Received a Lawyer's Letter in Hong Kong? Which Deadlines Are Real, and What Actually Follows

The distinction to draw first

The letter says "please respond within X days of the date of this letter." If what you have received is an ordinary solicitor's demand letter, that date was chosen by the sender. Neither the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) nor the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) contains any provision about correspondence before proceedings begin, and the first time limit either set of rules imposes on a defendant does not begin to run until service of a writ.

But one kind of document does have its period fixed by an ordinance, and you must be able to recognise it. If what arrived is in the prescribed form and calls itself a statutory demand, the period is not the sender's choice. Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6), section 6A(1):

Once those three weeks have run and the demand has been neither complied with nor set aside, the condition in section 6(2)(c) is met (section 6(2) itself opens "Subject to sections 6A to 6C", a further rules-based gateway) and the creditor may present a bankruptcy petition — section 6(2)(a) requiring in addition that the debt equal or exceed $10,000 or a prescribed amount, section 6(2)(b) that it be an unsecured liquidated sum, and section 6(2)(d) that "there is no outstanding application to set aside a statutory demand served under section 6A in respect of the debt" — "not set aside" and "no pending application to set aside" are not the same thing; a debtor can still have an application pending even after the three weeks run. The corporate equivalent is section 178(1)(a) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32), which carries its own debt-size gateway — the debt must equal or exceed the "specified amount", defined by section 178(3) as $10,000 (or such other amount as may be prescribed under subsection (4)): where a written demand in the prescribed form has been left at the company's registered office and "the company has, for 3 weeks after the service of the demand, neglected to pay the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of the creditor", the company is deemed unable to pay its debts — which is a ground for winding up by the court under section 177(1)(d).

Neither route requires a writ first, and neither requires a judgment first. So the order of operations set out below — establish the limitation position, then decide what to write — does not apply to a statutory demand. Three weeks is not enough time for it; take advice at once.

Unless otherwise stated, everything that follows is about an ordinary solicitor's demand letter, not a statutory demand. That is not a reason to ignore the letter. Three things are governed by law, and none of them depends on whether you reply:

• Limitation keeps running. It runs from the date the cause of action accrued (or from the date of knowledge); Cap. 347 contains no provision under which a demand for payment suspends, extends or shortens it.
• What you write can become evidence, and when the court later deals with costs it takes into account conduct before proceedings, not only during them.
• A few genuine statutory deadlines exist, shorter than most people expect and unconnected to the date on the letter — three months for a severance payment claim, twenty-four months for employees' compensation.

What follows says, for each point, whether it has a statutory anchor or is simply practice.

What a lawyer's letter can and cannot do

A lawyer's letter is not a court document. The machinery in Orders 45 to 50 of the Rules of the High Court — execution against property, garnishee proceedings, charging orders — does run on a judgment or order of the court (the District Court Rules use the same numbering).

What does not follow is that nothing can happen without a judgment. Within the categories this article covers there are at least two statutory routes that need neither a writ nor a judgment: the statutory demand above (Cap. 6 s. 6A, Cap. 32 s. 178), and the warrant of distress for rent dealt with in the tenancy section below, which is issued on an affidavit by a judge or the Registrar and executed by a bailiff who seizes movable property. The accurate statement is narrower: a letter does not itself create anything enforceable, but the legal route behind the letter does not always run through a trial.

Two rules, besides, stop the pre-action stage from being consequence-free.

First, costs. Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A), Order 62, rule 5:

Order 62, rule 5 of the District Court Rules (Cap. 336H) is to the same effect.

A note about the quotations, which applies throughout: every rule of court quoted in this article is quoted from the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A). The District Court Rules carry mostly the same Order numbers, periods and legal effect, but not word for word the same text, and not every rule has a District Court counterpart at all — Order 3, rule 3 (excluding the Summer Vacation from time reckoned for serving a pleading) is one example with no equivalent in the District Court Order 3, discussed under the 28-day defence period below. Order 12, rule 5, for instance, reads "these rules" and "fourteen days" in Cap. 4A and "these Rules" and "14 days" in Cap. 336H; the Chinese texts write 法庭 in Cap. 4A and 區域法院 in Cap. 336H throughout; and the amendment markers run "(L.N. 152 of 2008)" in Cap. 4A against "(L.N. 153 of 2008)" in Cap. 336H. If your document is a District Court document, read the words below as an accurate statement of the same rule, not as the text of your own rule.

So "whether I replied is invisible to the court" is not accurate: rule 5(2)(d) puts conduct before proceedings expressly into the costs discretion.

One rule-group away in the same Order, the drafter drew the line in the opposite place, and it is worth knowing both. Order 62, rule 32C deals with the Court's powers in relation to misconduct by a party or a legal representative, and rule 32C(2) provides: "For the purpose of paragraph (1), the conduct of a party or his legal representative does not include any conduct before the commencement of the action." Pre-action conduct therefore enters the general costs discretion under rule 5, but not the misconduct and wasted-costs jurisdiction under rule 32C.

