Car Crash Self-Help Checklist

After a crash it often comes down to one word against another, and evidence settles it. This is a one-page checklist to print, save, or send to your family: 5 steps at the scene, plus 6 keys to a smooth claim.

Underneath the checklist, though, there is a layer most versions of this advice get wrong. The most common error is "you must report to the police immediately". Section 56 of the Road Traffic Ordinance (Cap. 374) never says "immediately", and it does not use the word "report to the police" in the way people assume. What it says is "not later than 24 hours after the accident" — and the events that trigger the reporting duty are not the ones most drivers expect. Nor is s.56 the only provision requiring a report within 24 hours: Cap. 272 s.16(3) contains a second one. So this page sets out the checklist, then reads section 56 subsection by subsection, along with the other provisions that actually decide whether you get paid.

5 steps at the scene (every step is evidence)

• Safety first. If anyone is injured, call 999 for an ambulance immediately; move vehicles only if safe, switch on hazard lights, place the warning triangle; do not move a seriously injured person unless there is immediate danger.
• Stop. This is a statutory duty under s.56(1), not a courtesy. The subsection closes: "the driver of that vehicle shall stop." Contravening subsection (1) carries a fine at level 3 and 12 months' imprisonment (s.56(5)).
• Secure your dashcam footage. Police advice: keep the dashcam working, and preserve footage and evidence immediately after any suspicious incident. Dashcams overwrite — lock or back up the clip before you leave the scene.
• Photograph everything. Vehicle positions, both cars' damage, road surface, traffic signals, road markings, the other car's plate — multiple angles and distances.
• Exchange particulars, then report. The other driver's name, HKID number, phone, address, driving licence, registration, insurer and policy number. Note witnesses' names and numbers on the spot — they are near-impossible to find later. For when you must attend a police station, see the next section.

This checklist is written for drivers: the duties to stop and report set out below are imposed by the text on the driver, and a pedestrian or passenger does not carry them. (The wording is worth reading closely: s.56(1) says "the driver of that vehicle", s.56(2) and (2A) say "the driver of the vehicle", and the s.56(3) reporting duty says simply "the driver" — the same person, but not the same form of words.) (What a pedestrian or passenger can use is Cap. 272 s.13, below.)

A passenger has one provision of his own. Cap. 272 s.12(2) applies where, under s.4(1), third-party insurance is required for the use in question and "any other person is carried in or upon the vehicle while the user is so using it". Then "any antecedent agreement or understanding between them (whether intended to be legally binding or not) shall be of no effect so far as it purports or might be held—" (a) "to negative or restrict any such liability of the user in respect of persons carried in or upon the vehicle as is required by section 6(1) to be covered by a policy of insurance"; or (b) "to impose any conditions with respect to the enforcement of any such liability of the user". The subsection then closes: "and the fact that a person so carried has willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence on the part of the user shall not be treated as negativing any such liability of the user." Section 12(3) adds that "references to a person being carried in or upon a vehicle include references to a person entering or getting on to, or alighting from, the vehicle", and that "the reference to an antecedent agreement is to one made at any time before the liability arose". So an understanding reached before getting in — "I know you have been drinking; I ride at my own risk" — is on the text of no effect against the driver's liability.

The item marked "police advice" (step 3) restates what Hong Kong police publicly urged in 2026 (see our crash-for-cash article for the attributed reports).

Section 56, subsection by subsection: this one section asks three different things

Most guides compress "stop, exchange details, report" into one duty. Section 56 separates them into three, with three different triggers and two different penalties. And s.56 is not the whole of it: a second 24-hour duty sits in the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272) s.16(3), set out as the fourth item in this section.

First: stop (s.56(1)).

The trigger is an accident owing to the presence of a vehicle on a road whereby (a) "personal injury is caused to a person other than the driver of that vehicle"; or (b) damage is caused to another vehicle, a specified animal, or "any other thing not being in or on that vehicle or a trailer drawn thereby". Note (a): the trigger for stopping is injury to someone other than the driver. Note (b)(iii) too: hitting a lamp post, a railing or a gate falls squarely within subsection (1).

The term "specified animal" is defined exhaustively by s.56(7): "any horse, cattle, ass, mule, sheep, pig, goat, cat or dog." A dog or a cow is inside (1)(b)(ii); a wild boar or a bird is not on the list.

Second: give particulars (s.56(2)) — but only "if required".

The subsection reads: "In the case of any such accident, the driver of the vehicle shall, if required, give to any police officer or to any person having reasonable grounds for so requiring the following particulars—", namely his name and address, the name and address of the owner of the vehicle, and the registration or identification mark or number of the vehicle. Those two words "if required" matter: subsection (2) is not a duty to volunteer particulars, it is a duty to supply them on demand. In practice you should of course exchange details — but the legal trigger is a request by the other party or by a police officer.

