When the Administrator or Executor Moves the Estate's Money: What a Hong Kong Beneficiary Can Actually Do
Published: 2026-08-30
Do You Want the Thing Back, or Do You Want Him Punished? In Hong Kong Those Run on Separate Machinery
You probably arrived with one word — report it to the police — and that word points at a machine that does not do the thing you actually want.
Many people arrive at this question in criminal words — can I report it to the police, theft, fraud.
Here is the problem. The word the reader has is criminal; the outcome the reader wants is proprietary; and in Hong Kong those are handled by two sets of machinery. ⚠ But it is too strong to say that they never hand work to each other. On a conviction the criminal court has three statutory money powers — Cap. 210 s.30 (orders for restitution), Cap. 221 s.73 (power to award compensation) and Cap. 227 s.98 (a magistrate’s corresponding power). All three are discretionary, all three are conditional, and none of them moves title by itself. They are set out in full below.
Two routes, in one line
Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210), section 33(2):
"(2) Notwithstanding any enactment to the contrary, where property has been stolen or obtained by fraud or other wrongful means, the title to that or any other property shall not be affected by reason only of the conviction of the offender."
A conviction does not turn the flat or the money back into estate property. On the other side, Order 85, rule 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court lists, as the first relief you may claim:
"(a) an order requiring an executor, administrator or trustee to furnish and, if necessary, verify accounts;"
One side punishes him. The other makes him account. ⚠ That does not mean the criminal court cannot help get the thing back: Cap. 210 s.30 lets the convicting court order restitution, delivery of traceable proceeds, or payment out of money taken on arrest. The civil route remains the one this article explains, because it does not depend on a prosecution being brought or a conviction being obtained.
The thirty-second version
- A conviction does not by itself change who owns anything — but that is not the same as the criminal court being powerless. Cap. 210 s.33(2) says title is not affected "by reason only of the conviction of the offender". ⚠ Section 30 of the same Ordinance gives the convicting court three restitution powers: to order anyone in possession "to restore them to any person entitled to recover them from him"; to order delivery of other goods "directly or indirectly representing" the first; and to order "a sum not exceeding the value of those goods" be paid out of money taken from the convicted person on arrest. Whether a particular case meets s.30's conditions depends on the facts, and s.30(4) imposes its own evidential limit.
- Besides a police report there is a second way in: making him account — and the provision that gives you that step is Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court.
- Delay by itself is not the offence. Cap. 10 section 71 gives a personal representative a year before he is bound to distribute; section 60J punishes handling the estate without having filed, not doing nothing.
- The offence that needs no proof of dishonesty has a death-date floor: section 60J(1)(a) applies only to the estate of a person who dies on or after 11 February 2006. The provision for following property, Cap. 10 section 67(3), expressly says it applies whether the deceased died before or after the Ordinance commenced.
- Even a civil win needs something to enforce against. The Legal Aid Department's own published refusal examples include an opposite party carrying no insurance and holding nothing worth enforcing against, so that a judgment could not be enforced.
- Two free channels do cover this problem, and neither of them gives you a lawyer to act for you.
Please note. This article states the general position under Hong Kong law. Whether a particular personal representative has broken the law, whether to report, which route to take, and how to word a letter all turn on the dates, documents and facts of the case.
Slow Is Not the Same as Wrong — and the Two Twelve-Month Periods Are Not the Same Thing
The Ordinance itself separates "has not distributed" from "handled the estate without filing": the first carries a year's grace, the second is the offence — and the two twelve-month periods run from the same day doing opposite work.
1. Section 71 is about distribution, and only about distribution
Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10), section 71, in a single sentence:
"Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, a personal representative is not bound to distribute the estate of the deceased before the expiration of one year from the death."
Eight months after the death with nothing paid out to anybody is not, by itself, a breach of section 71. That sentence is where a great many family disputes begin. ⚠ But read what s.71 actually covers. It opens "Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance", and it says only that a personal representative is not bound to distribute. It confers no year of inactivity and suspends none of his other duties under the same Ordinance or at general law — collecting in the assets, safeguarding the estate, and accounting for it.
2. The other twelve months is a filing deadline
Section 60J(8) defines the prescribed period:
"(8) In subsections (6) and (7), prescribed period (訂明期間)— (a) in a case in which— (i) an application to the Official Administrator for the exercise of his power under section 15; or (ii) an application for a grant under section 24, is made, means 12 months; (b) in a case in which an application for sealing of a grant under section 49 is made, means 18 months."
It runs from the date of death, exactly as section 71's year does. Same start, opposite work: one protects him from being made to distribute, the other punishes him for not filing in time.
3. And doing nothing does not fall inside the offence
Sections 60J(6) and (7) each carry an act element. Subsection (6):
"(6) Subject to section 60K(9), any executor of a deceased person or any person entitled in priority to the administration of the estate of a deceased person who— (a) takes possession of, or in any way administers, any part of the estate or the income of any part of the estate within the prescribed period commencing on the date on which the deceased dies; and (b) fails to submit within the prescribed period an application in respect of the estate— (i) to the Official Administrator for the exercise of his power under section 15; (ii) for a grant under section 24; or (iii) for sealing of a grant under section 49, supported by an affidavit exhibiting a schedule, or a corrective affidavit exhibiting an additional schedule, setting out such part of the estate, commits an offence."
Subsection (7) is the other half of the same pair, addressing possession or administration after the period has expired without first filing.
Both require that the person "takes possession of, or in any way administers" part of the estate. Reading those two subsections' own words, this site's reading is that doing nothing at all does not fall within either. That is a reading of the text, not a decision of any court.
And if he did file and did obtain a grant? Then subsections (6) and (7) are looking at the twelve or eighteen months after the death — a window that has closed — and nothing he does today changes what happened inside it. Which is why the section on the offence below lands on subsection (2) rather than on (6) or (7).
4. There is no remuneration unless the court allows it — and the court may not allow it to a personal representative who does not account
Everything after the opening subsection is qualified by it. Section 60(1):
"(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court may allow to any executor or administrator, including an administrator appointed pendente lite under section 40 (or to a person acting under a power of attorney as attorney for an executor or administrator in the matter of the sealing of a probate or administration under Part IV or in the matter of the realization and administration of an estate under a probate or administration so sealed) such remuneration out of the estate of the deceased person as the court thinks fit."
Two phrases carry the whole section: "the court may allow", and "as the court thinks fit". Remuneration under section 60 is a discretionary court allowance, not an entitlement. A personal representative does not begin with a right to be paid out of the estate which subsection (2) then removes. He begins with nothing, and subsection (1) is the only route to anything under section 60. ⚠ Section 60 is about a court allowance; it does not address a remuneration, charging or conditional-gift provision in the will itself. Whether a will may provide for payment is a separate question that Cap. 10 does not answer, so section 60 is not necessarily the only route to payment.
The limits come next. Section 60(2)(a):
"(a) No allowance shall be made to any executor or administrator or attorney who neglects to pass his accounts at such time, or to dispose of any moneys, goods, chattels, or securities with which he is chargeable in such manner as may be required by probate rules and orders."
And the cap, in the same subsection — it opens with the words "No such remuneration", and the antecedent of such is the allowance subsection (1) permits, not any sum he already had:
"(b) No such remuneration shall exceed five per cent on the first $1,000, two and a half per cent on the next $4,000 and one per cent on the balance of the gross value of all property of whatsoever nature administered."
So the accurate statement is a narrow one: there is no remuneration unless the court allows it, and the court may not allow it to a personal representative who neglects to pass his accounts as the probate rules and orders require. What that is worth to a beneficiary depends on whether the court would ever have allowed anything — and in an ordinary family administration the question may never have been put to it.
Note those percentages and those two figures: Cap. 10 contains no power to change that scale. The point is taken up below.
In one line: section 71 means distribution is not due before the executor's year expires, and it suspends none of his other duties; handling the estate without filing in time is the offence the Ordinance actually creates; and a personal representative who neglects to pass his accounts cannot be allowed remuneration under section 60.
Making Him Account: the Provision Is in the Rules of the High Court
There is a provision aimed squarely at making a personal representative account, and it is drafted so that the action need not ask the Court to administer the whole estate — and so that the Court may stay the action and order proper accounts within a set period instead.
1. The duty, and what triggers it
Cap. 10, section 56:
"The personal representative of a deceased person shall, when lawfully required so to do, exhibit, by affidavit filed in the court, a true and perfect inventory and account of the movable and immovable property of the deceased, and the court shall have power as heretofore to require personal representatives to bring in inventories."
The whole sentence turns on "when lawfully required so to do". The duty does not run by itself — somebody has to require it lawfully. So the next step is the actual entry point.
2. How it is required, in Order 85 of the Rules of the High Court
Rule 2(3) lists the reliefs that may be claimed. The first is the one this article is about:
"(a) an order requiring an executor, administrator or trustee to furnish and, if necessary, verify accounts;"
And for a reader whose administrator has already moved the money, the next two paragraphs of the same list are closer to the point than the first. Rule 2(3)(b):
"(b) an order requiring the payment into court of money held by a person in his capacity as executor, administrator or trustee;"
Rule 2(3)(c):
"(c) an order directing a person to do or abstain from doing a particular act in his capacity as executor, administrator or trustee;"
An order for accounts tells you what happened. An order under (b) puts money into court, and an order under (c) tells him to do something or to stop. The list also has a questions limb: rule 2(2) allows an action for the determination of any question arising in the administration of a deceased person's estate or in the execution of a trust, any question as to the composition of a class of claimants or beneficiaries, and any question as to the rights or interests of a person claiming to be a creditor of the estate or to be entitled under a will, on an intestacy or under a trust.
And rule 2(1) sets the shape of the action:
"(1) An action may be brought for the determination of any question or for any relief which could be determined or granted, as the case may be, in an administration action and a claim need not be made in the action for the administration or execution under the direction of the Court of the estate or trust in connection with which the question arises or the relief is sought."
You do not have to ask the Court to take over the estate in order to ask for an account.
One more rule in the same Order decides who has to be in the action, and it is not optional. Rule 3(1):
"(1) All the executors or administrators of the estate or trustees of the trust, as the case may be, to which an administration action or such an action as is referred to in rule 2 relates must be parties to the action, and where the action is brought by executors, administrators or trustees, any of them who does not consent to being joined as a plaintiff must be made a defendant."
So every personal representative has to be in it — and where one of them will not join as a plaintiff, the rule says he is made a defendant instead. For an estate with two administrators and a dispute between them, that is the mechanism rather than an obstacle. Rule 3(2) then runs the other way and is the reader-favourable half: notwithstanding Order 15, rule 4(2), all the persons with a beneficial interest in or a claim against the estate need not be parties; the plaintiff may join such of them as he thinks fit having regard to the nature of the relief claimed. You do not have to assemble the whole family to start.
3. And the rule is built so that the accounts arrive and the action stops
Rule 5, both paragraphs:
"(1) A judgment or order for the administration or execution under the direction of the Court of an estate or trust need not be given or made unless in the opinion of the Court the questions at issue between the parties cannot properly be determined otherwise than under such a judgment or order. (2) Where an administration action is brought by a creditor of the estate of a deceased person or by a person claiming to be entitled under a will or on the intestacy of a deceased person or to be beneficially entitled under a trust, and the plaintiff alleges that no or insufficient accounts have been furnished by the executors, administrators or trustees, as the case may be, then, without prejudice to its other powers, the Court may— (a) order that proceedings in the action be stayed for a period specified in the order and that the executors, administrators or trustees, as the case may be, shall within that period furnish the plaintiff with proper accounts; (b) if necessary to prevent proceedings by other creditors or by other persons claiming to be entitled as aforesaid, give judgment or make an order for the administration of the estate to which the action relates and include therein an order that no proceedings are to be taken under the judgment or order, or under any particular account or inquiry directed, without the leave of the judge in person."
What the rule is built to do: the Court is told not to make a full administration order lightly, and it may stay the action and order accounts within a specified period.
4. Two routes, two originating documents — and a bridge between them
Order 43, rule 1(1) — the summary order — has a narrow entrance:
"(1) Where a writ is indorsed with a claim for an account or a claim which necessarily involves taking an account, the plaintiff may, at any time after the defendant has acknowledged service of the writ or after the time limited for acknowledging service, apply for an order under this rule."
Rule 1(3):
"(3) On the hearing of the application, the Court may, unless satisfied that there is some preliminary question to be tried, order that an account be taken and may also order that any amount certified on taking the account to be due to either party be paid to him within a time specified in the order."