Second, at the letter stage you cannot make a sanctioned offer. Many people assume that a formal settlement proposal now will protect their costs position. Order 22, rule 5(6):

The District Court Rules are to the same effect. The Order 22 costs machinery therefore is not yet available when the letter arrives; what the court may take into account at this stage is what Order 62, rule 5(1)(d) describes — "any written offer which is expressed to be “without prejudice save as to costs” and which relates to any issue in the proceedings". That distinction shapes how a reply should be written, and whether it should be written by a solicitor.

The rules are not, however, silent about a payment offered before proceedings. Order 18, rule 16 provides a defence of tender:

So: there is no rule about pre-action correspondence, but there is a rule about a pre-action tender of payment — on condition that the sum is paid into court if proceedings follow. That is a different thing from a "without prejudice save as to costs" offer under Order 62, rule 5(1)(d): one is a defence, the other a costs consideration. A reader who wants to settle without admitting liability should weigh both with a solicitor — not least because of how tendering a payment interacts with the "makes any payment" limb of section 23(3) above.

The deadlines the law does set: the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347)

This is the most important section of this article. Whether what the sender is claiming is already time-barred has nothing whatever to do with the number of days printed on the letter.

Contract and tort generally: six years. Section 4(1):

Further periods sit in the same section, and they are often the reason a letter has been sent at all:

• Specialty (a deed): twelve years. Section 4(3): "An action upon a specialty shall not be brought after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued: Provided that this subsection shall not affect any action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed by any other provision of this Ordinance." Whether your document was executed as a deed turns six years into twelve.
• On a judgment: twelve years; arrears of interest: six. Section 4(4): "An action shall not be brought upon any judgment after the expiration of 12 years from the date on which the judgment became enforceable, and no arrears of interest in respect of any judgment debt shall be recovered after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the interest became due."
• A penalty or forfeiture recoverable under an Ordinance: two years. Section 4(5): "An action to recover any penalty or forfeiture, or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture, recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued", with a proviso that "for the purposes of this subsection the expression penalty (罰金) shall not include a fine to which any person is liable on conviction of a criminal offence." The qualifier matters: the two years attach to penalties "recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment", not to penalties in general.

Section 4 does not reach injunctions or equitable relief. Section 4(7): "This section shall not apply to any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief" — subject only to an exception where the court applies a provision of the section by analogy. This matters most to a reader whose former employer's solicitors have written about a restrictive covenant or a confidentiality clause. What such a letter is usually threatening is an injunction, and the six years in section 4 do not govern an injunction claim; they govern the damages claim arising from the same facts. A six-year figure in the limitation table is not a statement that the sender has six years before doing anything.

The timing runs the other way, in fact. An injunction need not wait for a writ. Order 29, rule 1(2) and (3):

So in an urgent case an injunction can be granted before any writ has been issued, on affidavit, without notice to the other side. A covenant or confidentiality letter cannot be handled on the assumption that nothing happens until a writ arrives.

The trap: acknowledgment or part payment restarts the clock

This is the one provision under which replying to a letter can leave the reader worse off than saying nothing. Section 23(3):

In other words: a reply acknowledging the debt, or a small payment made to show good faith, can cause a claim that was close to being time-barred to be treated as having accrued on that date. That is why this article does not tell you to write back offering to pay. The order of operations is: establish the limitation position first, then decide what the reply should say.

What counts as an acknowledgment is settled by section 24, which fixes both its form and the person it must be made to:

Two consequences bear directly on a reply. Section 24(1) requires the acknowledgment to be in writing and signed by the person making it — which is exactly the form of a signed letter of reply. Section 24(2) provides that the acknowledgment may be made by your own agent, and that it operates when made to the claimant or to an agent of the claimant — so a reply sent to the firm of solicitors that wrote to you can acknowledge the claim just as a reply to the client would.

Personal injury: three years, but on the later of two dates, and the Court can override it

Sections 27(3) and (4):

Both subsections refer to subsection (5). Section 27(5) deals with the case where the injured person dies:

So where the injured person dies before the three years have run, the cause of action surviving for the estate carries its own fresh three years, running from the death or from the personal representative's date of knowledge, whichever is later — not the timeline that applied during the injured person's lifetime. Where there is more than one personal representative, section 27(10) governs which date: "If there is more than one personal representative, and their dates of knowledge are different, subsection (5)(b) shall be read as referring to the earliest of those dates" — the earliest-knowing representative's date, not the latest.

Two further things follow. First, section 27(3) leaves a door open at its very first words — the subsection begins "Subject to section 30", and section 30(1) gives the court power to disapply section 27 altogether:

Section 30(3) lists what the court must have regard to, and item (c) is "the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the extent, if any, to which he responded to requests reasonably made by the plaintiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which were or might be relevant to the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant;" How the recipient of a letter responds to a request for information is therefore itself one of the matters a court weighs when deciding whether to relax the three-year period.