Note how short that list is. HKID number, phone number and driving licence are not on it: if the other driver refuses those, s.56(2) will not compel them. Insurance details, however, are compellable — under a different Ordinance:

• Cap. 272 s.13(1). "Any person against whom a claim is made in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under section 6(1)(b) shall, on demand by or on behalf of the person making the claim, state whether or not he was insured in respect of that liability by any policy having effect for purposes of this Ordinance, or would have been so insured if the insurer had not avoided or cancelled the policy, and, if he was or would have been so insured, give such particulars with respect to that policy as were specified in the certificate of insurance issued in respect thereof under section 6(3)." Section 13(2): "If, without reasonable excuse, any person fails to comply with the provisions of this section, or wilfully makes any false statement in reply to any such demand as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an offence." Sections 13, 16 and 18 specify no penalty of their own, so the penalty comes from s.19(1): "Any person on conviction of an offence under this Ordinance shall, unless a penalty is otherwise specifically provided, be liable to a fine at level 1 and to imprisonment for 3 months." Note the trigger: s.13 is a duty owed by the person "against whom a claim is made" to "the person making the claim" — you have to be making a claim against him, not merely asking at the roadside.
• s.16(1) — a police officer can require the certificate as well. "Any person driving a motor vehicle on a road shall, on being so required by any police officer, give his name and address and the name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle and produce his certificate, and if he fails so to do or gives a false name or address he shall be guilty of an offence". A proviso saves the production limb only, and note what the 5 days run from — "if the driver of a motor vehicle within 5 days after the date on which the production of his certificate was so required" produces the certificate together with the policy in person at the police station he specified at the time, he cannot be convicted of failing to produce it. The clock starts on the date production was required, not on the date of the accident. This is one of the practical reasons to have police attend.
• s.18 — the other driver leaves, but you got the plate. Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence under the Ordinance, the owner "shall give such information as he may be required by or on behalf of the Commissioner of Police to give as to the identity of the driver, and, if he fails to do so shall be guilty of an offence", and the escape from that is not merely asserting ignorance — the paragraph reads "unless he shows to the satisfaction of the court or magistrate that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained who the driver was". Who has to be satisfied is the whole weight of the defence. And any other person must, if required, give any information in his power that may lead to identifying the driver, again on pain of an offence.

Third: report — within 24 hours, not immediately.

There are two subsections here, with different triggers:

• s.56(2A) (the s.56(1)(b) accidents — damage to another vehicle, a specified animal, or a thing outside your vehicle): "If, in the case of an accident referred to in subsection (1)(b), the driver of the vehicle for any reason does not give the particulars mentioned in subsection (2), he shall report the accident in person at the nearest police station or to any police officer as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident." The trigger is your failure to give the particulars, not the other party's absence. If the other party was there and you handed over your details, the subsection (2A) reporting duty was never triggered at all. (The section does not define how much must be handed over before particulars count as "given" — the text simply does not answer that.)
• s.56(3) (injury): "If the accident involves injury to any person including the driver, the driver shall report the accident in person at the nearest police station or to any police officer as soon as reasonably practicable, and in any case not later than 24 hours after the accident, unless the driver is incapable of doing so by reason of injuries sustained by him in the accident."

Those three words in s.56(3) — "including the driver" — are what most guides drop. Your own injury triggers the reporting duty, even where nobody else was hurt. And read the closing words too: a driver who is incapable of reporting because of his own injuries is not in breach.

(One textual limit should be stated plainly. Subsection (3) begins "If the accident involves…" — note the definite article — and "the accident" points back to an accident within s.56(1) — one whereby a person other than the driver is injured, or another vehicle, a specified animal or a thing outside the vehicle is damaged. Whether an accident that injures only the driver and damages nothing outside his own vehicle reaches subsection (3) at all is therefore arguable on the text. In practice hitting a lamp post or a railing already engages (1)(b)(iii), so the point rarely arises — and wherever there is doubt, reporting is the safe course.)

Contravening subsection (2), (2A) or (3) carries a fine at level 4 and 6 months' imprisonment (s.56(6)).

Fourth: produce the certificate and report at a police station — Cap. 272 s.16(3).

This one is not in s.56, and most checklists miss it entirely. Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272) s.16(3): "If in any case where, owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road, an accident occurs involving personal injury to another person, the driver of the motor vehicle does not at any time produce his certificate to a police officer or to some person who, having reasonable grounds for so doing, has required its production, the driver shall report the accident at a police station as soon as possible, and in any case within 24 hours of the occurrence of the accident and there produce his certificate, and if he fails so to do, he shall be guilty of an offence".