The entrance is a writ. Order 85, rule 4 deals with the other side of the fork, and it is set out entire here, because its first half is the stronger point for a beneficiary and its closing words are the ones usually dropped:
"In an administration action or such an action as is referred to in rule 2, the Court may make any certificate or order and grant any relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled by reason of any breach of trust, wilful default or other misconduct of the defendant notwithstanding that the action was begun by originating summons, but the foregoing provision is without prejudice to the power of the Court to make an order under Order 28, rule 8, in relation to the action."
Two things come out of that, and the second is that taking one route does not necessarily shut off the other.
- The first half is the reader-facing point. On an action begun by originating summons the Court may still make any certificate or order and grant any relief the plaintiff is entitled to by reason of any breach of trust, wilful default or other misconduct of the defendant. Choosing the summons does not narrow what can be ordered at the end of it.
- The closing words send you to Order 28, rule 8 — and that rule is a bridge, not a wall. Rule 8(1):
"(1) Where, in the case of a cause or matter begun by originating summons, it appears to the Court at any stage of the proceedings that the proceedings should for any reason be continued as if the cause or matter had been begun by writ, it may order the proceedings to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun and may, in particular, order that any affidavits shall stand as pleadings, with or without liberty to any of the parties to add thereto or to apply for particulars thereof."
And rule 8(4) carries that through the rest of the Rules:
"(4) Any reference in these rules to an action begun by writ shall, unless the context otherwise requires, be construed as including a reference to a cause or matter proceedings in which are ordered under this rule to continue as if the cause or matter had been so begun."
So the two routes are not sealed off from one another. The Court may order originating-summons proceedings to continue as if they had been begun by writ, and once it has, a reference in the Rules to an action begun by writ includes them — and "a writ" is the entrance Order 43, rule 1(1) is written on. The two routes start with different documents, and the Order 43 summary order is drafted for the writ; whether a court would make an Order 28, rule 8 order depends on the case.
The summary disposal available on the originating-summons side is Order 28, rule 4(1):
"(1) The Court by whom an originating summons is heard may, if the liability of the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of any claim made by the plaintiff is established, make such order in favour of the plaintiff as the nature of the case may require, but where the Court makes an order under this paragraph against a defendant who does not appear at the hearing, the order may be varied or revoked by a subsequent order of the Court on such terms as it thinks just."
5. And if the accounting itself stalls, the rules anticipated that
Order 43, rule 7:
"(1) If it appears to the Court that there is undue delay in the prosecution of any accounts or inquiries, or in any other proceedings under any judgment or order, the Court may require the party having the conduct of the proceedings or any other party to explain the delay and may then make such order for staying the proceedings or for expediting them or for the conduct thereof and for costs as the circumstances require. (2) The Court may direct any party or the Official Solicitor to take over the conduct of the proceedings in question and to carry out any directions made by an order under this rule and may make such order as it thinks fit as to the payment of the Official Solicitor’s costs."
5a. And the published procedure for all of this is Practice Direction 20.2
There is a Judiciary practice direction covering exactly the ground this section and the removal section describe. It is Practice Direction 20.2, Probate and Administration of Estate Proceedings (other than applications under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules (Cap. 10A)). Its paragraph 1 states its own scope:
"This Practice Direction supplements the practice and procedure in Order 76, Rules of the High Court (Cap.4A) (“RHC”). In particular, it prescribes the procedure for an action for revocation of grant of probate of a will or letters of administration of the estate of a deceased person, administration pendente lite and rectification of a will. This Practice Direction also sets out the procedure for removal or substitution of an executor or administrator under section 33, Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap.10) (“PAO”), and the taking of accounts in administration actions concerning the estate of a deceased person. Finally, it deals with the applicability of mediation to those contentious proceedings set out in Part V."
Paragraph 2 draws the line the reader most needs, because the grant application itself is a Cap. 10A matter:
"For the avoidance of doubt, this Practice Direction shall not apply to applications under the Non-contentious Probate Rules (Cap.10A) (“NCPR”)."
And paragraph 3(2) ties the practice direction's own term back to the rule this section is built on:
"“administration action” shall have the same meaning as set out in Order 85, rule 1 save and except that it does not include an action for the execution under the direction of the Court of a trust; and"
So the practice direction and the Order 85 route set out above are the same route, described from two ends — the rule confers the jurisdiction, the practice direction says how the paperwork is done. They do not conflict.
On accounts specifically, Part IV is short and it is the part that matters here. Paragraph 54:
"If the court orders an account to be taken in an administration action, then unless otherwise directed by the court, the account may be taken by a master."
Paragraph 55, on directions:
"When ordering accounts to be taken, the court may, at the same time or subsequently, give directions as to the manner in which the account is to be taken or verified including directions as to who is to lodge the accounts and within what period, within what period any objection to the accounts is to be lodged, and as to arrangements for the inspection of vouchers and other relevant documents."
Paragraph 57, on the form the account must take:
"Unless the court otherwise directs, the accounting party must make out the account by separately numbering each distinct account and exhibiting it to an affidavit or a witness statement verifying it."
Three things follow that a reader cannot get from the Rules alone. The account may be taken by a master, not necessarily a judge. The court may fix who lodges what and by when, and a period within which objections must be lodged — so the accounting is a two-sided timetable, not a single filing. And the accounting party must separately number each distinct account and exhibit it to an affidavit or witness statement verifying it — which is the same affidavit form the judgment in section seven of this article records the court ordering.
A practice direction states procedure, not substantive law; it does not say when a court will order an account, when it will remove anybody, or what has to be proved. Its date is in paragraph 72 and the line under it:
"This Practice Direction shall supersede Practice Direction 20.2, and come into effect on 1 August 2012. Dated this 2nd day of July 2012."
6. Open questions
- Whether the Order 28, rule 4 summary disposal is available against a personal representative, as opposed to an express trustee, turns on case law.
- Whether there is a common-law duty to keep and render accounts separate from section 56 is a further question. The duty in this section is section 56's and the relief is Order 85's.
You Can Ask to See the Schedule of Assets — and on the Grant Routes the Ordinance Says It Need Not State the Value of Anything but Cash
The document that defines the boundary of the offence is sworn by the person the offence is aimed at, is not independently verified by the Registry as part of issuing the grant, and there is a stated route by which you can ask to inspect it — and for the schedule annexed to a grant, and for the schedule annexed to the sealing of a foreign grant, the Ordinance says in terms that the value of assets other than cash need not be stated in it.
1. The offence's boundary is the schedule
Section 60J(2):
"(2) Any person who, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, deals with— (a) any part of the estate of a deceased person; or (b) any property held by the deceased in the capacity of a trustee or the manager of a Tso or Tong, which is not set out in the schedule and additional schedule (if any)— (c) exhibited under section 15A; (d) annexed to a grant made in respect of the estate; or (e) annexed to an instrument effecting the sealing of a grant in respect of the estate under section 49AA, commits an offence."
The scope of that subsection is set by what is and is not on the schedule.
2. Why the schedule exists
In 2005 the Administration proposed dropping the requirement that a schedule of assets and liabilities be annexed to the grant. Its reasons were that the office usually falls to somebody the deceased had trusted or to his nearest family, so that mismanagement was not to be expected as the ordinary case, and it offered a list of provisions already on the statute book as the beneficiary's protection instead (Bills Committee report, paragraphs 14 and 16). Members did not accept that assessment, taking the view that the Crimes Ordinance provisions the Administration had cited could not deal with intermeddling (paragraph 17); the Administration then reversed its position and made a sworn schedule of assets and liabilities mandatory (paragraph 18). The same report, at paragraph 19, records that the prescribed form would say on its face that nobody at the Registry, and nobody in government, had checked what the schedule contains. (This site's summary, with paragraph numbers.)
So the document that fixes the offence's boundary is sworn by the person the offence is aimed at, and the Registry does not independently verify what it says as part of issuing the grant — and it exists at all because the legislature did not accept the Administration's assessment. ⚠ That does not mean the schedule cannot be tested. The schedule is sworn; section 24A(8) imposes a continuing correction duty; inspection may be permitted on the stated route; and in any later proceedings it can be challenged.
3. There is a stated route to see it
The Judiciary's public probate FAQ, at section 15.1, says that once the grant has issued the application file is closed to inspection unless the applicant consents in writing, or the Registrar accepts that good reason has been shown — and the illustration the page itself offers is somebody who is a beneficiary of that estate and is asking how it stands. (This site's summary.)
4. And the section 24A and section 49AA schedules need not state value — which must be read with the three points above
Cap. 10, section 24A(13):
"(13) For the avoidance of doubt, the value of assets other than cash does not have to be stated in a schedule or an additional schedule exhibited under this section."
Section 49AA(13), for a sealed foreign grant, is word for word identical.
There are three schedule routes, and only two of them carry this subsection. Section 60J(2) fixes the offence's boundary by reference to a schedule exhibited under section 15A (the Official Administrator route), annexed to a grant (section 24A), or annexed to a sealing instrument under section 49AA. Section 24A and section 49AA each have a subsection (13) in these words. Section 15A has no equivalent: it runs to subsection (7) and contains no "for the avoidance of doubt" provision about value at all. So what is said here concerns the section 24A and section 49AA schedules; for a section 15A schedule the Ordinance neither requires value to be stated nor excuses it in the terms it uses for the other two.
So the document you can ask to see — on the two routes that carry the subsection — is a list, not a valuation. A flat, a shareholding and a car can each appear as a single line with no figure after it.
5. But the schedule is not write-once: the Ordinance imposes a continuing duty to correct it
Section 24A(7) provides that the duplicate schedule shall be annexed to the grant. Section 24A(8):
"(8) If, after the court makes a grant under section 3, any inaccuracy in a schedule or additional schedule annexed to the grant comes to the knowledge of the executor or administrator, he shall— (a) file— (i) a corrective affidavit; and (ii) a duplicate of the additional schedule exhibited by such affidavit under subsection (9), with the Registry; and (b) deliver the grant to the Registry together with such affidavit."
And section 24A(12) closes off the answer that the grant only covered part of the estate:
"(12) Notwithstanding subsections (6) and (10), the court or the Registrar may require an applicant for a grant or an executor or administrator to file an affidavit exhibiting a schedule setting out all of the assets and liabilities of a deceased person as at the date of his death known to the applicant, executor or administrator despite the grant covers or is to cover only a part of the estate."
In one line: an asset left off the schedule does two things at once — it may bring subsection 60J(2) into play, and it removes the item from the one official record you can most easily reach. And the Ordinance does impose a duty to correct an inaccuracy discovered later.
Subsection 60J(2) reaches property not set out in the schedule. An asset that is properly listed, and is then sold or spent by the person who listed it, is outside subsection (2) for that reason alone — and subsections (3), (6) and (7) address a person who is not the grant-holder, or a window that closed when the grant issued. So for a grant-holding administrator who sells a flat that is on the schedule and keeps the proceeds, the offence this article calls the one needing no proof of dishonesty may reach nothing at all. That is a reading of the four limbs' own words, not any court's decision.
How the schedule is prepared, how the correction procedure works from the applicant's side, and what it costs to file are covered in our guide to grants of probate and letters of administration.
He Bought It Himself, or One of Them Signed the Transfer Alone: Two Voidability Provisions, and One Section That Splits Land from Everything Else
There are two voidability provisions, not one: one for a personal representative who purchases the deceased's property, and one for any disposal made in contravention of section 54 — and section 54 lays down opposite rules for land and for everything else, with a further exception of its own for an executor who has proved.
1. He bought it himself — section 55
"If a personal representative purchases, either directly or indirectly, any of the property of the deceased, the sale shall be voidable at the instance of any other person interested in the property sold."
Three things at once: it is voidable, not automatically void; it requires another person interested in the property sold to take the point; and it is not a criminal provision.
2. Other disposals — section 54, which is what most people actually meet
Land: all the personal representatives must concur — except where section 54(2) applies. Section 54(1):
"(1) No conveyance of immovable property of a deceased person dying after the commencement* of this Ordinance shall be made without the concurrence of all the personal representatives of the deceased or an order of the court."
(The asterisk points to the section's editorial note; the commencement date is 7 October 1971.)
And the exception is the very next subsection. Section 54(2):
"(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where probate is granted to one or some of two or more persons named as executors, whether or not power is reserved to the other or others to prove, any conveyance of the immovable property may be made by the proving executor or executors for the time being, without an order of the court, and shall be as effectual as if all the persons named as executors had concurred therein."
