrar may act “as he may think fit in any particular case”, and must endorse the reason on the document when he does. A fee concession is not legal aid; they are separate things.

Legal aid is available for these proceedings. Section 5(1) of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91) provides:

Schedule 2 Part 1 paragraph 1(d) names “District Court.” among the courts, and Schedule 2 Part 2 (Excepted Proceedings) lists defamation, relator actions, recovery of a penalty payable to the person bringing the proceedings, certain election petitions, proceedings in which the only question for a defendant is the time and mode of paying a debt and costs, proceedings incidental to those, the Small Claims Tribunal, the Labour Tribunal and the commercial list — none of which reaches a Cap. 189 application. This site's reading: where a statute fixes its scope by naming a court rather than an Ordinance, the question is whether the proceedings fall inside that court, not whether the Ordinance is named.

The financial-resources limit of HK$452,320 is in section 5(1), and that amount was last amended by L.N. 29 of 2026; section 7 lets the Legislative Council amend it by resolution, so it is a figure that moves and has to be read together with that power. Whether a certificate is granted remains the Director of Legal Aid's decision under section 10, including the merits condition, and the assessment of resources and exemptions sit in subsidiary legislation. Further information: the Department's financial-eligibility page and civil legal-aid FAQ . Its telephone number is 2537 7677.

An authorization under section 5 of Cap. 189 supplies a specific warrantless-arrest power for breach of the injunction.

The first condition (section 5(1)): the injunction must contain a provision restraining violence, or prohibiting entry into or remaining in any premises or area. Section 5(1) is not confined to Cap. 189 injunctions — it also reaches an injunction granted “pursuant to any other power upon an application made by a party to a marriage against the other party to the marriage”. So an injunction obtained in matrimonial proceedings under another power can carry an authorization of arrest too.

The second condition (section 5(1A)):

Note the statutory words. Both limbs read “actual bodily harm to the protected person”; harm to somebody else does not satisfy them. This threshold is separate from molestation:

• non-physical conduct may constitute molestation but does not automatically satisfy the authorization threshold;
• no previous physical assault does not automatically defeat the forward-looking “likely” limb; and
• the sealed order—not an assumption—shows whether authorization is attached.

A further condition applies where the applicant is a party to a cohabitation relationship: under section 6(3), the court may not grant an injunction containing a section 3B(1)(c) or (d) provision (ouster or re-entry), nor attach an authorization of arrest under section 5(1), unless satisfied that, having regard to the permanence of the cohabitation relationship, it is appropriate in all the circumstances. A cohabitant's supporting affirmation therefore usually has to address the nature and continuity of the relationship, not only the incidents of violence. By its terms this condition applies to an application by a party to a cohabitation relationship.

Where authorization is attached, section 5(2) permits a police officer to arrest without warrant on reasonable suspicion of a breach involving violence or entry/remain conduct prohibited by the injunction. Section 5(3)(a) requires the arrested person to be brought before the court that granted the injunction “before the expiry of the day after the day of his arrest”. On gale-warning and black-rainstorm-warning days, the effect of section 5(4) is to disapply section 71 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) from section 5 altogether, preserving it only so far as it applies to those two kinds of day:

This is not the only route to arrest. Even without an authorization, conduct that is independently an offence — assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Cap. 212 s. 39), wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm (s. 19), wounding with intent (s. 17), common assault (s. 40), or an act of intimidation prohibited by section 24 of the Crimes Ordinance (Cap. 200) — falls within the general criminal law. The Department of Justice's prosecution policy states that where an act of violence arises within a domestic context the perpetrator may be prosecuted under the general criminal law; this site's summary: that is the prosecutor's own policy document, not legislation, and it creates no rights. As to arrest, section 50(1)(a) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) makes it lawful for a police officer to apprehend a person he reasonably believes will be charged with, or reasonably suspects of being guilty of, an offence punishable by imprisonment, and section 50(1A) provides that the power may be exercised without warrant. In immediate danger, call 999; a current order, any authorization of arrest, the conduct and location are information available to Police when addressing the danger.

What the criminal courts actually did — two appeals, pointing two ways

⚠ Neither of these is a Cap. 189 case: both are criminal sentence appeals under the Offences against the Person Ordinance. They show the consequences that followed in real cases, but they are not authority on an injunction application.