It differs from s.56(3) in three ways, each of which changes what you do today:

• The trigger is narrower. s.16(3) says "personal injury to another person"; s.56(3) says "injury to any person including the driver". If you alone were hurt, s.16(3) is not engaged.
• The place is not optional. s.56(2A) and (3) allow a report "at the nearest police station or to any police officer", either one; s.16(3) says "at a police station", and you must produce your certificate of insurance there. So: take the certificate, and go to a station.
• Only the production half has a cure. The proviso: "a person shall not be convicted under this subsection of the offence of failing to produce his certificate if, within 5 days after the occurrence of the accident, he produces the certificate in person together with the policy of insurance to which the certificate relates at such police station as may have been specified by him at the time the accident was reported." That saves a missing certificate. It does not save a late report.

Section 16 specifies no penalty of its own, so s.19(1) supplies it: a fine at level 1 and imprisonment for 3 months.

Two practical consequences:

• "24 hours" is not "immediately". If you did not realise at the scene that someone was hurt and only noticed hours later, you are not necessarily already in breach — but the clock runs from the accident, not from the moment you noticed. So the answer is always: go now.
• The other party being present and making a verbal promise on the spot is not protection — you are under no obligation to accept an on-the-spot private settlement, and you have the right to insist on police attendance. If anyone was injured — including you — subsection (3) still requires you to report in person within 24 hours, regardless of what was agreed at the scene; and if the person injured was someone other than you, note Cap. 272 s.16(3) too — it is triggered only where you have not at any time produced your certificate to a police officer or a person with reasonable grounds to require it; if you have not, it requires a report at a police station with your certificate of insurance produced there.

6 keys to your claim

1. You are under no obligation to settle in cash at the scene.

The law does not require on-the-spot payment or settlement, and it does not require you to reach conclusions about fault there and then. You can of course call the police and ask them to attend. None of the Ordinances read for this article — Cap. 374, Cap. 272 and the Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) — confers a right to compel attendance: Cap. 232 s.10 sets out the duties of the police force, including preventing injury to life and property and controlling traffic upon public thoroughfares, but those are duties owed to the public, not rights given to an individual. That search covers those three Ordinances only, not the Police Force subsidiary legislation or the rest of the statute book. Nothing prevents you asking, and once an officer is present the powers to require particulars under s.56(2) and Cap. 272 s.16(1) are in his hands. Everything you say can become evidence later, so stay calm and factual.

But the distinction matters: you need not volunteer conclusions about fault, and anything you do say must be true. Two offences sit here:

• Section 56(6) does not only punish breaches of (2), (2A) and (3). The same subsection also covers a person "who knowingly makes a false statement in supplying particulars under subsection (2)", with the same penalty — a fine at level 4 and 6 months' imprisonment. Giving a false name or false owner's details is itself an offence under the Road Traffic Ordinance.
• Police Force Ordinance (Cap. 232) s.64: any person who knowingly "makes or causes to be made to any police officer a false report of the commission of any offence" or "misleads any police officer by giving false information or by making false statements or accusations" commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine at level 1 and to imprisonment for 6 months.

Equally, you are under no obligation to sign any admission or settlement document at the scene.

2. See a doctor the same day or the next, even if you feel fine.

Whiplash-type soft-tissue symptoms can surface days later; the first consultation record is critical claim evidence. No statute requires this — but it feeds directly into the "date of knowledge" question in key 4.

3. Notify your own insurer — and note that Hong Kong has two different "7 days".

• The contractual 7 days. Many policies require notice within a set period (commonly 7 days); late notice can prejudice your cover. That is a policy term, not a statute, and the actual period is whatever your policy says. Notification is not an admission of liability.
• The statutory 7 days, in Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance (Cap. 272) s.10(2)(a). Almost no guide mentions this one, and it is not a protection — it is a trap. Subsection (2) opens "No sum shall be payable by an insurer under the foregoing provisions of this section—", and paragraph (a) is one of the ways the third party (the person who was hit) ends up with nothing: no sum is payable "in respect of any judgment, unless before or within 7 days after the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgement was given, the insurer had notice of the bringing of the proceedings". The Chinese authentic text is built differently, and the difference is real rather than a translation choice: subsection (2) there carries no chapeau at all, and the words are written separately into each of the four paragraphs — closing (a), (b) and (d) (paragraph (a) ends 「否則保險人無須根據本條前述條文就該判決支付任何款項」), and, in (c), standing immediately before subparagraphs (i)–(iii) rather than at that paragraph's end. See the Chinese version above, which states it in the Chinese text's own terms. The protective half is s.10(1); (2)(a) is a condition that takes it away.

Note the difference: the contractual 7 days runs from the accident; the statutory 7 days runs from the commencement of proceedings. The second has nothing to do with notifying your own insurer — it governs whether the other side's insurer has to satisfy a judgment you later win. The section does not say who must give that notice, and it does not address whether serving the writ on the insured operates as notice to the insurer; the text has no answer, and the answer lies in the case law.