Read what that does. Where the deceased left a will naming two or more executors and probate has been granted to one or some of them, the proving executor may convey the immovable property alone, without an order of the court, and the conveyance is as effectual as if all the named executors had concurred in it. So unanimity on land is the rule for administrators. Where the grant is probate of a will naming executors of whom only some have proved, section 54(2) is an express answer to it. Which of the two positions you are in is a question about the grant in your own case: whether it is probate of a will naming executors, or letters of administration.
Everything else: any one of them can act. Section 54(3):
"(3) Save where subsection (1) or (2) applies, where there are several personal representatives the powers of all may, in the absence of any direction to the contrary in the will or grant of administration, be exercised by any one of them."
And a disposal in contravention of the section is voidable. Section 54(5):
"(5) The disposal of property by a personal representative in contravention of the provisions of this section shall be voidable at the instance of any other person interested in the property."
A worked comparison: the same conduct, two different results — and it is written for administrators
Suppose the deceased died intestate, left a flat and a bank account, there are two administrators, and the grant contains no contrary direction. Note the premise: there is no proving executor.
- The flat is transferred on the signature of one administrator alone. Section 54(1) requires the concurrence of all the personal representatives or an order of the court, and neither is present, so the disposal is one made in contravention of the section and section 54(5) applies — voidable at the instance of any other person interested in the property.
- The bank account is drawn down by one administrator alone. Section 54(1) speaks only of immovable property; absent a contrary direction, section 54(3) provides that the powers of all may be exercised by any one of them, so the bare fact that one of them acted alone does not engage section 54(5).
That comparison is simply the two subsections read side by side; it is not any court's decision. It holds only where there is more than one personal representative and no contrary direction — change either premise and the answer changes.
And where there is only one administrator? Section 54(1) speaks of "all the personal representatives" — where there is one, he is all of them. So this distinction is for estates with more than one personal representative.
And where the grant is probate of a will naming more than one executor, and only some of them have proved? Then section 54(2) applies and the land case behaves like the bank-account case: the proving executor may convey the immovable property without the others and without an order of the court, and the conveyance is as effectual as if they had all concurred. The comparison above is written for administrators. It is not the position for a proving executor.
3. The other side, stated: disposal is his power
Section 54(4) allows a personal representative to charge, mortgage or otherwise dispose of any property vested in him as he may think proper, subject to any restriction imposed in that behalf by the will of the deceased and to the provisions of the section — and the subsection carries a proviso that goes the other way again: an executor may dispose of any property notwithstanding a restriction so imposed, if he does so in accordance with an order of the court. Disposal is the rule; sections 54(1) and 55 are the exceptions; and a court order can lift a testator's own restriction.
4. Beyond the provisions
What a court does about a sale at an undervalue to a family member, and who bears the onus on price, turn on case law. This section sets out the two provisions and what each of them requires.
The Property Has Gone to Somebody Else: the Ordinance's Word Is "Follow", Not "Trace"
Cap. 10 section 67 provides that an assent, transfer or conveyance to somebody who is not a purchaser does not prejudice the right to follow the property into that person's hands, and it lets the court declare that person a trustee — and it says expressly that it applies whether the deceased died before or after the Ordinance commenced.
1. What subsection (1) actually does — and it is a non-prejudice provision
Section 67(1):
"(1) An assent, transfer or conveyance by a personal representative to a person other than a purchaser does not prejudice the rights of any person to follow the property to which the assent, transfer or conveyance relates, or any property representing the same, into the hands of the person in whom it is vested by the assent, transfer or conveyance, nor of any other person (not being a purchaser) who may have received the same or in whom it may be vested."
Read the verb. The subsection says such a transfer "does not prejudice the rights of any person to follow the property". It preserves a right against being defeated by the transfer; it does not, in those words, create one. Where that right comes from, and what it lets a beneficiary recover, is a separate question. What section 67 does confer in its own words is in subsection (2), and those are powers of the court. (The section's heading, "Right to follow property and powers of the court in relation thereto", is framed more broadly.)
2. What the court may do
Section 67(2):
"(2) Notwithstanding any such assent, transfer or conveyance the court may, on the application of any creditor or other person interested— (a) order a sale, exchange, mortgage, charge, lease, payment, transfer or other transaction to be carried out which the court considers requisite for the purpose of giving effect to the rights of the persons interested; (b) declare that the person, not being a purchaser, in whom the property is vested is a trustee for those purposes; (c) give directions respecting the preparation and execution of any conveyance or other instrument, or as to any other matter required for giving effect to the order; (d) make any vesting order or appoint a person to convey in accordance with provisions of the Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29)."
Paragraph (b) is the single sentence in this whole article that points most directly at getting the thing back: the court may declare the recipient, not being a purchaser, a trustee.
3. And there is no death-date floor, because the subsection says so
Section 67(3):
"(3) This section does not prejudice the rights of a purchaser or a person deriving title under him, but applies whether the testator or intestate died before or after the commencement* of this Ordinance."
Two things in one sentence, and both must be carried:
- The right reaches deaths before the Ordinance commenced — the editorial note gives the commencement date as 7 October 1971;
- but it expressly does not prejudice a purchaser, or a person deriving title under a purchaser. It reaches somebody who was given the property; it stops at a "purchaser" in the subsection's own word. That limit is the subsection's own. ⚠ But section 67 does not define "purchaser". The only definition in Cap. 10 is in section 68(9), and it is expressly confined to that section:
"(9) In this section, a settled legacy, share or interest includes any legacy, share or interest to which a person is not absolutely entitled in possession at the date of the appropriation, also an annuity, and purchaser (買家) means a purchaser for money or money’s worth."
Who counts as a purchaser under section 67, and how value, notice or knowledge bear on it, the section does not say.
4. Terminology: the statute follows; it does not trace
The Ordinances speak of following, not tracing: section 67 is itself headed "Right to follow property and powers of the court in relation thereto". So this article uses "following" for the statutory power.
5. Put beside the criminal route
| which deaths it reaches | what the provision says | |
|---|---|---|
| Cap. 10 section 60J (intermeddling) | estates of persons dying on or after 11 February 2006 | section 60J(1)(a) sets the floor expressly |
| Cap. 10 section 67 (following property) | deaths before or after the Ordinance's commencement on 7 October 1971 — no floor | section 67(3) says "before or after" expressly |
As at 30 August 2026 the first covers 20 years and 6 months. The second has no coverage span to state, because section 67(3) declines to floor itself at the commencement date at all. The accessible offence has a date line; the provision that can actually get the thing back was drafted not to have one.
Removing Him: the Court Has the Power, What It Takes Is Judge-Made — and One Judgment, with Its Bounds
The court may suspend or remove an executor or administrator, provide for a successor, and vest estate property in that successor. The provision is plain. What it takes before the court will do it is not in the provision.
1. The removal power: Cap. 10 section 33(3)
"(3) The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator) and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate."
Note the last limb: "for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate". That is an express vesting power, and a criminal court has nothing like it (see below).
And subsection (3) is not the whole of section 33. The section is headed "Revocation of grants and removal of executors", and the first two subsections are about revocation. Section 33(1):
"Where it appears to the court that a probate or administration either ought not to have been granted or contains an error, the court may call in the probate or administration and if satisfied that it would be revoked at the instance of a party interested, may revoke it."
Section 33(2):
"(2) A probate or administration may be revoked under subsection (1) without being called in if it cannot be called in."
Two separate things live in this section, and they answer different questions. Subsections (1) and (2) go to the grant — that it ought not to have been made, or that it contains an error. Subsection (3) goes to the person — that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of those beneficially entitled require his suspension or removal. Both are set out because "revoke" is a word a reader may well be searching for. What a court requires before doing either is judge-made.
Note: that is Cap. 10 section 33. The provision quoted earlier for the proposition that a conviction does not move title is Cap. 210 section 33. Two Ordinances, the same section number, opposite work.
2. Appointing somebody else: Cap. 10 section 36
Section 36 allows the court, where it appears necessary or convenient to appoint some person other than the person who would by law otherwise have been entitled, to appoint such person as the court thinks fit — but expressly "subject to section 25".
3. And section 25 is not a cross-reference to skip
Section 25 has two subsections and the first is the operative constraint on a section 36 appointment, so it is quoted first. Section 25(1):
"Probate or administration shall not be granted to more than four persons in respect of the same property, and administration shall, if there is a minority or if a life interest arises under the will or intestacy, be granted either to a trust corporation, with or without an individual, or to not less than two individuals: Provided that the court in granting administration may act on such prima facie evidence, furnished by the applicant or any other person, as to whether or not there is a minority or life interest, in accordance with probate rules and orders."
Two limits in one subsection: never more than four, and — where there is a minority or a life interest — never fewer than two individuals, or a trust corporation. For a family estate with a minor beneficiary, the second is why a sole administrator may not be a lawful arrangement in the first place.
And section 25(2):
"(2) If there is only one personal representative (not being a trust corporation) then, during the minority of a beneficiary or the subsistence of a life interest and until the estate is fully administered, the court may, on the application of any person interested or of the guardian, committee or receiver of any such person, appoint one or more personal representatives in addition to the original personal representative in accordance with probate rules and orders."
Subsection (2) is an addition, not a removal, and its gate is a minority or a subsisting life interest — not misconduct. For some families it is closer to their actual position than removal is. Together the two subsections are a ceiling and a floor on who holds the office, and section 36 is expressly subject to both.
4. The judicial trustee: Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29) section 63
Section 63(1) allows the court, on the application of a beneficiary among others, in its discretion to appoint a judicial trustee jointly with any other person or as sole trustee, and, if sufficient cause is shown, in place of all or any existing trustees. And section 63(2):
"(2) The administration of the property of a deceased person, whether a testator or intestate, shall be a trust, and the executor or administrator a trustee, within the meaning of this Part."
The words "within the meaning of this Part" travel with that sentence every time it is used — it is a provision about Part V of Cap. 29, not a general equation.
5. There is one administrator none of this reaches
Section 33(3) expressly excludes the Official Administrator from the removal power. And Cap. 10 section 22:
"No action shall be brought against the Official Administrator for anything done bona fide by him in the execution or the intended execution of any power vested in him by this Ordinance or for anything done by him in the exercise of his office as administrator under any grant of letters of administration made to him under this Ordinance, but any person who feels aggrieved thereby may apply for redress to the court by summary petition, verified upon oath, and the court may thereupon take such evidence and may make such order in relation to the matter as it thinks fit."
The one personal representative the court cannot remove is also the one the section protects from being sued — and the Ordinance writes a different route for him: a summary petition. ⚠ Track the statutory qualification exactly: section 22 bars an action for anything done by the Official Administrator bona fide in the exercise or intended exercise of the powers the Ordinance gives him, or in the execution of his duties under a grant made to him. "Bona fide" and "the powers vested in him by this Ordinance" are two limits. It is not an unconditional immunity.
Who he is — section 9(1):
"(1) The Registrar shall be ex officio Official Administrator under this Ordinance."
When he acts — section 15(1):
"(1) The Official Administrator may, where the whole of an estate does not, in his opinion, exceed $150,000 in value, without any legal formality, get in and administer the same in a summary manner, for the benefit of the persons he may deem interested therein, without a grant or other legal formality."
That $150,000 is another figure Cap. 10 gives nobody power to change (see below).
5a. And the procedure for removal is published too — Practice Direction 20.2, Part III
Section 33(3) gives the power. It does not say how you ask for it. Practice Direction 20.2 does, and its Part III is headed for removal or substitution of an executor or administrator under section 33(3) of Cap. 10. Paragraph 44:
"An application may be made by way of an inter-partes originating summons, together with a supporting affidavit. The following documents must be lodged with the application at the Probate Registry : (1) A sealed or certified copy of the grant of probate or letters of administration; (2) Where the application is to substitute or remove an executor and is made before a grant of probate has been issued, the original or, if the original is not available, a copy of the will."
An inter-partes originating summons with a supporting affidavit — which is the same shape of process as the judgment set out below. On who has to be in the action, paragraph 45:
"Every administrator of the estate (if a grant has been obtained), all persons having a beneficial interest in the estate, residuary beneficiaries (unless numerous) should be joined as a party, unless their written consent to the application is available."