Second, "knowledge" is defined by the section itself. Section 27(6):

Section 27(7) defines "significant"; section 27(8) adds constructive knowledge — knowledge "which he might reasonably have been expected to acquire— (a) from facts observable or ascertainable by him; or (b) from facts ascertainable by him with the help of medical or other appropriate expert advice which it is reasonable for him to seek" — and then, just as importantly, closes with "but a person shall not be fixed under this subsection with knowledge of a fact ascertainable only with the help of expert advice so long as he has taken all reasonable steps to obtain (and, where appropriate, to act on) that advice."

Other provisions that move the clock

• Disability (infancy, unsoundness of mind). Section 22(1): where the person to whom the right of action accrued was under a disability, the action may be brought "at any time before the expiration of 6 years from the date when the person ceased to be under a disability or died, whichever event first occurred, notwithstanding that the period of limitation had expired", subject to four provisos. Section 22(2): "If the action is one to which section 27 or 28(3) applies subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words “6 years” there were substituted the words “3 years”." There is also section 22(2A), easy to miss: "Where this section applies by virtue of section 6, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for the words '6 years' there were substituted the words '2 years'." So where the action is of the kind section 6 covers (personal injury or death), the disability extension is not 6 years, and not the 3 years that applies under sections 27/28(3) either — it is 2 years.
• Fraud, concealment, mistake. Section 26(1): in those three cases "the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it" — expressly "Subject to subsection (4)", and subsections (4) and (5) protect an innocent third-party purchaser.
• Latent damage in negligence not involving personal injuries. Section 31(4): the period is "either— (a) 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued; or (b) 3 years from the date of knowledge, if that period expires later than the period mentioned in paragraph (a)." Section 32(1) then imposes a fifteen-year longstop, and section 32(2) provides that it "bars the right of action in a case to which subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that— (a) the cause of action has not yet accrued; or (b) where section 31 applies to the action, the date which is for the purposes of that section the date of knowledge has not yet occurred".

An expired period does nothing by itself: limitation must be specifically pleaded

This governs the practical value of everything above. Limitation expiring does not stop the other side issuing a writ and does not cause a court to dismiss the claim of its own motion. Order 18, rule 8:

(This rule is the exception to the note above: Order 18, rule 8(1) is word for word identical in Cap. 4A and Cap. 336H, in both languages.)

The words "any relevant statute of limitation" reach the court only because the defendant pleads them. So a writ on a time-barred claim can still be issued and still be served. A reader who reasons "it is out of time, so I can ignore this" runs the Order 13 and Order 19 default-judgment machineries described below at full speed and ends with a judgment against them — with the limitation defence never having been raised. An expired period is a defence you have to take, not a protection that operates by itself.

The genuinely short statutory deadlines (unrelated to the letter, and unforgiving)

• Employees' compensation: twenty-four months. Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282), section 14(1) provides that proceedings to recover compensation "shall not be maintainable" unless notice of the accident was given to the employer "as soon as practicable after the happening thereof and before the employee has voluntarily left the employment in which he was injured", and unless the application for compensation — "being an application to the Court by an employee under section 18A(2)" — "has been made within 24 months from the occurrence of the accident causing the injury or, in the case of death, within 24 months from the date of death or prior to a determination made by the Commissioner under section 6B(1)(a) , whichever is the earlier". Note the two limbs of the notice condition — an employee who has already resigned should check the second — and the potentially earlier cut-off in a death case. On notice there are two ways out, not one. First, section 14(1) carries its own proviso: "the want of, or any defect or irregularity in, a notice shall not be a bar to the maintenance of proceedings— (a) if the application is made in respect of the death of an employee resulting from an accident which occurred on the premises of the employer… or (b) if the employer is proved to have had knowledge of the accident from any other source at or about the time of the accident, or if it is found in the proceedings for settling that claim that the employer is not prejudiced… or that such want, defect or irregularity was occasioned by mistake, absence from Hong Kong, or other reasonable cause." That proviso operates by itself, with no application for leave, and limb (b) covers the commonest case — the employer already knew. Second, section 14(4) is the discretionary route for a late application (as well as a missing notice): "The Court may receive and determine any application for compensation in any case notwithstanding that the notice required by subsection (1) has not been given, or that the application has not been made in due time as required by that subsection, if it is satisfied that there was reasonable excuse for the failure so to give notice or to make an application, as the case may be."
• Severance payment: three months. Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), section 31N:

If the letter came from your employer's solicitors and you also have a severance claim, that three months is your own deadline, and it does not pause while you deal with theirs. The section does carry one relief — "or within such extended period as the Commissioner may agree" — but agreeing to an extension is the Commissioner's decision, not something to assume. One further point of scope: section 31N fixes the time limit for a severance claim and is not a general limitation provision for employment letters. If the letter is about a restrictive covenant, a confidentiality clause or any other contractual term, section 31N has no application; what governs is section 4 of Cap. 347 above, together with the section 4(7) exception for injunctions.