The safe practice: when you decide to issue proceedings, notify the other side's insurer at the same time and keep proof of when you did.

4. The "3-year limitation period" is a simplification — the actual provision is set out in the next section. Three years is the starting point in Cap. 347 s.27(4), but when it starts, whether it is extended, and whether the court can override it all turn on ss.27(5)–(8), 28, 30 and 22.

5. Other vehicle uninsured, hit-and-run, or untraceable? See "If the other driver is uninsured" below. One point up front, because it is the trap in most checklists: Cap. 272 s.10 does not help you here. It opens "If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under section 6(3)…", so it bites only where the other driver had a policy and a certificate and the insurer now wants out. Where the other driver never insured, or cannot be found, the route runs through the Motor Insurers' Bureau of Hong Kong — with two statutory levers alongside it, legal aid and interim payment. See the section below.

6. Assistance you can apply for without proving fault. See the section on the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme below.

Limitation: the section does not say "3 years, full stop"

Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347) s.27 governs personal injuries. It has four layers, and most guides give only the second; beyond the four there are two further timetables — death, and disability — set out below as well.

Layer one — the whole section is conditional. Section 27(3) opens: "Subject to section 30, an action to which this section applies shall not be brought after the expiration of the period specified in subsections (4) and (5)."

Layer two — three years from when? Section 27(4): "Except where subsection (5) applies, the said period is 3 years from— (a) the date on which the cause of action accrued; or (b) the date (if later) of the plaintiff’s knowledge."

So it is three years from the accident or from your date of knowledge, whichever is later. For a traffic accident the accident date is usually also the knowledge date — but where an injury is only later attributed to the crash (a spinal or head injury, say), subsection (4)(b) does real work.

Layer three — "knowledge" is defined more broadly than you would guess. Section 27(6) lists four facts: that the injury was significant; that it "was attributable in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence, nuisance or breach of duty"; the identity of the defendant; and, where the act or omission is alleged to have been that of a person other than the defendant, "the identity of that person and the additional facts supporting the bringing of an action against the defendant". The closing words of the subsection matter more to a lay reader than any of the four: "and knowledge that any acts or omissions did or did not, as a matter of law, involve negligence, nuisance or breach of duty is irrelevant." So "I didn't know I had a legal claim until my solicitor told me" does not restart the clock — what you must know are the facts, not the law. Section 27(7) defines "significant": an injury is significant "if the plaintiff would reasonably have considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment". Section 27(8) then adds constructive knowledge — knowledge includes what you might reasonably have been expected to acquire "from facts observable or ascertainable by him" or "from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek" — but you are not fixed with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with expert help "so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice".

Layer four — the court can override the time limit. Section 30(1): where it appears to the court that "it would be equitable to allow an action to proceed" having regard to the degree to which s.27 or s.28 prejudices the plaintiff and to which a decision under the subsection would prejudice the defendant, "the court may direct that those provisions shall not apply to the action, or shall not apply to any specified cause of action to which the action relates". Section 30(3) requires the court to have regard to "all the circumstances of the case and in particular to" six listed matters: the length of and reasons for the delay, the extent to which the evidence is likely to be less cogent because of it, the defendant's conduct after the cause of action arose, "the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of the accrual of the cause of action", "the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew whether or not the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributable, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages" — what he must have known is not merely that he was hurt, but that the defendant's act or omission might at that time found a claim for damages — and the steps taken to obtain medical, legal or other expert advice. Note "in particular": those six are illustrative, not a closed list.

And if the injured person dies — s.27(5) and s.28. Subsection (3), quoted above, refers to "the period specified in subsections (4) and (5)" — note the second of those — and subsection (4) opens "Except where subsection (5) applies". Subsection (5) is the timetable a road-accident article most needs: if the person injured dies before the s.27(4) period expires, the period for the cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate by virtue of s.20 of the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 23) is 3 years from "(a) the date of death; or (b) the date of the personal representative’s knowledge, whichever is the later". Section 27(9) defines "personal representative" and s.27(10) deals with there being more than one.

The dependants' own action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) is timed separately, by s.28. Section 28(3): no such action after 3 years from "(a) the date of death; or (b) the date of knowledge of the person for whose benefit the action is brought, whichever is the later". But s.28(2) is a hard bar: no action lies "if the death occurred when the person injured could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury (whether because of a time limit in this Ordinance or in any other Ordinance, or any other reason)" — the parenthesis matters, because it is exactly that limb which s.30(2) narrows two paragraphs below — and "where any such action by the injured person would have been barred by the time limit in section 27, no account shall be taken of the possibility of that time limit being overridden under section 30" — that is, in deciding whether the injured person could still have sued at his death, you do not count the chance that a court might have overridden the limit.