On what the affidavit has to contain, paragraph 46:
"The supporting affidavit should set out the grounds of the application and the following information so far as it is known to the plaintiff: (1) brief details of the property comprised in the estate, with an approximate estimate of its value, and any income that is received from it. If the personal representative has partially administered the estate, an account should be exhibited giving brief details of the size, value and nature of the assets administered; (2) brief details of the liabilities of the estate; (3) the names and addresses of the persons who are in possession of the documents relating to the estate if they are not in the possession of the plaintiff; and (4) the names of the beneficiaries and their respective interests in the estate, confirming whether there exist minority interest or interests of persons under disability."
Note the second half of paragraph 46(1): where the personal representative has partially administered the estate, an account is to be exhibited giving brief details of the size, value and nature of the assets administered. That is the accounting duty of this article's third section reappearing inside the removal procedure.
And whether a judge or a master deals with it turns on whether the application is fought. Where it is not contentious and the written consents of all interested parties are filed, paragraph 49 says:
"The originating summons shall be placed before a master. The master may give further directions if necessary and dispose of the application on paper or refer it to a Judge."
Paragraph 50:
"If the application is contentious, the originating summons shall be placed before a Judge."
Revocation, which is the other half of section 33, has its own procedure in Part II Section B, and it is split the same way. Where the grantee brings the action and nobody objects, paragraph 15:
"If there is no objection to the revocation, the action shall be brought by way of an ex-parte originating summons together with a supporting affidavit."
Where there is objection, paragraph 16:
"If there is objection to the revocation, the action shall be brought by way of a writ under Order 76 or an inter-partes originating summons."
And mediation is not optional to ignore. Paragraph 61 applies the practice direction's mediation Part to contentious proceedings commenced by originating summons under, among others, Part III:
"For contentious proceedings commenced by originating summons under Sections B, and D of Part II, Parts III and IV of this Practice Direction, this Part shall apply. Further, to promote the use of mediation, the court may impose cost sanctions in the manner stipulated in Practice Direction 31."
⚠ The bounds are the ones stated in section five above. Practice Direction 20.2 states procedure, not substantive law: it does not say what the court must be satisfied of before it removes anybody — that is section 33(3)'s own words plus the case law.
6. One judgment, and what it does and does not settle
One Hong Kong judgment illustrates this. It is Mak Mei Ki Angela v Chan Wai Fong and Mak Chi Tat, HCMP 1894/2016, Court of First Instance, Au-Yeung J in Chambers, heard and decided 8 March 2017 (the proceedings number carries 2016; the judgment is 2017). It was an originating summons under Order 76 and Order 85 rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court and section 33 of Cap. 10, brought by a daughter of an intestate who died in 2005. The administrators — the widow and a son — did not acknowledge service and did not appear, and the judge proceeded in their absence. That is the first thing to hold on to about it.
The two-step the court used. Where the defect in a grant is a supervening one — the grant was properly made but has since become ineffective — the judgment adopts the approach in Re Estate of Kwan Chung [2013] 6 HKC 29, quoting Poon J (as he then was): the applicant should consider "Whether removal of the grantee without revocation of the grant is sufficient." and, if so, proceed under section 33(3); and then "Whether there are additional special circumstances that require revocation of the grant as well.", proceeding under section 33(1) if they do. Removal and revocation are asked in that order, and they are different questions.
What satisfied the court on removal. Ten years after the grant, beyond a partial distribution the estate had not been fully administered:
"The administrators have also failed to furnish accounts despite repeated requests of Angela, and to answer the present proceedings."
"Their conduct is detrimental to the due and proper administration of the estate and the interest of the beneficiaries. They ought to be removed."
And why removal alone was not the whole remedy:
"However, removal is not enough."
— because their complete failure to participate created a real and substantial risk that they would refuse to lodge the grant, so the grant was revoked as well and the lodging dispensed with.
Accounts. Under Cap. 10 section 56 — the same provision section three of this article sets out — the court ordered accounts, on the footing that ten years had passed and there had been an interim distribution:
"The administrators ought to give a full and proper account of the estate and I so order."
The order required the accounts to be furnished by affidavit within a period the judgment states.
The replacement. Under Cap. 10 section 36 the court appointed an independent professional, on the principle in Re Estate of Loo Che Chin [2013] 6 HKC 303 that in exercising that discretion "the court will act in the best interests of the estate and apply common sense to the facts of the case" — and appointed one accountant rather than the two proposed, to save costs. Costs were ordered nisi against the administrators personally and on an indemnity basis, because the application was wholly necessitated by their inaction. ⚠ The costs figure in that case is specific to its facts and is not a guide to what an accounts application costs.
Now the limits.
⚠ This is one first-instance decision on an unopposed application. It shows what satisfied one judge on one set of facts. It is not a threshold — it does not establish that ten years, or a failure to account, or non-appearance, is what the court requires, or what a defended application would need.
⚠ On what a delay in rendering accounts has to do with removal: in that case the failure to furnish accounts despite repeated requests was among the conduct the court held detrimental to the due and proper administration of the estate. That is a fact about one case, not a rule about how long a delay must run.
⚠ Also turning on case law: How the court chooses between section 33(3) and section 36 in a case where both are open; whom it prefers as a replacement in general; and what a contested removal requires.
7. The threshold
What the court needs to see before it will suspend or remove anybody is judge-made, and the provision's own words are only that the court must be satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled so require. One judgment on that phrase is set out immediately above, with its limits.
Renunciation, retraction and the citation machinery — the case where he does not want the job — are covered in our guide to grants of probate and letters of administration.
Caveats: a Caveat Cannot Stop a Grant Sealed on the Day It Is Entered
A caveat is entered so that no grant is sealed without notice to the person who entered it, and the rule says expressly that it cannot stop a sealing on the day it is entered.
1. What the rule says
Non-Contentious Probate Rules (Cap. 10 sub. leg. A), rule 44(1):
"(1) Any person who wishes to ensure that no grant is sealed without notice to himself may enter a caveat in the Registry."
Rule 44(6):
"(6) The Registrar shall again cause the index to be searched before he shall allow any grant to be sealed and shall not allow any grant to be sealed if there is an effective caveat in respect thereof: Provided that no caveat shall operate to prevent the sealing of a grant on the day on which the caveat is entered."
Rule 44(4):
"(4) Except as otherwise provided by this rule, a caveat shall remain in force for 6 months from the date on which it is entered and shall then cease to have effect, without prejudice to the entry of a further caveat or caveats."
And rule 44 defines its own subject, which is worth reading before drawing any conclusion from its choice of verb. Rule 44(14):
"(14) In this rule, grant (授予、授予書) includes a grant made by any court outside Hong Kong which is produced for resealing by the court."
So "sealing" in rule 44 is the act by which a grant is allowed to go out, and the rule applies it both to a Hong Kong grant and to a foreign grant produced for resealing. The Registry's own practitioner guide uses "issued" for the same act, at paragraph 284.
2. What the public page says
The Judiciary's probate FAQ, at section 16.1, tells the reader that where an effective caveat stands against a deceased person's estate the Registrar may not let the grant go out — flatly, and with no proviso. It says that in both languages. Rule 44(6) says the same thing and then qualifies it: no caveat operates to prevent the sealing of a grant on the day the caveat is entered. (This site's summary.)
3. Which governs
The subsidiary legislation. The rules are the instrument; the FAQ is a description of it. And the same publisher's 107-page practitioner guide records, at paragraph 284, that entering a caveat does not stop a grant going out that same day.
4. What this means for you
If the administrator already holds a grant, a caveat has nothing left to stop. Its live use once a dispute is running is as the vehicle for a section 36 summons (practitioner guide, paragraph 294), and caveat proceedings are contentious, with costs (paragraph 292). So the one immediately available step you are most likely to find is the one that has already passed you by.
Sureties: the Ordinance Has Them, the Rules Switch Them Off by Default, and Solicitor Applicants Are Exempt Again
Cap. 10 section 46 lets the court require sureties, but rule 38 of the Non-Contentious Probate Rules reverses the default, so an ordinary Hong Kong-resident family applicant provides no guarantee at all — and where a guarantee does exist, no action may be brought on it without the leave of the court.
1. The power: Cap. 10 section 46
Section 46 allows the court, subject to section 47 and to and in accordance with probate rules and orders, to require one or more sureties to guarantee that they will make good, within any limit imposed by the court, any loss which a person interested in the administration of the estate may suffer in consequence of a breach by the administrator of his duties as such — as a condition of granting administration.
And the Ordinance itself provides for the switch. Section 47(3):
"No sureties shall be required where administration is granted to the Official Administrator or to the consular officer of a State to which section 3 of the Consular Conventions Ordinance (Cap. 267) applies or in such other cases as may be prescribed by probate rules and orders."
The closing words are the ones that matter here: "or in such other cases as may be prescribed by probate rules and orders". So what rule 38 does is not a rule overriding an Ordinance; it is the Ordinance's own delegation being exercised. The relationship is delegation, not reversal — the heading above says the rules switch sureties off by default, and section 47(3) is the provision that lets them.
2. How the rules exercise that delegation: rule 38(1)
The two authentic texts differ in modality here, and both are authentic.
English:
"(1) The Registrar shall not require a guarantee under section 46 of the Ordinance as a condition of granting administration except where it is proposed to grant it— (a) by virtue of rule 19(v) or rule 21(4) to a creditor or the personal representative of a creditor or to a person who has no immediate beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased but may have such an interest in the event of an accretion to the estate; (b) under rule 27 to a person or some of the persons who would, if the person beneficially entitled to the whole of the estate died intestate, be entitled to his estate; (c) under rule 30 to the attorney of a person entitled to a grant; (d) under rule 31 for the use and benefit of a person under the age of 21 years; (e) under rule 33 for the use and benefit of a person who is by reason of mental or physical incapacity incapable of managing his affairs; (f) to an applicant who appears to the Registrar to be resident elsewhere than in Hong Kong, or except where the Registrar considers that there are special circumstances making it desirable to require a guarantee."
The Chinese text of the same paragraph opens 「司法常務官無須根據本條例第46條規定提供擔保作為授予遺產管理的一項條件」, which reads naturally as need not rather than shall not. This article sets the two side by side and does not decide between them.
Six exceptions, one at a time: a creditor grant, a rule 27 grant, an attorney, a person under 21, a person incapable of managing his affairs, an applicant resident outside Hong Kong — plus a residual special-circumstances power. An ordinary Hong Kong-resident family applicant is in none of them.
3. And even inside an exception there is a further exemption
Rule 38(2):
"(2) Notwithstanding that it is proposed to grant administration as aforesaid, a guarantee shall not be required, except in special circumstances, on an application for administration where the applicant or one of the applicants is— (a) a trust corporation; (b) a solicitor holding a current practising certificate under the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159)."
And where a guarantee is required, rule 38(5) fixes how it is given — and contains a money figure of its own. Rule 38(5)(a) provides that unless the Registrar otherwise directs, a guarantee is to be given by two sureties, except where the gross value of the estate does not exceed $7,000, or a corporation is a proposed surety, in which cases one will suffice. Rule 38(5)(d) then caps the surety's liability at the gross amount of the estate as sworn on the application for the grant.
That $7,000 belongs with the frozen figures set out below; the table there lists the Ordinance's own figures, and this one is in the rules (Cap. 10A). Counting the rules as well, there are four such figures.
4. And where a guarantee does exist, there is one more gate
Cap. 10, section 47(2):
"(2) No action shall be brought on any such guarantee without the leave of the court."
The only third-party pocket in the entire scheme has a leave requirement in front of it.
5. The comparison with England, in the Registry's own words
The Judiciary's practitioner guide records, at paragraph 121, that notwithstanding the abolition of such a requirement in the United Kingdom, rule 38 requires the provision of a guarantee in the situations set out in rule 38(1)(a) to (f). (This site's summary.)
6. And if the administrator is a solicitor?
There is no solicitors' compensation fund in Hong Kong. The Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159) and its subsidiary legislation establish none.
What stands in a fund's place is rule 9A(2) of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules (Cap. 159 sub. leg. F):
"(2) Each principal of a firm shall be jointly and severally liable to carry out the duty to remedy any breach of these rules. This duty extends to replacing missing client’s money or trust money from the principal’s own resources, even if the money has not been misappropriated by the principal himself, and whether or not a claim is subsequently made on the fund established under rule 3 of the Solicitors (Professional Indemnity) Rules (Cap. 159 sub. leg. M)."