• A landlord's distress for rent: twelve months only. Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7), section 79: "No warrant shall be issued in any case for arrears of rent due for more than 12 months at the time of the application." That twelve months is a cap on the landlord, not a breathing space for the tenant; how the warrant is obtained is set out in the tenancy section below.

What actually happens if you ignore it

Everything in this section is a rule of court, not custom. The Court of First Instance applies the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A); the District Court applies the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H). The Order numbers, the periods and the legal effect are mostly the same in both, but not rule for rule — see Order 3, rule 3 below; as noted above, the words quoted below are quoted from Cap. 4A, and Cap. 336H expresses the same rules in slightly different wording where an equivalent rule exists.

Step one: service of the writ. Order 10, rule 1:

"I never received it" is not an automatic answer, but neither is it hopeless: paragraph (3)(a) is a rebuttable presumption ("unless the contrary is shown"). That is the practical reason to keep envelopes and postal records. Paragraph (3)(b) is useful for the same reason: the plaintiff's own affidavit of service has to state that the writ was not returned undelivered, so if in fact it came back, that affidavit does not stand (see Order 13, rule 7(3) and (4) below).

Step two: fourteen days. Order 12, rule 5:

The fourteen days are limb (a)'s figure — a writ served within the jurisdiction. Where the writ is served out of the jurisdiction the period is whatever the rules named in limb (b) fix, and it is not fourteen days.

"Notice of intention to defend" is a defined term. Order 1, rule 4 defines it as "an acknowledgment of service containing a statement to the effect that the person by whom or on whose behalf it is signed intends to contest the proceedings to which the acknowledgment relates" — that is, the acknowledgment of service plus the statement that you intend to contest, not a separate document.

Step three: twenty-eight days for the defence. Order 18, rule 2(1):

"Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3)" is not decorative — read on and it changes the calculation. Order 18, rule 2(2) and (3):

In other words: if the other side serves a summons under Order 14, rule 1 — the summary-judgment summons discussed just below — or under Order 86, rule 1, before the defence is served, the 28-day period in paragraph (1) stops applying to that defendant altogether, unless the order made on the summons gives leave to defend, in which case the 28 days runs afresh from the date of that order (or whatever other period the order specifies). And if the defendant applies under Order 12, rule 8(1) or (2) to challenge the Court's jurisdiction, the same thing happens: paragraph (1) has no effect until the application is finally determined, and the 28 days then runs from that determination. So the "twenty-eight days for the defence" only runs on the ordinary clock where neither of those two things has happened.

This is also where the High Court and District Court genuinely part company. Order 3, rule 3 of the Rules of the High Court provides: "Unless the Court otherwise directs, the period of the Summer Vacation shall be excluded in reckoning any period prescribed by these rules or by any order or direction for serving, filing or amending any pleading." A defence is served under Order 18, so in the High Court the Summer Vacation is excluded from the 28-day count unless the Court directs otherwise. The District Court Rules' Order 3 in this article's own source material has no equivalent rule 3 — it goes straight from rule 2 to rule 4. So the claim made above that "the periods and the legal effect are the same in both" is not true without qualification for this specific calculation: a District Court defence deadline does not get the same Summer Vacation exclusion a High Court one does.

There are two default-judgment machineries, not one. This is where most accounts go wrong:

• Order 13 applies to a failure to give notice of intention to defend. Rule 1(1): "Where a writ is indorsed with a claim against a defendant for a liquidated demand only, then, if that defendant fails to give notice of intention to defend, the plaintiff may, after the prescribed time, enter final judgment against that defendant for a sum not exceeding that claimed by the writ in respect of the demand and for costs". Rule 2: "Where a writ is indorsed with a claim against a defendant for unliquidated damages only, then, if that defendant fails to give notice of intention to defend, the plaintiff may, after the prescribed time, enter interlocutory judgment against that defendant for damages to be assessed and costs" — that is, liability is fixed and the amount is still to be assessed. Note the word only at the opening of each rule: these two short cuts are confined to a writ indorsed with a single kind of claim. A writ mixing heads of claim goes to rule 5 (mixed claims) or rule 6 (other claims, on application by summons), not to automatic entry of judgment. "The prescribed time" is defined by rule 6A as "the time limited for the defendant to acknowledge service of the writ or, if within that time the defendant has returned to the Registry an acknowledgment of service containing a statement to the effect that he does not intend to contest the proceedings, the date on which the acknowledgment was received at the Registry."
• Order 19 applies where notice of intention to defend was given but no defence was served. Rules 2(1) and 3 run in parallel: liquidated demand → final judgment; unliquidated damages → interlocutory judgment.