The bar is not, however, unopenable, and the provision that opens it sits alongside. Section 28(1) says so in its first line: "This section has effect subject to section 30." Section 30(2) then fixes the single case in which it opens: "The court shall not under this section disapply section 28(2) except where the reason why the person injured could no longer maintain an action was because of the time limit in section 27". Read the other way round: where the reason the injured person could no longer sue at his death was the s.27 limit — the run-out-of-three-years case, which is the case described above — the court does have power to disapply s.28(2); where the reason was a time limit in some other Ordinance (the subsection's own example is the Carriage by Air Ordinance (Cap. 500)), it has none. Section 30(6) adds: "A direction by the court disapplying the provisions of section 28(2) shall operate to disapply the provisions to the same effect in section 3 of the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22)." So the accurate statement is: s.28(2) is a hard bar, and s.30(2) is the one route through it, available only where the s.27 limit was the reason. It is a discretion, not a right, and it is not a fallback plan.

The neighbouring provisions belong here too. Section 29 — headed "Dependants subject to different time limits" — deals with there being more than one dependant: s.29(2) provides that "Section 28(3)(b) shall be applied separately to each of them, and if that would debar one or more of them, but not all, the court shall direct that any person who would be so debarred shall be excluded from those for whom the action is brought", "unless it is shown that if the action were brought exclusively for the benefit of that person it would not be defeated by a defence of limitation". So the s.28(3)(b) date of knowledge runs dependant by dependant, not once for the family: where one is out of time, the court excludes that person rather than losing the whole action. Section 28(5): "An action under the Fatal Accidents Ordinance (Cap. 22) shall be one to which section 22 applies, but otherwise sections 22 to 26, inclusive, and Part IV shall not apply to the action." So where a dependant is a child, the s.22 disability extension reaches the Fatal Accidents action as well. And s.30(4): "In a case where the person injured died when, because of section 27, he could no longer maintain an action and recover damages in respect of the injury, the court shall have regard in particular to the length of, and the reasons for, the delay on the part of the deceased." What the court weighs in deciding to disapply s.28(2) is the deceased's delay, not only the dependants'. The next subsection, s.30(5), then says how the six s.30(3) factors are to be read in that situation: "In a case under subsection (4), or any other case where the time limit, or one of the time limits, depends on the date of knowledge of a person other than the plaintiff, subsection (3) shall have effect with appropriate modifications, and shall have effect in particular as if references to the plaintiff included references to any person whose date of knowledge is or was relevant in determining a time limit." In a death case, in other words, every reference to the plaintiff in s.30(3) is read as reaching the deceased or the dependant whose knowledge fixes the limit.

And an extension for disability. Section 22(1) applies where, "on the date when any right of action accrued…, the person to whom it accrued was under a disability", and then allows the action to be brought within a period running from the date the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever first occurred, "notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired"; s.22(2) provides that where the action is one to which s.27 or s.28(3) applies, subsection (1) has effect as if “6 years” read “3 years”; and s.22(3) deems a person to be under a disability "while he is an infant or of unsound mind". The age at which infancy ends is not in Cap. 347 — it is in the Age of Majority (Related Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 410) s.2(1): "a person shall attain full age on attaining the age of 18 years". So a child injured in a crash has three years from turning 18, not three years from the accident. The extension is not automatic, though: s.22(1) carries provisos (a) to (d), of which (a) excludes cases where the right of action first accrued to some person not under a disability through whom the disabled person claims.

Property damage is 6 years, under s.4(1)(a) of the same Ordinance: "The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say— (a) actions founded on simple contract or on tort". It does not apply to personal injury actions, because s.27(2) expressly disapplies s.4.

How to use those four layers. Avoid both of the opposite mistakes:

• Do not give up because "it's been more than 3 years". Section 27(4)(b), s.30 and s.22 may all be available, and the only way to find out is to have a solicitor look at it.
• But do not rely on s.30 either. It is a discretion, not a right, and the first two factors in s.30(3) — the reasons for the delay and the extent to which evidence has deteriorated — usually run against whoever waited. Treat 3 years as the deadline and the other three layers as a safety net, not as a plan.

If the other driver is uninsured: what the law actually provides

First, third-party insurance is compulsory by statute. Cap. 272 s.4(1): "Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance it shall not be lawful for any person to use, or to cause or permit any other person to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the user of the vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Ordinance." The penalty is in s.4(2)(a): "If a person acts in contravention of this section, he shall be liable to a fine at level 3 and to imprisonment for 12 months", plus disqualification from driving for a period the court determines, "being not less than 12 months nor more than 3 years from the date of conviction", unless the court for special reasons orders otherwise.