The principal's own resources have to make it good. ⚠ But that does not support "there is no fund": the very rule quoted above refers to "the fund established under rule 3 of the Solicitors (Professional Indemnity) Rules (Cap. 159 sub. leg. M)". That rule, on the version in force 1 October 2022, provides:
"(1) The Society is hereby authorized to establish and maintain a fund in accordance with the provisions of these rules. (2) Subject to these rules, the fund shall provide indemnity against such loss as is mentioned in section 73A(1) of the Ordinance, in respect of the first indemnity period and each subsequent indemnity period and, subject to the former Rules, the fund shall provide indemnity against such loss as is mentioned in such former Rules. (L.N. 363 of 1991; L.N. 111 of 1992; L.N. 58 of 1993)"
The loss it indemnifies is the loss described in Cap. 159 section 73A(1), the section that authorises indemnity rules to be made. So the accurate statement is: Hong Kong has no statutory scheme called a compensation fund but there is a professional indemnity fund established under rule 3 of Cap. 159 sub. leg. M. The two are not substitutes for each other.
What that fund covers, on what terms, with what exclusions, and who may claim on it, is set out in the Law Society's own current material. The professional-misconduct complaint route is a separate matter; a complaint and a recovery are not the same thing.
7. The published figures
A written reply of 24 February 2021 gives the following figures (this site's summary): 15 interventions in solicitors' firms over 2016 to 2020 inclusive; of those 15, 3 were put down to suspected dishonesty on the part of an employee or partner — and the reply adds that two of those three also broke the Solicitors' Accounts Rules. It records 941 claims arising from those interventions, claims later withdrawn excluded; a total claimed of about HK$120 million; and, on the Law Society's own statistics, an average of about a year and a half, counted from the day of the intervention, before the money is released with the Court's approval. On the suggestion of a compensation fund the reply said only that the Department of Justice was willing to talk to the industry.
3 of 15 is 20%.
The denominators must travel with the figures: those 15 are interventions in law firms across all practice areas, not estate matters and not administrators; 941 is claims made, not claims established; HK$120 million is the amount claimed, not lost and not paid; and the year and a half runs from the intervention to release with the Court's approval. Nothing in those numbers is a rate of estate misappropriation.
What Crime Can He Be Charged With? Three Routes, Three Thresholds
There are three routes in the statute book that can point at a personal representative: theft, fraud, and the offence of intermeddling with an estate under section 60J of the Probate and Administration Ordinance. The third needs no proof of dishonesty — and the whole of it applies only to the estate of a person who dies on or after 11 February 2006.
Whether anybody's conduct falls within any of them depends on the facts.
1. Theft: four elements, all of them in the statute
Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210), section 2(1):
"(1) A person commits theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and thief (竊賊) and steal (偷竊) shall be construed accordingly."
Each element has its own defining section, and two of those sections mention personal representatives expressly — and both of them enlarge his exposure rather than reduce it. That is easy to read backwards, so it is set out here carefully.
"Dishonestly" — section 3(1):
"(1) A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— (a) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he has in law the right to deprive the other of it, on behalf of himself or of a third person; or (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it; or (c) (except where the property came to him as trustee or personal representative) if he appropriates the property in the belief that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be discovered by taking reasonable steps."
Read paragraph (c) word by word. Believing the owner cannot be found by reasonable steps is a route to not being dishonest, and the bracketed words take that route away from a person to whom the property came as trustee or personal representative. A personal representative therefore has one fewer way of being not-dishonest than an ordinary defendant, not one more.
"Appropriates" — section 4(1):
"(1) Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner."
Note the second half: coming by the property lawfully and later assuming a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner can be an appropriation.
"Property" — section 5(2):
"(2) A person cannot steal land, or things forming part of land and severed from it by him or by his directions, except in the following cases, that is to say— (a) when he is a trustee or personal representative, or is authorized by power of attorney, or as liquidator of a company, or otherwise, to sell or dispose of land belonging to another, and he appropriates the land or anything forming part of it by dealing with it in breach of the confidence reposed in him; or (b) when he is not in possession of the land and appropriates anything forming part of the land by severing it or causing it to be severed, or after it has been severed; or (c) when, being in possession of the land under a tenancy, he appropriates the whole or part of any fixture or structure let to be used with the land."
The general rule is that land cannot be stolen, and paragraph (a) creates an exception precisely for a trustee or personal representative. Land becomes capable of being stolen because of the office.
So the statement that trustees and personal representatives are "carved out" of the theft provisions is the opposite of what the sections say. Both are exceptions that enlarge criminal exposure.
"Belonging to another" — section 6(2):
"(2) Where property is subject to a trust, the person to whom it belongs shall be regarded as including any person having a right to enforce the trust, and an intention to defeat the trust shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive of the property any person having that right."
"With the intention of permanently depriving" — section 7(1):
"(1) A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating if, but only if, the borrowing or lending of it is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal."
The offence — section 9:
"Any person who commits theft shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for 10 years."
2. Fraud: a differently shaped threshold
Section 16A(1):
"(1) If any person by any deceit (whether or not the deceit is the sole or main inducement) and with intent to defraud induces another person to commit an act or make an omission, which results either— (a) in benefit to any person other than the second-mentioned person; or (b) in prejudice or a substantial risk of prejudice to any person other than the first-mentioned person, the first-mentioned person commits the offence of fraud and is liable on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for 14 years."
Note the structure: there must be a deceit, and the deceit must induce another person to do or omit something. On this site's reading of that structure, that is a different shape from a personal representative simply holding on to estate money — a reading of the subsection, not any court's decision.
3. Intermeddling: the offence that needs no proof of dishonesty, and a date line
The date line comes first, and it is repeated every time this offence is named — but subsection (1) has two limbs and both are gates, so it is quoted entire. Section 60J(1):
"(1) This section applies— (a) in relation to the estate of any person who dies on or after 11 February 2006; and (b) to— (i) any part of an estate; or (ii) any property, situated in Hong Kong when the deceased concerned dies."
Paragraph (a) is a date and paragraph (b) is a place. If the deceased died before 11 February 2006, section 60J does not apply at all, and the question of what he can be charged with falls back on Cap. 210, whose thresholds are considerably higher. And the section reaches only estate or property situated in Hong Kong when the deceased died — so for assets that were outside Hong Kong at the date of death, this offence is not the route, whatever the date. Section 60K carries the same pair, at section 60K(1)(a) and (b).
The four offence limbs, and who each addresses:
| limb | who | what it turns on | qualified by s. 60K(9)? |
|---|---|---|---|
| (2) | any person | dealing, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, with estate property not set out in the filed schedule | No |
| (3) | a person who is neither the executor nor the person entitled in priority | possession or administration without authority or without first filing | Yes |
| (6) | an executor or a person entitled in priority | possession or administration within the prescribed period and failure to file within it | Yes |
| (7) | an executor or a person entitled in priority | possession or administration after the period without first filing | Yes |
For a reader whose administrator already holds a grant, subsection (2) is the limb that speaks to present conduct. The reasoning was given earlier: (6) and (7) look at a window that closed when the grant issued, and (3) addresses somebody who is not that administrator. That is this site's reading of the four limbs' own act elements.
The table is limited to the four offence limbs, and section 60J has two further subsections that are not offences at all — which matters if what you are looking at is a bank. Subsections (4) and (5) deem a bank and its employee to have acted with lawful authority, for the purposes of subsections (2) and (3), where the employee acted in good faith and with due care: (4) where the bank was performing a function under the Part's inventory provisions, and (5) where it allowed a surviving joint renter to exercise his right of access to a safe deposit box under the renting contract, subject to section 60I. Section 60I is the provision that subjects that right of access to the Ordinance for the 12 months after the joint renter's death, or until an inventory is prepared. How safe-deposit-box access works is outside this article.
4. Section 60K — the provision three of those limbs are subject to, and what it actually is
This is missing from most accounts of the offence, and it narrows the table above. Section 60K(9):
"(9) Where a confirmation notice issued under subsection (2) is in force, section 60J(3), (6) and (7) shall not apply to— (a) the taking possession or administration by the holder of the notice of any property which is set out in the schedule exhibited by the affidavit to which the confirmation notice relates; and (b) any act incidental to such taking possession or administration of property."
And where does a confirmation notice come from? Section 60K(2):
"(2) The Secretary may— (a) upon an application by the executor of a deceased person or the person entitled in priority to administer the estate; and (b) upon being satisfied by an affidavit of the applicant that— (i) all properties beneficially owned by the deceased as at the date of his death are money not exceeding $50,000 in aggregate; and (ii) the deceased did not hold any property as trustee or as the manager of a Tso or Tong as at the date of his death, issue to the applicant a confirmation notice in respect of the estate."
And section 60K carries the same 11 February 2006 gate, at section 60K(1):
"(1) This section applies to— (a) any deceased person who dies on or after 11 February 2006; and (b) any property situated in Hong Kong when the deceased concerned dies."
Three sentences to hold together — and all three make the position narrower, not softer:
- This is not "an estate worth under $50,000". The provision requires that all properties beneficially owned by the deceased at death be money not exceeding $50,000 in aggregate, and that he held nothing as trustee or as manager of a Tso or Tong. A flat, a car, even one parcel of shares takes the estate outside section 60K however small the total.
- Section 60K(9) does not reach section 60J(2). So in a qualifying small estate the administrator who takes possession commits no offence under (6) or (7) — and the administrator who swore a false schedule still commits one under (2). The sworn schedule is the one thing the exemption does not forgive.
- It is not automatic. The words are "Where a confirmation notice issued under subsection (2) is in force" — and the weight sits on is in force. No notice, no disapplication.
5. The penalty, and one figure that can move beside one that cannot
Section 60J(9):
"(9) A person who commits an offence under subsection (2), (3), (6) or (7) shall be liable on conviction to— (a) a fine at level 3; and (b) an additional penalty equal to the value of— (i) the relevant part of the relevant estate; or (ii) the relevant part of the income of the relevant part of the relevant estate, as the case may be."
A fine at level 3 is $10,000 (Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221), Schedule 8). And that figure can be changed — Cap. 221, section 113B(3):
"(3) The Chief Executive in Council may by regulation amend the amounts set out in Schedule 8 to reflect his opinion of the effect of inflation on the value of the amounts set out in the Schedule since the date when the Schedule came into operation or since the date that the amounts in the Schedule were last amended."
Within one section you have met two money figures: one with an express power to update it, and one — the $50,000 in section 60K — with none.
6. The Government's own page, and its own warning
The Home Affairs Department publishes a page on intermeddling which confirms the executor and person-entitled-in-priority limbs from the Government's side and states the 12-month and 18-month prescribed periods (this site's summary). Two things go with it:
- Its opening sentence is narrower than the section its own detail sets out — it attaches "without lawful authority or reasonable excuse" to the offence generally, whereas the statute puts that qualifier in subsections (2) and (3) only.
- The page prints its own statement that the section has no legal effect.
A page that misstates its own subject in its first sentence and disclaims its own legal effect is not the answer to anybody's case.
7. Two further points
- The mode of trial for a section 60J offence: Cap. 210 sections 9 and 16A both say "on indictment"; section 60J(9) says only "on conviction".
- Time limits for prosecution depend on the class of offence and the facts.
8. And one common-law offence
Cap. 210, section 16A(4):
"(4) This section shall not affect or modify the offence at common law of conspiracy to defraud."
There is a legislative history behind that sentence. A 1998 LegCo Brief (file reference LP452/00C), at paragraph 3, records that the Law Reform Commission's consultation paper of May 1995 recommended creating a general offence of fraud and, at the same time, abolishing the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud. The first half was enacted as section 16A. The second was not — and the Ordinance says so in terms.
So Hong Kong keeps both a statutory fraud offence and the common law conspiracy, and that is the legislature's own choice after being advised to collapse them into one.
Section 16A(4) names the offence but gives none of its elements, which are found in the common law.
Does Making Him Account Help the Prosecution? Both Halves of the Bargain Are Limited to Cap. 210
Cap. 210 section 33(1) contains a trade: in proceedings for the recovery or administration of property, for the execution of a trust, or for an account, a person may not refuse to answer on the ground that answering may incriminate him; and the answers are not admissible against him in proceedings for an offence under the Theft Ordinance. Both halves of that trade are bounded by the same six words.