If you do respond, the next real deadline is usually summary judgment, not trial. Both machineries above bite on inaction. A reader who does what this article advises — acknowledge service, serve a defence, dispute the claim — meets a different procedure, and for a liquidated debt claim it is the plaintiff's normal next move. Order 14, rule 1(1):

That is an application for judgment without a trial, on the ground that the defence discloses no defence at all. Rule 1(2) lists the actions to which the rule does not apply, and limb (a) is "an action which includes a claim by the plaintiff for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or seduction" — so a defamation letter does not lead here, but a debt-recovery letter commonly does. The timing is tight: rule 2(3) requires that the summons and the affidavit in support "must be served on the defendant not less than 10 clear days before the return day" — that is a minimum notice period, not a fixed ten-day response window; actual service could come earlier, giving more time. And rule 4(1) provides that a defendant "may show cause against an application under rule 1 by affidavit or otherwise to the satisfaction of the Court" — an affidavit is not the only way to show cause.

The most important point: a default judgment can be set aside. Order 13, rule 9:

Order 19, rule 9 confers the same power in slightly narrower words: "The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, set a side or vary any judgment entered in pursuance of this Order." The spelling "set a side" is not a slip in this article — it is what Cap. 4A says. The corresponding rule in Cap. 336H reads "set aside", so this is one place where the two chapters are demonstrably not in identical terms. This article says nothing about whether such an application would succeed: the rules say only that the Court "may", on terms "it thinks just", and set out no criteria.

One further rule bears directly on "I never received it": Order 13, rule 7(3) and (4) provide that where, after judgment has been entered against a defendant purporting to have been served by post, the copy of the writ is returned to the plaintiff undelivered, the plaintiff must, before taking any step or further step in the action or the enforcement of the judgment, either request that the judgment be set aside on the ground that the writ has not been duly served or apply to the Court for directions — and on a request under paragraph (3)(a), supported by an affidavit stating the relevant facts, "thereupon the judgment shall be set aside".

Which court. The forum turns not on the raw amount claimed in the writ, but on "the amount of the plaintiff's claim" as adjusted. The Small Claims Tribunal's monetary head is paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338): "Any monetary claim founded in contract, quasi-contract or tort where the amount claimed is not more than $75,000, whether on balance of account or otherwise". For the District Court, section 32(1) of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336): "The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine any action founded on contract, quasi-contract or tort where the amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed $3,000,000." Section 32(2) defines that amount: "the amount of the plaintiff’s claim means the amount the plaintiff claims after taking into account— (a) any set-off or any debt or demand the defendant claims or may recover from the plaintiff; (b) any compensation, as defined in section 3 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282), paid to the plaintiff under that Ordinance; and (c) any contributory negligence, that the plaintiff admits in his statement of claim." Set-off, ECO compensation already paid, and any admitted contributory negligence therefore reduce the figure tested against the $3,000,000 threshold — the District Court/High Court split is not simply a function of the sum stated in the writ.

The Small Claims Tribunal is subject to exclusions besides defamation. The one that bears most on a debt letter is limb (c) of the proviso to paragraph 1 of the Schedule to Cap. 338, which removes from the tribunal "any action by a money lender licensed under the Money Lenders Ordinance (Cap. 163) for the recovery of any money lent, or the enforcement of any agreement or security made or taken in respect of money lent". A licensed money lender's claim will therefore not be in the Small Claims Tribunal even if it is well under $75,000.

Two further exclusions connect directly to this article's employment content. The same proviso's limbs (ca) and (d) remove "any action that lies within the jurisdiction of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board established by section 3 of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)" and "any action that lies within the jurisdiction of the Labour Tribunal established under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)". But that exclusion has a carve-back, and it is not absolute. Paragraph 1A of the Schedule: "Notwithstanding subparagraph (d) of the proviso to paragraph 1, the tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim transferred to the tribunal under section 10(2) of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)." So a claim that reaches the Small Claims Tribunal by transfer from the Labour Tribunal under section 10(2) of Cap. 25 is, despite limb (d), within the Tribunal's jurisdiction after all. This is the same structure as the money-lender exclusion above but a different scope, and it carries this additional carve-back that the money-lender exclusion does not.

If the forum is the Small Claims Tribunal, whether you need a solicitor is answered by the Ordinance itself. Section 19(2) of Cap. 338:

Neither side is legally represented there — not as a matter of cost, but because the Ordinance does not permit it. Section 19(1) sets out who does have a right of audience: any party; an officer or servant of a corporation that is a party; a member of a partnership where the partners are parties; with the tribunal's leave, any person other than counsel or a solicitor authorised in writing by a party to appear as his representative; and a public officer, not a barrister or solicitor, appearing on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, if the Secretary for Justice is a party.