Second, the minimum cover is $100 million — but only for death and bodily injury, and only per event. Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272A) reg. 27: "For the purpose of section 6(1)(b) of the Ordinance, the amount of $100 million is prescribed." That figure is prescribed, not written into the Ordinance: Cap. 272 s.20(1) empowers the Chief Executive in Council to "make regulations for prescribing anything which may be prescribed under this Ordinance, and generally for the purpose of carrying this Ordinance into effect", and s.20(1)(da) names the subject expressly — regulations "as to the minimum amount of insurance cover for the purpose of section 6(1)(b)". Changing the figure takes a regulation, not an amending Ordinance, so check the current Regulations before relying on it. Read s.6(1)(b) with it: a complying policy must insure against liability "in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person caused by or arising out of the use of the motor vehicle on a road and arising out of one event for an amount not less than that as may be prescribed", with a proviso that such a policy need not cover the death or bodily injury of an employee of the insured "arising out of and in the course of his employment", nor "any contractual liability".

Three consequences to take away: s.6(1)(b) says "not less than" the prescribed amount — the $100 million is the statutory minimum cover required per event, not a ceiling the Ordinance imposes, and a policy may insure for more without breaching anything; compulsory third-party cover does not extend to property damage at all, so the other driver's policy only has to reach your damaged car if he bought that cover voluntarily; and an employee injured in the course of employment is outside this compulsory cover and goes down the Employees' Compensation route instead.

Third, if the other driver was insured but the insurer wants out, the answer is Cap. 272 s.10. Section 10(1) provides that once a certificate of insurance has been issued, where judgment on a liability required to be covered under s.6(1)(b) — "(being a liability covered by the terms of the policy)" — is obtained against a person insured by the policy, then "notwithstanding that the insurer may be entitled to avoid or cancel, or may have avoided or cancelled, the policy, the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the persons entitled to the benefit of the judgment any sum payable thereunder in respect of the liability", together with costs and judgment interest.

Note how the subsection opens: "If, after a certificate of insurance has been issued under section 6(3) in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected…". No policy and no certificate means no s.10. It is the answer to "the other driver was insured but the insurer wants out"; it is not the answer to "the other driver had no insurance".

The words "subject to the provisions of this section" are not decorative — subsections (2) and (3) are those provisions:

• s.10(2)(a) — the statutory 7-day notice described above.
• s.10(2)(d) — nothing is payable "in respect of any sum adjudged to be payable under the judgment in excess of the amount covered by the policy of insurance after deducting therefrom any amount which is either paid or due and payable by the insurer under the policy (otherwise than by virtue of the judgment) in respect of the same event." The insurer's obligation is capped at what the policy actually covers.
• s.10(3) — an insurer escapes the foregoing provisions of s.10 if, in an action commenced before or within 3 months after the commencement of the proceedings, it obtains a declaration that it is entitled to avoid the policy for non-disclosure of a material fact or a materially false representation. Note the limit of that escape: the subsection disapplies "the foregoing provisions of this section" only, and does not extinguish the insured's own liability to you. The proviso limits it further: it does not apply to a judgment in proceedings commenced before that action unless, before or within 7 days after the action began, the insurer notified the plaintiff in those proceedings, "specifying the non-disclosure or false representation on which he proposes to rely", and anyone so notified "shall be entitled, if he thinks fit, to be made a party thereto".

Fourth, the Motor Insurers' Bureau of Hong Kong (MIB). This addresses a different problem — the other driver had no insurance, or cannot be identified. Its legal position needs stating precisely, because the two common accounts of it are both wrong:

• Nothing in Cap. 272, Cap. 272A, Cap. 374 or Cap. 229 establishes or funds the Bureau. The word "empowers" cannot be swept in with them: legislation does confer powers on the Bureau — Cap. 4A O.41A r.3(8) lets it sign a statement of truth "in or in relation to a pleading" on behalf of a party in whose proceedings it has a financial interest, as the next point sets out. It is a body underpinned by industry agreement, not a statutory body — and what it pays, on what notice periods and subject to what exclusions, is fixed by those agreements. Agreements are not legislation, and they are not published in the statute book, so confirm those terms with the Bureau or a solicitor rather than inferring them from any Ordinance.
• But "it has no statutory footing at all" is false. The statute book names it in several places, two of which are directly useful to you:

- Legal aid. The Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91) s.2 defines "proceedings" to include "negotiations prior to the issue of legal proceedings, including mediation, and for the payment of compensation by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau for which no legal proceedings are issued", and Schedule 2 Part 1 item 5 repeats it as a class of proceedings for which legal aid may be given. So legal aid can be applied for to negotiate compensation with the Bureau even where no writ is ever issued (subject, as always, to the means and merits tests).