1. The subsection
"(1) A person shall not be excused, by reason that to do so may incriminate that person or the wife or husband of that person of an offence under this Ordinance— (a) from answering any question put to that person in proceedings for the recovery or administration of any property, for the execution of any trust or for an account of any property or dealings with property; or (b) from complying with any order made in any such proceedings, but no statement or admission made by a person in answering a question put or complying with an order made as aforesaid shall, in proceedings for an offence under this Ordinance, be admissible in evidence against that person or (unless they married after the making of the statement or admission) against the wife or husband of that person."
The words "an offence under this Ordinance" appear twice in that subsection: once at the start and once at the end.
2. So what falls inside, and what does not
| offence | maximum | inside Cap. 210 section 33(1)'s exclusion? |
|---|---|---|
| Cap. 210 s. 9, theft | 10 years on indictment | Yes |
| Cap. 210 s. 16A, fraud | 14 years on indictment | Yes |
| Cap. 10 s. 60J, intermeddling | level 3 fine plus an additional penalty equal to value | No — a different Ordinance |
| Cap. 200 s. 32 (false statements on oath made otherwise than in a judicial proceeding) and s. 36 (false statutory declarations and other false statements without oath), named by the Administration in its 2005 list | headings only | No — a different Ordinance |
3. Two limits
- That Cap. 210 section 33(1)'s exclusion does not reach a Cap. 10 section 60J prosecution is not a statement that such answers are admissible there. It means only that this provision is not the source of any protection.
- That Cap. 210 section 33(1) does not remove the excuse where the fear is of a non-Cap. 210 offence is not a statement that the administrator may refuse. It means only that the provision does not speak to that case.
4. Which route first
Whether a court will stay civil proceedings while a criminal complaint about the same estate is on foot depends on the case.
Which route to take first is a question of practice and cost, not a fixed rule.
5. Police reports and civil cases
It does not follow that a police report stalls a civil case, or that documents held by the police stay any proceedings. The police general order discussed below describes investigation and referral and says nothing about the effect of any seizure on a civil action.
The interference shown in this section is evidential rather than procedural.
Even a Conviction Does Not Bring the Money Back — but the Criminal Court Is Not Without Money Powers
Cap. 210 section 33(2) is plain: where property has been stolen or obtained by fraud or other wrongful means, title is not affected by reason only of the conviction of the offender. And the additional penalty measured by value under section 60J(9) is a penalty, not compensation to the estate. ⚠ But "title is not affected" and "the criminal court can make no money order" are two different propositions. Three statutes give the convicting court a discretionary money power, and this section sets each of them out with its conditions.
1. The provision
"(2) Notwithstanding any enactment to the contrary, where property has been stolen or obtained by fraud or other wrongful means, the title to that or any other property shall not be affected by reason only of the conviction of the offender."
Note the opening words: "Notwithstanding any enactment to the contrary". This subsection overrides.
2. And the value-measured additional penalty is a penalty
The additional penalty in section 60J(9)(b) is payable on conviction. A penalty is not compensation, and it does not go to the estate. Read with Cap. 210 section 33(2), the precise position is: on that penalty alone, the criminal route can produce a money consequence measured by what was taken, and still not put it in the beneficiary's hands.
3. But three statutes give the convicting court a money power
Cap. 210 section 30 — orders for restitution, exercisable on a conviction for an offence with reference to a theft:
"(1) Where goods have been stolen, and a person is convicted of any offence with reference to the theft (whether or not the stealing is the gist of his offence), the court by or before which the offender is convicted may on the conviction exercise any of the following powers— (a) the court may order anyone having possession or control of the goods to restore them to any person entitled to recover them from him; or (b) on the application of a person entitled to recover from the person convicted any other goods directly or indirectly representing the first-mentioned goods (as being the proceeds of any disposal or realization of the whole or part of them or of goods so representing them), the court may order those other goods to be delivered or transferred to the applicant; or (c) on the application of a person who, if the first-mentioned goods were in the possession of the person convicted, would be entitled to recover them from him, the court may order that a sum not exceeding the value of those goods shall be paid to the applicant out of any money of the person convicted which was taken out of his possession on his apprehension."
And the section carries its own evidential limit, in subsection (4):
"(4) The court shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section unless in the opinion of the court the relevant facts sufficiently appear from evidence given at the trial or the available documents, together with admissions made by or on behalf of any person in connexion with any proposed exercise of the powers; and for this purpose the available documents (可用的文件) means any written statements or admissions which were made for use, and would have been admissible, as evidence at the trial, the depositions taken at any committal proceedings and any written statements or admissions used as evidence in those proceedings."
Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221) section 73 — power to award compensation. This one is not confined to theft; it follows a conviction for any offence:
"(1) Where a person is convicted of an offence, the court may, in addition to passing such sentence as may otherwise by law be passed or making an order under section 107(1), order the person so convicted to pay to any aggrieved person such compensation for— (a) personal injury; (b) loss of or damage to property; or (c) both such injury and loss or damage, as it thinks reasonable. (2) The amount ordered as compensation under subsection (1) shall be deemed a judgment debt due to the person entitled to receive the same from the person so convicted. (Amended 23 of 2002 s. 7) (3) If before an order for compensation is made, any money— (a) was taken from the person so convicted on his apprehension, arrest, being taken into custody or his surrender to custody; or (b) was paid into court by the person so convicted, the court may, on making the order, order that the compensation be paid out of any money so taken or paid. (Added 23 of 2002 s. 7) (4) Subsection (3) shall not apply to any money that is a first charge for the benefit of the Director of Legal Aid within the meaning of section 18A(1) of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91). (Added 23 of 2002 s. 7) (5) Payment of the compensation may be enforced at the instance of any person entitled thereto in the same way as a judgment debt. (Added 23 of 2002 s. 7)"
Note subsections (2) and (5): once made, the sum is a judgment debt and is enforceable as one.
Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227) section 98 — the corresponding power in a magistracy, with a ceiling. On the version in force 14 May 2026:
"Where a magistrate makes an order under section 36(1) or convicts a person of an offence and passes such sentence (if any) as may otherwise by law be passed, he may, in addition to the order or sentence, order the offender to pay to any aggrieved person such compensation for— (a) personal injury; (b) loss of or damage to property; or (c) both such injury and loss or damage, not exceeding $100,000, as he thinks reasonable."
Put together, the accurate statement is this:
- All three say "may", not "shall" — each is a discretion.
- All three are conditional. Section 30 needs goods stolen and a conviction with reference to that theft, and is subject to the evidential limit in section 30(4); sections 73 and 98 need an aggrieved person and loss of or damage to property (or personal injury); section 98 is capped at $100,000.
- None of them is a vesting order. None makes the property revest in the estate, and Cap. 210 section 33(2) remains correct on its own terms.
- An order still has to be collected. Section 73(2) and (5) say so themselves: the sum is a judgment debt, enforceable as one.
Whether a particular case meets any of those conditions depends on the facts.
3. The Police Force says the same thing from the other end
Police General Orders, chapter 21, order 21-41 tells officers handling a money dispute three things (this site's summary): they are never to take part in the parties' own settlement discussions; an investigating officer's job is confined to finding out whether an offence has been committed; and where the investigation discloses none, the complainant is to be given its outcome and pointed to the civil courts to recover what he says he is owed. The order is published in both languages.
It is the Force telling its own officers that, where the investigation discloses no offence, the complainant is to be pointed to the civil courts. ⚠ It is not a statement that a beneficiary's money is always a civil matter, and it does not touch the powers the previous section sets out.
4. And the civil court has something the criminal court does not
- Cap. 10 section 33(3) gives the court an express vesting power: on removal, it may provide for the vesting in the successor of any property belonging to the estate.
- Cap. 10 section 67(2)(b) gives the court an express power to declare a recipient who is not a purchaser to be a trustee.
- Cap. 210 section 33(2) says title is not affected by reason only of a conviction.
- And on the criminal side, Cap. 210 section 30, Cap. 221 section 73 and Cap. 227 section 98 are discretionary money powers, none of them a vesting order. That is the distinction: the two civil provisions move the thing, or its legal character; the three criminal ones order a person to hand something back or to pay.
Two provisions numbered 33, in two different Ordinances, doing opposite work.
It Has Been Years — Is It Too Late? The Chain Connects, but One Phrase Stands in the Way
The Limitation Ordinance takes two classes of beneficiary's action outside the periods it prescribes, and one of them requires no proof of fraud. But getting from the Limitation Ordinance to the words "personal representative" takes three definitional steps, and the last of them reads "where the context admits".
1. The two provisions
Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), section 20(1):
"(1) No period of limitation prescribed by this Ordinance shall apply to an action by a beneficiary under a trust, being an action— (a) in respect of any fraud or fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was a party or privy; or (b) to recover from the trustee trust property or the proceeds thereof in the possession of the trustee, or previously received by the trustee and converted to his use."
Paragraph (b) requires no proof of fraud.
The ordinary period, in the same section, at subsection (2):
"(2) Subject as aforesaid, an action by a beneficiary to recover trust property or in respect of any breach of trust, not being an action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance, shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the right of action accrued: Provided that the right of action shall not be deemed to have accrued to any beneficiary entitled to a future interest in the trust property, until the interest fell into possession."
And for a deceased person's estate, section 21:
"Subject to the provisions of section 20(1), no action in respect of any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest in such estate, whether under a will or on intestacy, shall be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date when the right to receive the share or interest accrued, and no action to recover arrears of interest in respect of any legacy, or damages in respect of such arrears, shall be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due."
Note the opening words of section 21: "Subject to the provisions of section 20(1)". The legislature subordinated the deceased-estate period to section 20(1) in terms.
2. The chain, link by link
Link 1: Cap. 347 section 2(1) gives "trust", "trustee" and "trust for sale" the same meanings as in the Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29).
Link 2: Cap. 29 section 2, in the definition of trust, provides that the expressions trust and trustee extend to implied and constructive trusts, to cases where the trustee has a beneficial interest in the trust property, and to the duties incident to the office of a personal representative, and that trustee "where the context admits includes a personal representative".
Link 3: Cap. 29 section 3(1):
"(1) This Ordinance applies to trusts (whenever created) including, so far as this Ordinance applies, executorships and administratorships whenever constituted."
Corroborating: Cap. 29 section 63(2) — the administration of a deceased person's property is a trust and the executor or administrator a trustee, "within the meaning of this Part", and those five words travel with the sentence.
3. On the text the chain holds — but there is a qualifier
The strongest single piece of support is internal to Cap. 347 itself: section 21 subordinates the twelve-year deceased-estate period to section 20(1). That subordination would be pointless if section 20(1) could never bite on a claim against a personal representative.
The qualifier is the phrase in link 2: "where the context admits".
Whether the context of Cap. 347 section 20(1)(b) admits it is a question of construction for a court. ⚠ The Court of Final Appeal judgment set out immediately below does not answer it.
3a. A Court of Final Appeal judgment on section 20 — decided about a different kind of trustee
It is Hui Chun Ping v Hui Kau Mo, FACV 6/2024, neutral citation [2024] HKCFA 32, on appeal from CACV 377/2022, heard 27 and 28 November 2024 and decided 23 December 2024. The judgment was given by Lord Hoffmann NPJ; Cheung CJ, Ribeiro PJ, Fok PJ and Lam PJ each recorded their agreement with it in a single line.
What the case was. The plaintiff had been engaged as a consultant on a Mainland construction project and was to be remunerated partly by an interest in the profits. He alleged that the defendant, acting as his agent, had by 2006 secretly acquired that interest for himself in breach of fiduciary duty, which would have made the defendant a constructive trustee of it. He sued in 2018. There is no estate, no grant and no personal representative anywhere in the case. The question was whether section 20(1)(b) of Cap. 347 took the claim outside the six-year period in section 20(2).
The classification the Court worked with. It is Millett LJ's, from Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co: category 1 trustees are those who accepted fiduciary duties in relation to property before the transaction complained of; category 2 are those whose "trusteeship" arises only out of the wrongful transaction itself. The Court's description of category 1 includes personal representatives in terms:
"These would include executors and administrators, company directors, trustees de son tort and the like."
The boundary between the two categories is the one Viscount Cave drew in Taylor v Davies, which the Court expressly approved. Viscount Cave's words, as the judgment sets them out, are that the exception refers to
"cases where a trust arose before the occurrence of the transaction impeached and not to cases where it arises only by reason of that transaction."
and the Court's own sentence on that passage is:
"That is the true boundary between category 1 and category 2 trustees."
The four holdings. The Court of Appeal had certified four questions and the Court answered all four against the plaintiff.