On legal aid, more is in the Ordinance than the defamation exclusion. Section 6 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91) sets out the scope of legal aid: "Legal aid shall consist of representation, on the terms provided for by this Ordinance, by the Director or by a solicitor and, so far as necessary, by counsel including all such assistance as is usually given by solicitor or counsel in the steps preliminary or incidental to any proceedings or in arriving at or giving effect to a compromise to bring to an end any proceedings." Part 1 of Schedule 2 lists the classes of proceedings for which aid is available, and paragraph 5 is the one that speaks directly to a reader who has a letter but no writ: "Negotiations prior to the issue of legal proceedings, including mediation, and for the payment of compensation by the Motor Insurers’ Bureau for which no legal proceedings are issued." The pre-action stage is within the scheme; it is not necessary to wait for proceedings.

Part 2 of the same Schedule has to be read alongside it. Besides defamation (paragraph 1(a)), paragraph 9 excepts "In the Small Claims Tribunal, proceedings under the Small Claims Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 338)" — which matches section 19(2) — and paragraph 10 excepts Labour Tribunal proceedings. Paragraph 5 matters most to a debt reader: "In the District Court or Court of First Instance, in the case of a defendant, proceedings where the only question to be brought before the court is as to the time and mode of payment by him of debt (including liquidated damages) and costs." If the only live issue is when and how you will pay, that is outside the scheme.

Counting days: the letter and the rules of court count differently

How the letter counts days is a matter for the letter (from its date? from service? are holidays included?). That is private wording, with no provision behind it.

Court periods do have a rule. Order 3, rule 2:

Rule 2(2) fixes the starting point: "Where the act is required to be done within a specified period after or from a specified date, the period begins immediately after that date." Rules 2(5) and (6) deal with holidays:

Note the limit: this exclusion of Saturdays and holidays applies only to periods of 7 days or less. The fourteen-day and twenty-eight-day periods above are not affected by it.

A second rule carries no such limit, and it is the one a fourteen- or twenty-eight-day deadline actually turns on. Order 3, rule 4(1):

Rule 4(2) uses the same list of specified days in relation to an office of the Court — a Saturday, a general holiday, a gale warning day, a black rainstorm warning day, and any other day on which the office is closed. So the period itself still counts Saturdays and holidays, but if the last day falls on a day when the court office is shut and the act therefore cannot be done, doing it on the next day the office is open is in time. A fourteen- or twenty-eight-day deadline landing on a Saturday or a black-rainstorm day is saved by this rule, not by rule 2(5).

Court periods can also be extended. Order 3, rule 5: "(1) The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorized by these rules, or by any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in any proceedings. (2) The Court may extend any such period as is referred to in paragraph (1) although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period." Rule 5(3) further allows the period for serving, filing or amending a pleading or other document to be "extended by consent (given in writing) without an order of the Court being made for that purpose."

The six common types: which have a chapter of their own, and which do not

The point worth making about debt-recovery letters is that there is no general debt-recovery Act to name. The legal basis of such a letter is the contract itself; what governs such a claim is limitation (Cap. 347 s. 4(1) above), the procedure that applies once proceedings begin, and — if the creditor takes the insolvency route — the statutory demand in Cap. 6 s. 6A and Cap. 32 s. 178 set out above. So the sentence-form "under Hong Kong law you are required to…" in this kind of letter often refers to a term of a contract rather than to a provision of an ordinance. Money-lending and regulated-credit arrangements have ordinances of their own, which are outside this article's scope (see the appendix).

Defamation letters: what the Defamation Ordinance (Cap. 21) actually contains

Start with a fact most people guess wrongly: Cap. 21 sets no limitation period for a defamation claim. There is no limitation provision anywhere in the Ordinance; what applies is the six years in Cap. 347 s. 4(1) for "actions founded on simple contract or on tort".

What Cap. 21 does contain is a set of provisions that matter to the recipient of such a letter:

• An apology is admissible in mitigation of damages. Section 3: "In any action for defamation it shall be competent to the defendant (after notice in writing of his intention to do so duly given to the plaintiff within a reasonable time before the trial of the cause) to give in evidence in mitigation of damages that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity of doing so in case the action has been commenced before there was an opportunity of making or offering such apology." Note what it does: it mitigates damages. It is not a defence to liability.
• For a newspaper item there is a genuine defence, not merely mitigation. Section 4 (right of defendant in an action for libel to plead absence of malice, etc. and apology) allows a defendant to set up as a defence "that the libel was inserted in the newspaper without actual malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in the newspaper a full apology for the libel, or if the newspaper in which the libel appeared is ordinarily published at intervals exceeding 1 week, had offered to publish the said apology in any newspaper to be selected by the plaintiff in the action". Unlike section 3, that is a defence and not mitigation — but it is doubly confined: to a libel "contained in any newspaper", and by a proviso that "it shall not be competent to any defendant in such action to set up any defence as aforesaid without at the same time making a payment of money into court by way of amends". Where the letter concerns a press report, the operative moment is "before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards".
• Two definitional provisions decide which kind of defamation the letter is about. Section 22: "For the purposes of the law of libel and slander, the broadcasting of words shall be treated as publication in permanent form." Section 23: in an action for slander in respect of words "calculated to disparage the plaintiff in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of the publication, it shall not be necessary to allege or prove special damage, whether or not the words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession, calling, trade or business" — so a spoken allegation touching the other side's work or business is actionable without their having to show a money loss.
• The offer of amends. Section 25(1): a person who has published words alleged to be defamatory "may, if he claims that the words were published by him innocently in relation to that other person, make an offer of amends under this section"; if accepted and duly performed, "no proceedings for libel or slander shall be taken or continued by that party against the person making the offer in respect of the publication in question (but without prejudice to any cause of action against any other person jointly responsible for that publication)"; if not accepted, it is a defence to prove that the words "were published by the defendant innocently in relation to the plaintiff and that the offer was made as soon as practicable after the defendant received notice that they were or might be defamatory of the plaintiff, and has not been withdrawn." But making a valid offer is not simply correction plus apology: section 25(2) adds two mandatory formal gateways — "An offer of amends under this section must be expressed to be made for the purposes of this section, and must be accompanied by an affidavit specifying the facts relied upon" by the person making it to show innocence. Section 25(3) requires the offer to include "a suitable correction of the words complained of, and a sufficient apology to the party aggrieved", and, where copies have been distributed, reasonable steps to notify recipients. Section 25(5) defines "innocently" narrowly and requires that "the publisher exercised all reasonable care in relation to the publication". Where the publisher is not the author, section 25(6) adds a further condition: "Subsection (1)(b) shall not apply in relation to the publication by any person of words of which he is not the author unless he proves that the words were written by the author without malice" — innocence, promptness and non-withdrawal are not enough on their own for a non-author publisher; the author's lack of malice must also be proved. The phrase "as soon as practicable" in that limb is not the only genuinely time-sensitive statutory consideration in this category of letter — sections 3 and 4 of the same Ordinance carry their own express timing requirements for notice and apology (see below), which this article also quotes. Section 25 is open only to a publisher who published innocently, and section 25(5) draws that narrowly, so it will often not be available for an ordinary post naming a person.
• Justification and fair comment. Section 26 (where the words contain two or more distinct charges, a defence of justification "shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the truth of the remaining charges") and section 27 (where the words are partly fact and partly opinion, fair comment "shall not fail by reason only that the truth of every allegation of fact is not proved if the expression of opinion is fair comment having regard to such of the facts alleged or referred to in the words complained of as are proved").
• Section 5 is criminal. "Any person who maliciously publishes any defamatory libel, knowing the same to be false, shall be liable to imprisonment for 2 years, and, in addition, to pay such fine as the court may award."

Two practical consequences are worth knowing. A defamation claim cannot be brought in the Small Claims Tribunal: the proviso to paragraph 1 of the Schedule to Cap. 338 states that the tribunal shall not have jurisdiction to hear and determine "any action in respect of— (i) defamation". And legal aid is not available for one: Schedule 2 Part 2 to the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91) lists as excepted proceedings "Proceedings wholly or partly in respect of— (a) defamation, other than the defence of a counterclaim alleging defamation." Both exclusions are specific to defamation and do not generalise to the other categories; what the legal aid scheme does cover is set out above.

Tenancy letters: Part IV reaches domestic tenancies only — Part III does not stop there

Take Part III first, because it is the one procedure in this whole article that can reach a tenant's goods without a writ and without a judgment, and it is not confined to domestic tenancies. Section 77: "The court shall have jurisdiction to issue warrants of distress for arrears of rent in all cases, without respect to the value of the property on which the rent is to be levied and without respect to the amount of rent to be levied." Section 81: "Any person claiming to be entitled to arrears of rent, or his duly constituted attorney or agent, may apply for a warrant." Section 82 requires that "Every application for a warrant shall be supported by an affidavit in Form 1 in the Fifth Schedule , sworn in like manner as other affidavits in the court." Section 83:

Section 87 then provides that "In pursuance of a warrant, a bailiff shall seize the movable property found in or upon the house or premises mentioned in the warrant, and in the apparent possession of the person from whom the rent is claimed, or such part thereof as may, in the bailiff's judgment, be sufficient to cover the amount of the rent, together with the costs of the distress" — the bailiff is not obliged to seize everything found; a part sufficient to cover the rent and costs of distress is enough. Section 78(1) confines distress to this Part — "No distress shall be levied for arrears of rent except under the provisions of this Part" — but this Part needs neither writ nor judgment. The twelve-month cap in section 79, quoted above, is a limit on this warrant. So the real exposure created by ignoring a rent demand is not only "they might sue".