- Interim payment. The power to order an interim payment is in Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) O.29 r.11(1), not r.11(2) — but r.11 is not itself the door in. r.11(1) opens "If, on the hearing of an application under rule 10 in an action for damages, the Court is satisfied—", so there must first be an application on foot under r.10. And r.10(1) fixes when that application can even be made: "The plaintiff may, at any time after the writ has been served on a defendant and the time limited for him to acknowledge service has expired, apply to the Court for an order requiring that defendant to make an interim payment." Before the writ is served, and before the time to acknowledge service has run, there is no application to hear. Past that gate, r.11(1) requires the court to first be satisfied of one of three things: (a) that the defendant (called the respondent in that paragraph) "has admitted liability for the plaintiff’s damages"; (b) "that the plaintiff has obtained judgment against the respondent for damages to be assessed"; or (c) "that, if the action proceeded to trial, the plaintiff would obtain judgment for substantial damages against the respondent or, where there are two or more defendants, against any of them" — and only then may it order such amount as it thinks just, not exceeding a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the Court are likely to be recovered by the plaintiff after taking into account any relevant contributory negligence and any set-off, cross-claim or counterclaim on which the respondent may be entitled to rely. Rule 11(2) is not the source of the power; it is a restriction on it: "No order shall be made under paragraph (1) in an action for personal injuries if it appears to the Court that the defendant is not a person falling within one of the following categories". That list is closed, and there are three categories — (a) a person insured in respect of the plaintiff's claim, or whose liability for it will be met by an insurer under Cap. 272 s.10, by "an insurer who is a party to an agreement with the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong" or by "the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong"; (b) a public authority; (c) a person whose means and resources are such as to enable him to make the interim payment. The Bureau's role here is therefore to get the defendant through the r.11(2) gate, not to confer the power itself. Rule 11(3) defines that agreement as "the domestic agreement between the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong and the insurance companies and Lloyd’s underwriters authorized to carry on motor vehicle insurance business in Hong Kong, made on 1 February 1981, as amended from time to time". The Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) mirror the same rule. O.41A r.3(8) also allows an insurer or the Bureau to sign a statement of truth for a party in whose proceedings it has a financial interest, but the rule confines that to a statement of truth "in or in relation to a pleading" — not to documents generally.

- Separately, the Financial Institutions (Resolution) Ordinance (Cap. 628) Schedule 1 item 2 lists a fund as a statutory Protective Scheme, and the item's own words fix what that fund protects: "The Insolvency Fund administered by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau of Hong Kong that protects claims under a policy as defined by regulation 2 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Regulations (Cap. 272 sub. leg. A)." Note the limit — claims under a policy as defined by Cap. 272A reg. 2, not the Bureau's compensation arrangements at large.

One correction while we are here: the only agreement identifiable from the legislation is the domestic agreement between the Bureau and the insurance companies and Lloyd's underwriters — not an agreement between insurers and the Government.

In short: an uninsured other driver does not mean there is no route to recovery. No Ordinance created that route, but legislation recognises it, opens legal aid for negotiating with the Bureau, and empowers the court to order an interim payment. As for the Bureau's own notification deadlines, those come from the agreements rather than the Limitation Ordinance, so do not compute them from Cap. 347 — ask the Bureau.

The Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme: the Scheme and the Ordinance are two different documents

The Social Welfare Department's Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme is no-fault assistance: you need not prove who caused the accident. But the Scheme and the Ordinance are two different documents, and citing the wrong one sends you to the wrong place to check.

The Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance (Cap. 229) does not contain the Scheme. The Ordinance has 15 sections (ss. 1, 2, 2A and 3 to 14) and a Schedule. Section 4 provides:

(Paragraphs (b) and (c) follow in the section, dealing with refunds of levies under s.5(9) and the administration fee under s.12; neither concerns the Scheme, and they are omitted here.)

The Scheme is therefore a separate instrument approved by the Legislative Council, not part of the Ordinance. The Ordinance contains no application deadline, no daily rate, no sick-leave threshold, no frequency limit, and no provision for burial, death or disability grants — those figures are fixed by the Scheme itself and published by the Social Welfare Department; the verified current figures follow below, and the latest version always governs. The only money figures in Cap. 229 are the levy rates in the two Parts of its Schedule — $84 or $114 a year on motor vehicles, trade licences, light rail vehicles, tramcars and tramcar-drawn trailers, and $28 or $38 a year on driving licences. The two columns are the rate for a levy paid in 1994 and the rate for one paid after 1994; they are not two classes of payer. The $28/$38 pairing covers only items 1 to 4 of Part 2 of the Schedule (full, learner's, temporary, and government-service driving licences); Part 2 is in fact headed "Levy on Holders of Driving Licences and Members of Hong Kong Garrison", and item 3A (probationary driving licence) and item 5 ("Permission permitting a member of the Hong Kong Garrison to drive a vehicle belonging to the Hong Kong Garrison") read "not applicable" and "—" respectively in the 1994 column, with $38 only in the post-1994 column. Those amounts are themselves movable: s.14 provides that "The Legislative Council may by resolution amend the Schedule." A resolution, not an amending Ordinance, changes the levy rates — so check the current Schedule before relying on a figure.