One — the sentence came down ([2013] HKCA 169, CACC 317/2012, Court of Appeal Reasons for Judgment 11 April 2013). A husband wounded his wife with intent to do grievous bodily harm and was sentenced to 8 years. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had given insufficient regard to the unusual features of the case:

Outcome: 8 years quashed and 5 years 4 months substituted. The same judgment nonetheless says:

Two — the sentence stood (CACC 170/2013, from HCCC 313/2012, Court of Appeal judgment 26 November 2013, Reasons 2 December 2013; the applicant appeared in person). The Reasons open their account of the facts with the words “This is a case of domestic violence.”. The applicant had assaulted the same victim occasioning actual bodily harm (Cap. 212 s. 39) and then, while on police bail for that assault and just six weeks later, threw corrosive fluid at her with intent to do grievous bodily harm (Cap. 212 s. 29).

Outcome: the eight-year total stood (2 months on section 39, concurrent with 8 years on the other count).

This site's reading (the two read together): the same fact — that the violence happened inside a domestic relationship — was used in one appeal to bring a starting point down, while in the other the trial judge treated the domestic context as of minimal significance and the Court of Appeal left the sentence standing. That is not a conflict of law but one factor weighed differently on different facts, and nothing about any other case follows from either.

Cap. 189 does not prescribe one fixed maximum penalty for every breach of an injunction. A breach may be dealt with as contempt; punishment depends on the court, procedure, facts and applicable contempt law. The two-year figure in section 20 of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336) concerns specified misconduct in the face of that court and should not be presented as the general maximum for breach of a Cap. 189 order.

Two documents show how the committal machinery actually runs. ⚠ Both concern breach of an undertaking in a consent order, not breach of a Cap. 189 injunction, so they illustrate committal in practice and are not authority on Cap. 189 breach.

LCH v WPSN (CACV 327/2024, [2025] HKCA 376, Court of Appeal; heard and decided 8 April 2025, Reasons 25 April 2025): a husband was committed for contempt for breaching his undertaking in a consent order to pay his elder child's school fees, the judge imposing eight weeks' imprisonment, suspended on condition the arrears were paid by a stated date; the arrears when the application was lodged were $111,757. On the standard of proof:

The outcome:

The Court of Final Appeal Appeal Committee (FAMV No. 133 of 2025, [2026] HKCFA 5; heard and determined 20 January 2026, Reasons 23 January 2026) then refused leave to appeal, holding the husband's argument that only the judgment summons route was available to be wholly unsustainable. ⚠ That document is a Reasons for Determination of the Appeal Committee on a leave application, not a substantive judgment of the Court of Final Appeal. The determination also records a safeguard:

The outcome:

And on the contempt being purged, the committal sentence was set aside in accordance with the judge's suspensory order. This site's reading: the pair shows the practical shape of the consequences of disobedience — proof beyond reasonable doubt, inability to pay needing evidence, costs available on an indemnity basis, and a purged contempt ending the sentence. They decide nothing under Cap. 189.

Rule 8 of the Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Rules (Cap. 189A) provides that Cap. 189 proceedings are ordinarily heard in chambers unless the judge directs otherwise. Rule 3 expressly applies the Rules of the High Court to proceedings under Cap. 189 as they apply in the Court of First Instance, subject to the domestic-violence rules and necessary modifications. The fact that a matter is heard in the Family Court therefore does not by itself exclude Order 52 of the Rules of the High Court . On a committal application the default set by Order 52 rule 6(1) is open court: the court may sit in private only in the four cases that rule lists,

Rule 6(2) then provides that where the court hearing an application in private by virtue of paragraph (1) decides to make a committal order, it must state in open court the person's name, in general terms the nature of the contempt, and the length of the period of committal. Read with Cap. 189A rules 3 and 8 and Order 52, proceedings in chambers do not guarantee privacy of all information at every stage.

Where gathering or retaining material does not increase danger, the following may help a court, the police or a solicitor understand the situation:

• the injunction, authorization of arrest and proof of service;
• a short incident log with dates, times, locations and witnesses;
• original messages, voicemail, call logs, account details and photographs;
• medical records, police report references and property-damage records; and
• safety risks involving home, school, workplace or joint accounts.

An exit plan, the location of copies, device access and location sharing can all affect safety; a social worker or the police can provide safety information based on the risk. The Police's rights of victims and witnesses and the SWD's Victim Support Programme provide further official information.

Can a same-sex cohabitant apply?