- Section 20(1)(b). "I therefore agree with the Court of Appeal that section 20(1)(b) of the Ordinance does not apply to this case."
- Section 20(2) applies even so, and the Court accepted that the word "trustee" therefore does different work in the two subsections: "section 20(2) was obviously intended to create a limitation period for all claims for breach of trust, express or constructive, apart from those specified in section 20(1)."
- Accounts and inquiries do not survive the bar on the underlying claim. "If the purpose of a limitation period is to encourage people to assert any claims they have within a reasonable time and avoid the courts having to make decisions upon scanty evidence of what happened in the distant past, it would be strange if ancillary or alternative remedies were exempt from limitation."
- Neither does "equitable compensation" for breach of the no-profit / no-conflict rule, because on the Court's view "a claim in this form is substantially the same as the claim for breach of trust"
And the disposal: "I would therefore affirm the decisions of the Court of Appeal on all four certified points and dismiss the appeal."
Two further things the judgment says are directly relevant. First, on category 2 trustees, "On the contrary, time ran from the moment when the constructive trust arose." Second, on the objection that a limitation period lets a plainly dishonest defendant keep the money — which is the objection every reader of this article will have — "But any limitation period may produce cases in which people who are undoubtedly liable can nevertheless retain wrongful gains."
And one Hong Kong decision is displaced. Secretary for Justice v Hon Kam Wing [2003] 1 HKLRD 524 had treated a corrupt police officer as a category 1 trustee by deeming the government to have authorised him to take bribes on its behalf. Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that that decision was right and the English cases wrong. The Court's answer was: "As I have indicated, I do not agree."
Now the limits.
⚠ This is not a decision about personal representatives. The defendant was an agent who was said to have acquired property for himself out of the very transaction complained of — a category 2 constructive trustee. The Court decided the status of that kind of defendant. It decided nothing about an executor or an administrator, none was before it, and the sentence quoted above about executors and administrators is the Court's account of Millett LJ's classification in an English case, given while explaining where the boundary lies. It is not a holding that a Hong Kong personal representative falls inside Cap. 347 section 20(1)(b).
⚠ It does not touch the "where the context admits" qualifier. The phrase "where the context admits" in the Trustee Ordinance definition, on which the chain from Cap. 347 to "personal representative" turns, is nowhere in the judgment; Cap. 29 was not in issue. That question remains open.
⚠ It says nothing about Cap. 347 section 21, section 26 or section 36. The twelve-year deceased-estate period, the fraud-and-concealment postponement and the preserved equitable jurisdiction were not before the Court and are not decided by it.
⚠ What it does settle is narrower and still worth knowing. Three things. One: being in a fiduciary relationship is not by itself enough to put a defendant inside section 20(1)(b) — the Court rejected exactly that argument. Two: where the underlying claim for breach of trust is time-barred, re-labelling it as a claim for an account, or as equitable compensation for breach of the no-profit / no-conflict rule, does not escape the bar. Three: Secretary for Justice v Hon Kam Wing can no longer be relied on for the contrary.
⚠ Holding two must be read precisely. It is about an account claimed as an ancillary or alternative remedy to a barred claim for breach of trust. It is not about the section 56 duty to exhibit a true and perfect inventory and account, which is a statutory duty imposed on a personal representative by Cap. 10 and which was not before the Court. They are different things, and the judgment addressed only the first.
Where to find it in the judgment: the category-1 description is at paragraph 21; the Taylor v Davies boundary is quoted at paragraph 20 and approved at paragraph 29, where the Court's own sentence about the true boundary also appears; the answer to counsel on Hon Kam Wing and the observation about wrongful gains are at paragraph 31; the section 20(1)(b) conclusion at paragraph 35; the section 20(2) conclusion at paragraph 37; the accounting point at paragraph 38; the no-profit / no-conflict point at paragraph 39; and the disposal at paragraph 40. The sentence about time running from the moment the constructive trust arose is at paragraph 17.
4. Delay in equity
Cap. 347, section 36:
"Nothing in this Ordinance shall affect any equitable jurisdiction to refuse relief on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise."
⚠ section 36 preserves the court's equitable jurisdiction; it does not provide that delay by itself defeats a claim. What any period of delay does turns on case law.
4a. One further section runs the other way
Cap. 347 section 26 postpones the limitation period in cases of fraud, concealment or mistake. In a case where the allegation is that something was taken and not disclosed, it may matter, so it is set out. Section 26(1):
"(1) Subject to subsection (4), where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance, either— (a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; (b) any fact relevant to the plaintiff’s right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or (c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake, the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it."
And section 26(3) defines deliberate concealment:
"(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty."
Three limits apply: first, section 26 operates on actions "for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Ordinance" — if section 20(1) applies, there is no prescribed period and section 26 is not on that road; second, subsection (1) opens "Subject to subsection (4)", and subsection (4) protects an innocent third-party purchaser; third, whether anything was deliberately concealed in a particular case is a question of fact.
And one further subsection of section 20 itself belongs here. Section 20(3):
"No beneficiary as against whom there would be a good defence under this Ordinance shall derive any greater or other benefit from a judgment or order obtained by any other beneficiary than he could have obtained if he had brought the action and this Ordinance had been pleaded in defence."
On its own words, a judgment another beneficiary obtains does not carry a beneficiary past his own limitation position. Where one sibling sues in time and another would have met a good defence under the Ordinance, the second takes no greater or other benefit from the first's judgment than he could have got by suing himself. So "let my sister sue and I will come in on the result" does not work, and the subsection is the reason.
5. In summary
What is settled: the provisions take two classes of action outside the prescribed periods; one of them needs no fraud; the three links of the chain are on the face of the statutes; section 21 is expressly subordinate to section 20(1); and section 36 sits alongside all of it. And, from the Court of Final Appeal judgment above: that a fiduciary relationship is not by itself enough to bring a defendant inside section 20(1)(b), and that where the underlying breach-of-trust claim is barred, an account or an equitable-compensation claim put in its place is barred with it — both said about a category 2 constructive trustee, and neither said about a personal representative.
What depends on your case: how limitation works out on your claim. Do not assume that time has stopped running — section 20(1) says that no period prescribed by that Ordinance applies to two classes of action, and whether it reaches a claim against a personal representative turns on the phrase quoted above.
The version-in-force date of the Limitation Ordinance text is in Sources.
What Can He Say Back? The Ordinance Gives Him a Defence
If the court is satisfied that a trustee has acted honestly and reasonably and ought fairly to be excused, it may relieve him wholly or partly from personal liability for a breach of trust.
1. Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29), section 60
"If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or otherwise, is or may be personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same."
Three conditions on the face of the section: honestly, reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused. What each of them requires turns on case law.
2. Together with Cap. 10 section 71
Section 71: distribution is not due before the executor's year expires. That point appeared earlier and appears again here, because it is also something the other side can say. It has to be said with its limit: section 71 is about distribution alone and suspends none of his other duties — collecting in, safeguarding, and accounting.
3. One power that looks like yours and is his
Cap. 29, section 24(4):
"(4) Trustees may, in their absolute discretion, from time to time, but not more than once in every year unless the nature of the trust or any special dealings with the trust property make a more frequent exercise of the right reasonable, cause the accounts of the trust property to be examined or audited by an independent accountant, and shall, for that purpose, produce such vouchers and give such information to the accountant as the accountant may require."
And section 24(5):
"(5) The costs of the examination or audit referred to in subsection (4), including the fee of an auditor, are to be paid out of the trust funds."
Point by point: the audit power is the trustees' absolute discretion, not more than once a year, and paid for out of the trust funds. The one power that looks like "make him get the books audited" is his, not yours.
And there is a further layer. Cap. 29 section 3A(1) applies the statutory duty of care only "as provided in Schedule 3". Schedule 3's Division 5 is headed "Reversionary Interests, Valuations and Audit", and paragraph 7 of the Schedule reads in full:
"7. The statutory duty of care applies to a trustee when— (a) exercising the power under section 24(1) or (3); or (b) exercising any corresponding power, however conferred."
Both limbs are about exercising a power, and neither names section 24(4): limb (a) lists section 24(1) and (3) only, and limb (b) reaches a power corresponding to those, not the audit power itself. On the words of the paragraph, this article reads the section 24(4) audit power as outside the statutory duty of care — this site's reading, given carefully because the Division's own heading names audit.
But outside the statutory duty is not outside every duty, and the Ordinance says which displacement it is making. Section 3A(2) provides that where the statutory duty of care applies to a trustee exercising a power, "that duty has effect in place of any common law rules and equitable principles regarding the duty and standard of care owed by the trustee to the beneficiaries of the trust when exercising the power or doing the act." The displacement reaches exactly as far as the statutory duty reaches and no further.
And the Trustee Ordinance is not empty on accounts. Section 63(1) lets a beneficiary apply for the appointment of a judicial trustee, and where one has been appointed, section 63(6) provides:
"(6) Once in every year the accounts of every trust of which a judicial trustee has been appointed shall be audited, and a report thereon made to the court by such persons as may be prescribed, and, in any case where the court shall so direct, an inquiry into the administration by a judicial trustee of any trust, or into any dealing or transaction of a judicial trustee, shall be made in such manner as may be prescribed."
Section 63(4) adds that the court "may, either on request or without request, give to a judicial trustee any general or special directions in regard to the trust or the administration thereof."
So the accurate statement is about which machinery reaches whom, not about the Trustee Ordinance being silent. Cap. 29 section 63 does contain accounting machinery and a beneficiary can start it — but the annual audit in section 63(6) runs on a judicial trustee the court has appointed, not on the personal representative who is in office now. To make the person presently in office account, the route set out in this article is Cap. 10 section 56 read with Orders 85 and 43 of the Rules of the High Court, as above.
4. And one provision that reaches neither of you
Cap. 29 section 41W provides that the terms of a trust must not relieve, release or exonerate a trustee from liability for a breach of trust arising from the trustee's own fraud, wilful misconduct or gross negligence, nor grant the trustee an indemnity against the trust property for that liability, and that a term which appears to do either is void to the extent that it so appears. But section 41W(1) applies only to a trustee who:
"(1) Subject to subsection (2), this section applies to a trustee who— (a) acts in a professional capacity; and (b) receives remuneration for the trustee’s services provided to, or on behalf of, the trust."
Both conditions must be met. What "acts in a professional capacity" means is sent by section 41W(7) to section 41R(1) — acting in the course of a profession or business consisting of, or including, the provision of trust management services.
On dates the section reaches further than subsection (5) alone suggests. Section 41W(5) provides that the section has effect in respect of a trust created on or after the commencement date of the 2013 amending Ordinance. Subsection (6) then deals with trusts created before that date, and it does not exclude them:
"(6) For a trust created before the commencement date# of the 2013 amending Ordinance, this section— (a) has effect in respect of the trust on the expiry of 1 year after that date; and (b) does not affect the liability for anything done by a trustee of the trust within that 1-year period."
(The hash points to the section's editorial note, which gives the commencement date as 1 December 2013. So an earlier trust comes inside the section a year after that date, rather than staying outside it.)
A date is therefore not the reason section 41W does not reach the administrator this article is about. The reason is subsection (1): an unpaid family member who is not in the business of providing trust management services neither acts in a professional capacity nor receives remuneration for services provided to the trust, so both limbs of (1) fail.
Money and Help: Legal Aid and Two Free Channels
In the Legal Aid Department's own published three-year figures, refusals on merits rose as a share of applications while refusals on means barely moved — and its published refusal examples include an opposite party carrying no insurance and holding nothing worth enforcing against, so that a judgment could not be enforced.
1. The figures, with the Department's own footnote
The Department's own footnote says that where an application fails on the merits and on means alike, it is counted once in each of the two refusal columns. The two therefore may not be added together.
(The table below is wide; scroll horizontally to see all of it.)
| Calendar year | Civil legal aid applications | Refused on merits | % of applications | Refused on means | % | Appeals heard | Allowed | % of appeals heard |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 9 558 | 3 656 | 38.25% | 674 | 7.05% | 799 | 36 | 4.51% |
| 2024 | 9 506 | 3 588 | 37.74% | 630 | 6.63% | 754 | 33 | 4.38% |
| 2025 | 8 636 | 3 612 | 41.82% | 571 | 6.61% | 749 | 19 | 2.54% |
Because the columns overlap, the true number of applications refused in 2025 lies between 3,612 and 4,183.