Verified current figures (fixed by the Scheme itself, published by the Social Welfare Department): The Social Welfare Department's Traffic Accident Victims Assistance Scheme (Traffic Accident Victims (Assistance Fund) Ordinance, Cap. 229) is no-fault — whoever caused the accident, you may apply as long as it was reported to police. The application deadline is 6 months from the accident. For accidents on or after 28 June 2025, the Compassionate Grant pays $330/day for up to 60 days of sick leave, requiring hospitalization or certified sick leave of at least 7 days (registered doctor or registered Chinese medicine practitioner), claimable once every two years; burial, death and disability grants are separate. Applying does not affect your civil claim, but assistance generally must be repaid if you later recover compensation. (Note: defrauding the scheme is a criminal offence under the Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210), maximum 14 years' imprisonment on conviction.)

So: any application deadline, daily rate or sick-leave threshold presented as something "Cap. 229 provides" is attached to the wrong provision — the figures above come from the Scheme, not the Ordinance itself. Those conditions are fixed by the Scheme, which together with any amendment or replacement is approved by the Legislative Council (s.4(a)), and the current, complete version always governs, as published by the Social Welfare Department: ask immediately after the accident; do not wait — see the official link under "Where to go from here", or contact an SWD district social welfare office directly.

What the Ordinance does provide bears directly on your civil claim:

• Applying means signing an undertaking (s.9(1)). It is a condition of any payment from the fund that the recipient signs, in such form as the Director of Social Welfare may specify, an undertaking to notify the Director, within the period specified in the undertaking, of any claim or legal proceedings he brings in respect of that traffic accident; and to notify any person against whom he claims of the amount he has received from the fund. Wilfully breaching that undertaking is an offence — s.9(3): "Any person who wilfully breaches an undertaking signed by him under subsection (1) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine at level 1 and to imprisonment for 6 months." That punishes breach of the undertaking; it is not a fraud provision.
• Before the other side pays you, it must give the Director 72 hours' notice (s.9(2)). This duty falls on whoever is paying — normally the other driver or his insurer — and never on you. Once you have told him under s.9(1)(b) how much you received from the fund, he must, "not less than 72 hours before the day on which payment is to be made", notify the Director of Social Welfare in writing of your name and address and the amount. The offence for not doing so is s.9(4): "Any person who fails to comply with subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine at level 1." Note: a fine only, no imprisonment. The practical use is at settlement — if you have taken assistance, remind the payer of it.
• Repayment if you later recover, but capped (s.10(1) and (2)). Section 10(1): "Subject to subsection (2), where as a result of a traffic accident damages or compensation are or is paid to or for the benefit of any person to whom or for whose benefit money from the fund in respect of that accident has been paid, the person receiving the damages or compensation shall pay to the fund the amount of money paid from the fund." Section 10(2) is the cap: "Where the damages or compensation are or is less than the money paid from the fund the amount to be paid to the fund under subsection (1) shall not exceed the amount of the damages or compensation." If you do not pay, s.10(3) makes the sum recoverable as a debt due to the Government.
• The court will not deduct your assistance when assessing damages (s.10(4)). "In an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of a traffic accident there shall not be taken into account any money which has been or may be paid from the fund in respect of that accident."
• Applying does not weaken your common-law rights (s.13). "Nothing in this Ordinance shall diminish or extinguish any rights enforceable at common law arising from a traffic accident."

Put plainly: taking assistance does not shrink your claim and the court will not award you less because you took it — but once you win, the assistance is repayable, and the amount repayable is capped at what you actually recover.

Defrauding the Scheme is a criminal offence. The applicable provisions are Theft Ordinance (Cap. 210) s.16A (fraud — liable "on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for 14 years") or s.17 (obtaining property by deception — "on conviction upon indictment to imprisonment for 10 years"). Cap. 229 contains no fraud offence of its own: ss.9(3) and 9(4), set out above, are two different things — one punishes wilful breach of the undertaking (fine and 6 months), the other punishes a payer's failure to give the 72-hour notice (fine only).

Documents you will need for a claim

• The Traffic Accident Report number (obtained when you report)
• Your own certificate of insurance — where someone other than you was injured, Cap. 272 s.16(3) requires you to produce it at the police station when you report
• Dashcam footage and scene photographs
• The other party's particulars, insurance details (compellable under Cap. 272 s.13), and witness contacts
• All medical records, sick-leave certificates and receipts, from the first consultation on
• Repair quotations/invoices and transport expense receipts
• All correspondence with insurers, including the date and method of any notice you gave
• If you have applied to the assistance scheme: the application record and a copy of the undertaking you signed under s.9(1)