Part IV is a different matter, and its very first words qualify it. Section 116(1) provides that, "Subject to subsection (2), this Part applies to any domestic tenancy", and then that it does so "notwithstanding any provision in such tenancy, including any provision purporting generally or specifically to exclude this Part". Section 116(2) then lists the exclusions — tenancies to which Part I, II or IVA applies, land unbuilt on, agricultural land, employer-provided accommodation tied to employment, tenancies held from the Government or the Housing Authority or Housing Society, and written tenancies created after 18 December 1981 for a fixed term of five years or longer meeting the stated conditions, among others. Non-domestic premises — a shop or an office — are outside this Part, though, as above, Part III's distress procedure carries no such limit.

Within its scope, section 117(3) implies a series of covenants and forfeiture conditions into a tenancy entered into on or after 27 December 2002, running from limb (a) to limb (h). The two that bear on rent are (a) and (b):

So the real time pressure on receiving a rent demand may not be the number of days in the letter but fifteen days after the rent fell due. Section 117(5)(a) provides that subsection (3)(a) and (b) "shall have effect subject to section 58(4) and (10) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance (Cap. 219) (and notwithstanding subsection (14) of that section)" — that is, forfeiture is itself subject to a further statutory procedure in another ordinance, which this article does not go into. Only limbs (a) and (b) are set out above; limbs (c) to (h) use the same structure to imply three further pairs of covenant and forfeiture condition — on immoral or illegal use of the premises, on causing the landlord or anyone else unnecessary annoyance, inconvenience or disturbance, and on structural alteration without the landlord's prior written consent. That connects directly to the next line: section 117(5)(c) provides that "for the purposes of subsection (3)(e) and (f), the persistent delay of payment of rent is unnecessary annoyance, inconvenience or disturbance." But the two conditions are not the same thing, and they are not triggered the same way. The fifteen-day forfeiture condition under (a)/(b) is engaged by a single payment more than 15 days late — no "persistence" is required. The "annoyance" forfeiture condition under (e)/(f) requires "persistent delay" (section 117(5)(c)'s own words): a single late payment is not deemed annoyance under (e)/(f). So persistent late payment does trigger both forfeiture grounds at once, but a single payment more than 15 days late engages only (a)/(b), not (e)/(f).

What to do after it arrives

• Identify what you have actually received. If it is a statutory demand (Cap. 6 s. 6A; Cap. 32 s. 178), the three weeks are fixed by ordinance and an application to set it aside must be made within them. If it is a rent demand, read the Part III distress procedure as well as the letter.
• If it is an ordinary demand letter, you have the right to establish your limitation position before replying. Section 23(3) above: an acknowledgment or a part payment restarts the clock from that date, and section 24 requires only that the acknowledgment be in writing and signed, and allows it to be made to the sender's solicitors. It is the only statutory mechanism under which replying can make things worse. Note also that an expired period protects you only if it is pleaded (Order 18, rule 8(1)).
• Keep the envelope, the postmark and any record of receipt — not because of the letter, but because if a writ is later served by registered post or through the letter box, the presumption in Order 10, rule 1(3)(a) applies "unless the contrary is shown".
• Check each allegation against the facts, separating what is accurate from what is disputed. A false denial is not a neutral option: Order 62, rule 5(2)(a) and (b) put "whether it was reasonable for a party to raise, pursue or contest a particular allegation or issue" and "the manner in which a party has pursued or defended his case" into the costs discretion.
• Check whether you have a short statutory deadline of your own — three months for severance, twenty-four months for employees' compensation.
• Work out whether the sender wants money or an order. If the letter is about a restrictive covenant, confidentiality, or stopping you doing something, what is really being threatened is an injunction: section 4(7) of Cap. 347 disapplies the six years to an injunction claim, and Order 29, rule 1(3) allows an urgent application ex parte before the writ is even issued. That timetable is nothing like a debt letter's.
• If it is a defamation letter, the timing point in section 25 needs attention at once — but note where it actually sits: "as soon as practicable" is the statute's own wording in section 25(1)(b), one of the conditions for the defence that applies once a rejected offer is relied on, not a free-standing deadline for the act of making the offer itself. It is available only where the publication was innocent within section 25(5), and the offer must also meet section 25(2)'s formal requirements (expressed for the purposes of section 25, accompanied by an affidavit). Distinguish sections 3 and 4 as well: section 3's apology mitigates damages, while section 4 is a defence but only for a libel in a newspaper and only with a payment into court.
• If it is a rent demand, the date that matters may be the due date plus fifteen days, not the date on the letter.
• Decide whether you need a solicitor. A large sum, a limitation position near the line, litigation already mentioned, or an inability to tell which sentences in the letter are contract and which are statute — each is a reason to consult a practising Hong Kong solicitor.

If the letter is employment-related, our free severance calculator estimates the approximate figures under the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57); if it concerns a work injury, the work injury compensation calculator sets out the compensation items under the Employees' Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282). These give a general estimate and do not replace a solicitor's view on your case.

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