A worked figure
Over the same civil-applications denominator, 2023 against 2025:
- applications fell from 9 558 to 8 636 — down 9.65%;
- refusals on merits fell from 3 656 to 3 612 — down only 1.20%, so the rate rose from 38.25% to 41.82%;
- refusals on means fell from 674 to 571 — down 15.28% — and the rate barely moved, 7.05% to 6.61%;
- appeals allowed went from 36 of 799 heard to 19 of 749 heard, 4.51% to 2.54%.
Two cautions:
- The Department states the 2025 rates as 42% / 7% / 3%; 19 ÷ 749 is 2.54% — the report rounds.
- Applications and refusals in the same calendar year are not the same cohort. The report divides them that way.
2. The gate that tightened
Merits. The Department's published material states (this site's summary) that a prospect of success is not by itself enough: the Director may still refuse where a judgment could not be enforced afterwards. The examples it gives are an opposite party carrying no insurance and holding nothing worth enforcing against; an opposite party who cannot be found; and a case where, given its nature or how little stands to be gained, nobody acting sensibly would fund a lawyer out of his own money.
The first of those examples describes a situation that can arise with a personal representative who has spent what he took. ⚠ The two are not the same thing: spending estate money does not mean he owns nothing himself; property may still be followed; a third party who received it may have his own liability; some cases carry a guarantee; and where the person is a solicitor, professional indemnity is a separate layer again. That example is one of the Department's own illustrations, not a conclusion about estate cases.
3. Two free channels, each with its limits attached
A wills and probate helpline run by a solicitors' professional body. Free consultation capped at 45 minutes; a volunteer solicitor generally replies within 3 working days; enquiries are taken only where the estate in the individual case is worth HK$10 million or less; running since 20 May 2013.
Beyond the HK$10 million estate limit, the page states no financial-eligibility condition.
A procedural advice scheme for unrepresented litigants in the named courts. It gives free advice on civil procedural matters; its excluded list covers applying for a grant of representation; and it expressly declines both to advise on the substance of a case and to act for anybody.
Those two exclusions do different work: the grants exclusion does not shut out a claim against a sitting administrator; the exclusion of anything going to the substance of the case is the one that bites.
4. Neither channel acts for you
Both channels are real and both are free, and neither of them gives you a lawyer to act for you. The helpline is a capped free consultation and the procedural scheme expressly declines to act for anybody; neither is continuing representation.
Legal-aid eligibility and the application process are covered in our guide to legal aid; court and tribunal fees in our guide to those fees; waiting times in our guide to court waiting times.
Why the Provisions Read Like This: a 1971 Transplant and a 2005 Amendment
The provisions that can actually recover something arrived in 1971 as a block of transplanted English law. The two criminal provisions Hong Kong drafted for itself came later — which is why one of them has a death-date floor.
1. Provenance
Most of the civil provisions this article relies on carry an English-ancestor note in the consolidated text, tracing to 1857, 1896, 1925, 1939, 1956 and 1968. The two provisions the question "what can I charge him with" points at — Cap. 210 section 16A, added in 1999, and Cap. 10 section 60J, added in 2005 — carry none. Nor does Cap. 10 section 55, the self-dealing provision. A missing note shows only that the consolidated text records no English ancestor; it does not prove that none exists.
2. The mechanism
A statute transplanted wholesale in 1971 had no occasion to give itself a death-date floor — and section 67(3) says so expressly. An offence created by amendment in 2005 necessarily did — and section 60J(1)(a) says so.
3. The amendment credits
Cap. 10 sections 33, 36, 46, 47, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 67 and 71 carry no amendment credits, while in the same chapter section 75 (repealed in 1995) and sections 15A and 60J (both added by 21 of 2005) do.
So the accurate statement is that the misconduct sections are themselves the 1971 text — not that the law has not moved. Sections 15A, 24A, 49AA, 60J and 60K were all added by 21 of 2005 and sit in the same Ordinance.
4. Where the accessible offence came from
Not because the legislature assessed a risk and legislated against it — because the legislature declined to accept an assessment.
In 2005 the Administration proposed removing the requirement that a schedule of assets and liabilities be annexed to the grant. Its reasons included that the office usually falls to somebody the deceased had trusted or to his nearest family, so that mismanagement was not to be expected as the ordinary case, and that running a function to check the schedule would cost more than it was worth (Bills Committee report, paragraph 14). It offered instead a list of provisions already on the statute book as the beneficiary's protection, naming Cap. 10 sections 56 and 58, Cap. 210 section 9 and Cap. 200 sections 32 and 36 (paragraphs 14(e) and 16).
Members did not accept it, taking the view that the Crimes Ordinance provisions the Administration had quoted would not be able to deal with the issue of intermeddling (paragraph 17); the Administration then reversed and made the sworn schedule mandatory (paragraph 18). (This site's summary, with paragraph numbers.)
Sections 15A and 60J are the product of that reversal — and it explains the shape of section 60J(2): the mandatory schedule had to exist before an offence could be defined by reference to it.
5. Section 58
The Administration's 2005 menu included Cap. 10 section 58. Section 58's operative words charge the defendant "as executor in his own wrong", and section 59 has to bring the executor in his own wrong expressly inside the words "personal representative".
This site's reading is that the Ordinance treats those as two categories. That is a reading of the two sections side by side; it does not follow that section 58 is unavailable against an appointed administrator.
And section 59 earns one line: it bites only after the defaulting personal representative has himself died, and only to the extent of his available assets. It is not a remedy against a sitting administrator.
6. Three figures in Cap. 10 that cannot be moved, and one that can
Cap. 10 contains no power to change the three figures below. Its Gazette provisions do other things: sections 15A(7), 24A(15) and 49AA(15) let the Registrar specify the form of the schedules and affidavits by general notice in the Gazette — a power over form, not over what the schedule must state, which subsection (13) fixes — and section 49A lets the Chief Executive in Council amend Schedule 2's list of countries and places.
| figure | provision | any power in Cap. 10 to change it |
|---|---|---|
| $50,000 | s. 60K(2)(b)(i) | none |
| $150,000 † | s. 15(1) | none |
| 5% on the first $1,000, 2.5% on the next $4,000, 1% on the balance | s. 60(2)(b) | none |
† The $150,000 figure is quoted from Cap. 10 section 15(1) above.
Counting the subsidiary rules as well, there is a fourth such figure — the $7,000 in Non-Contentious Probate Rules rule 38(5)(a), set out in the sureties section above.
Against that, the level 3 fine in section 60J(9) can be changed — Cap. 221 section 113B(3) gives the Chief Executive in Council an express regulation-making power over Schedule 8.
In one line: within a few sentences of the statute book you meet one money figure with a maintenance mechanism and three without. And the $50,000 has stood since 21 of 2005 section 24 commenced on 11 February 2006 — 20 years and 6 months as at 30 August 2026. The commencement date itself was fixed by Legal Notice: the source note on section 60K(1)(a) in both language texts records an amendment by L.N. 210 of 2005, so the gate date came from a Legal Notice rather than from the Ordinance as enacted.
7. And one word, corrected
Some readers search for devastavit; the Judiciary's probate materials do not use the term.
Hong Kong material puts the same ground in the language of the provisions set out above — breach of a personal representative's duties.
Frequently Asked Questions
He has been administrator for over a year and has paid nobody. Is that already unlawful?
Can I make him account, and how?
Can I see what assets he declared?
He bought the flat himself, or one of them signed the transfer alone. What then?
Can I go to the police, and what happens if I do?
It has been ten years. Is it too late?
Next Steps
- How a grant is applied for, how the schedule of assets is prepared and corrected, what it costs to file, pre-grant release of funeral money, renunciation, and resealing a foreign grant — see our guide to grants of probate and letters of administration.
- Who is entitled to what — see our guide to intestacy in Hong Kong.
- Anything about the will itself — see our guide to making a will in Hong Kong.
- Legal-aid eligibility and the application process — see our guide to legal aid eligibility.
- Court and tribunal fees — see our guide to those fees; waiting times — see our guide to court waiting times.
Sources
- Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap. 10), sections 9, 15, 15A, 22, 24A, 25, 33, 36, 46, 47, 49A, 49AA, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 60I, 60J, 60K, 62, 67 and 71 (version in force 18 December 2025).
- Non-Contentious Probate Rules (Cap. 10 sub. leg. A), rules 38 and 44 (version in force 16 January 2020)
- Trustee Ordinance (Cap. 29), sections 2, 3, 3A, 24, 41R, 41W, 60 and 63, and Schedule 3 (version in force 23 May 2025)
- Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210), sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 16A, 30 and 33 (version in force 24 June 2021)
- Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), sections 2, 20, 21, 26 and 36 (version in force 9 July 2020)
- Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg. A), Orders 28, 43 and 85 (version in force 1 October 2025)
- Solicitors' Accounts Rules (Cap. 159 sub. leg. F), rule 9A (version in force 1 October 2022)
- Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap. 221), sections 73 and 113B and Schedule 8 (version in force 14 May 2026)
- Magistrates Ordinance (Cap. 227), sections 26 and 98 (version in force 14 May 2026)
- Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159), section 73A (version in force 24 August 2025)
- Solicitors (Professional Indemnity) Rules (Cap. 159 sub. leg. M), rule 3 (version in force 1 October 2022)
- Mak Mei Ki Angela v Chan Wai Fong and Mak Chi Tat, HCMP 1894/2016, Court of First Instance (Au-Yeung J in Chambers), 8 March 2017. The judgment is in English and is quoted verbatim in this block; the Chinese block carries a marked summary, not a quotation. Re Estate of Kwan Chung [2013] 6 HKC 29 and Re Estate of Loo Che Chin [2013] 6 HKC 303 are referred to only as that judgment cites them.
- Hui Chun Ping v Hui Kau Mo, FACV 6/2024, [2024] HKCFA 32, Court of Final Appeal (Cheung CJ, Ribeiro PJ, Fok PJ, Lam PJ, Lord Hoffmann NPJ), 23 December 2024, on appeal from CACV 377/2022. The judgment is in English and is quoted verbatim in this block; the Chinese block carries a marked summary, not a quotation. Cases cited within it — Taylor v Davies [1920] AC 636,
Paragon Finance plc v D B Thakerar & Co [1999] 1 All ER 400, Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] AC 1189, Gwembe Valley Development Co Ltd v Koshy (No 3) [2004] 1 BCLC 131,
Secretary for Justice v Hon Kam Wing [2003] 1 HKLRD 524 and the rest — are referred to only as that judgment refers to them.
- Judiciary, Practice Direction 20.2, Probate and Administration of Estate Proceedings (other than applications under the Non-Contentious Probate Rules (Cap.10A)), https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/pd/pdcontent.jsp?pdn=PD20.2.htm&lang=EN — dated 2 July 2012, effect 1 August 2012. Used for procedure only.
- Judiciary, "Probate Registry — Frequently Asked Questions", https://www.judiciary.hk/en/court_services_facilities/probate.html
- Judiciary, Guide to Non-Contentious Probate Practice, https://www.judiciary.hk/doc/en/court_services_facilities/guide_to_probate_practice.pdf
- Home Affairs Department, "What is Intermeddling?", https://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/estates/intermeddling.htm
- Hong Kong Police Force, Police General Orders, chapter 21, order 21-41, https://www.police.gov.hk/info/doc/pgo/en/Epgo021.pdf
- The Law Society of Hong Kong, "Free Legal Helpline" (Wills & Probate line), https://www.hklawsoc.org.hk/en/Serve-the-Public/List-of-pro-bono-legal-services/Free-Legal-Helpline
- Administration Wing, Chief Secretary for Administration's Office, Procedural Advice Scheme, https://www.admwing.gov.hk/
- Legal Aid Department, Annual Report 2025 and legal aid FAQ, https://www.lad.gov.hk/
- Legislative Council written reply of 24 February 2021 on interventions in solicitors' firms and a proposed compensation fund, https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202102/24/P2021022400413p.htm
- Report of the Bills Committee on the Revenue (Abolition of Estate Duty) Bill 2005, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/bc/bc60/reports/bc601102cb2-177-e.pdf
- LegCo Brief, Theft (Amendment) Bill 1998, file reference LP452/00C, https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr98-99/english/bc/bc60/general/26_brf.pdf
- Statutory text quoted in this article is reproduced from the authentic English texts of the Ordinances named; the Chinese block quotes the authentic Chinese texts of the same Ordinances.
Last updated: 5 September 2026 / 最後更新:2026年9月5日