Yes. The section 2 definition says in terms “(whether of the same sex or of the opposite sex)”, and the Court of Final Appeal set out the same definition at ¶99 of [2024] HKCFA 30. The other half of the definition still has to be satisfied — the two persons must “live together as a couple in an intimate relationship” — as do the statutory conditions including molestation. The Judiciary webpage describes the cohabitation limb as a partner or former partner “of opposite sex”, which is narrower than the legislation; the Registry explains procedure, while a Hong Kong solicitor can address individual eligibility.

Does no authorization of arrest mean the police cannot arrest?

No. It means the specific section 5(2) arrest power for a qualifying breach is unavailable. If the conduct is independently criminal — Cap. 212 s. 39 or Cap. 200 s. 24, for instance — there is a separate route in the general criminal law: section 50(1)(a) of the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) makes it lawful for a police officer to apprehend a person he reasonably believes will be charged with, or reasonably suspects of being guilty of, an offence punishable by imprisonment, and section 50(1A) provides that this may be done without warrant. What is actually done in a given situation is a matter for the police. Call 999 in immediate danger.

Can threats, surveillance or financial control support an application?

Non-physical conduct may amount to molestation depending on its nature, context and evidence; it is not automatic. Authorization of arrest has a separate threshold: actual bodily harm to the protected person, either caused or likely to be caused. A Hong Kong solicitor can assess the complete facts; obtaining evidence should not increase danger.

Is every part of the injunction limited to 24 months?

No. The 24-month restriction applies only to specified statutory parts. The sealed order records the duration of a non-molestation provision; the absence of one universal statutory number does not mean the provision is permanent. ⚠ Note: several online explanations state a flat 24-month maximum for “an injunction order” plus one renewal; the Judiciary's own page mentions 24 months only under the Ouster/Re-entry heading. The statute is what governs — and section 6(1) states no universal number for a non-molestation provision.

Is the injunction hearing completely private?

Cap. 189 proceedings are ordinarily in chambers, subject to judicial direction. Later committal proceedings may require specified information to be stated in open court, so complete confidentiality throughout the process is not guaranteed.

In danger, call 999 or a support service first; a document service is not an emergency service. HKGoodLawyer provides general legal-document explanation and lawyer referral. It is not a law firm, does not provide legal advice and does not guarantee an outcome. Validity, police powers, deadlines and prospects depend on the facts and require the court, relevant agency or an independent Hong Kong solicitor.

Domestic-violence documents often contain names, Hong Kong identity-card numbers, addresses, children's and school details, medical information, police references, signatures, photograph location data and third-party information. Handling or uploading them on a monitored device can itself create a safety risk. A referral is only a route to locating an independent Hong Kong solicitor; engagement and scope are agreed separately with that solicitor.

Legislation consolidation versions: the Hong Kong e-Legislation texts cited in this article are Caps. 189 and 189A (19 September 2019), Cap. 212 (22 April 2021), Cap. 336C (1 October 2021), Cap. 200 (23 March 2024), Cap. 336 (18 August 2024), Cap. 232 (24 August 2025), Cap. 4A (1 October 2025), Cap. 91 (27 March 2026) and Cap. 1 (31 July 2026).

• Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Ordinance (Cap. 189)
• Domestic and Cohabitation Relationships Violence Rules (Cap. 189A)
• Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91)
• District Court (Fees) Rules (Cap. 336C)
• Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232)
• Judiciary guide to applying for a domestic-violence injunction
• D v L [2014] HKFC 26, FCMC 8507/2013 (District Court, Family Court, 13 March 2014)
• Ng Hon Lam Edgar v Secretary for Justice, FACV 4/2024, [2024] HKCFA 30 (Court of Final Appeal, 26 November 2024)
• LCH v WPSN, CACV 327/2024, [2025] HKCA 376 (Court of Appeal, Reasons for Judgment 25 April 2025)
• LCH v WPSN, FAMV No. 133 of 2025, [2026] HKCFA 5 (Court of Final Appeal, Appeal Committee Reasons for Determination 23 January 2026)
• HKSAR v Chan Chun Tat, CACC 317/2012, [2013] HKCA 169 (Court of Appeal, Reasons for Judgment 11 April 2013)
• CACC 170/2013, from HCCC 313/2012 (Court of Appeal, Reasons 2 December 2013)
• SWD support for victims of violence
• SWD refuge centres and hotlines